Can You Stand the Heat?
How Perceptions of Trustworthiness and Expertise
are Developed in National Security Advising

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Dedication

To my beloved wife, Carol, who has been my best friend, partner, and closest confidant since we first met more than 42 years ago. She encouraged me to pursue my doctorate, and her patience and understanding over the past three and a half years made it possible for me to complete this program. She read and reread every draft of every chapter of this dissertation, and her suggestions—as always—were invaluable in making the final version so much better.

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My parents instilled in me the love of lifelong learning, the importance of setting goals, and the ability to persevere in my efforts. Though they are no longer with me, the lessons they taught me as I was growing up undergird all that I have achieved.

The dedicated men and women of the military, diplomatic, and intelligence communities serve their nation every day, at home and around the world—performing their duties professionally, without expectation of any acknowledgment—while wrestling with some of the most intractable, dangerous and consequential problems imaginable. They provided the inspiration for my work.

Disclaimer

All statements of analysis or opinion are those of the author and interviewees, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or any of its components, or of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views. This material has been reviewed by the Defense Intelligence Agency to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

Abstract of Dissertation

Can You Stand the Heat?
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This basic interpretive study addresses the research question: What are the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders? Numerous experiences were identified that develop and maintain the perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise. The developmental trajectories of individual participants were consistently found to include four stages: (1) formative experiences that build reputation; (2) transformative experiences that expand horizons; (3) mid-level advising / mid-level principal experiences that refine awareness; and (4) strategic advising / national-level principal experiences that enhance effectiveness. Seven themes emerged that describe the characteristics of the developmental experiences: (1) they required a deep understanding of the adviser, the principal, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and one's own domain; (2) they demanded mental closeness between the adviser and the principal; (3) they were continuously built (and could be undone); (4) they involved higher order thinking skills; (5) they acknowledged the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level; (6) they involved a combination of cognition and behavior; and (7) they were both contextually and socially dependent. The study offers recommendations related to theory, practice, and future research.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Overview of the Study

This study was designed to gain an understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that developed perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, as seen through the lens of the Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) between the strategic adviser and the national-level leader. At the national level, leaders receive advice (while leading their own organization) and simultaneously serve as strategic advisers to other national-level leaders (e.g., the Secretary of State leads the State Department and the U.S. Foreign Service while also serving as the chief foreign affairs adviser to the President; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff simultaneously leads the Joint Staff and the U.S. armed forces, and is the principal military adviser to the President; the Director of National Intelligence leads the Intelligence Community, and is also the principal intelligence adviser to the President). Strategic leaders consistently identify their advisory function as their *most important role* (Bolden, 2014; Clapper, 2014; Jumper, 2012; Myers, 2014) or *one of their most important roles* (Casey, 2014), yet little is known about advisership at the strategic level or the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the dyadic relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders.

National-level leaders wield great power. They decide whether or not to go to war, negotiate treaties, promote or constrain international trade, lead a workforce of more than 4.1 million—nearly four times the total of the nation's 10 largest private companies (Forbes, 2014; OPM, 2014), and manage budgets five times the combined totals of the nation's 20 largest private companies (Boccia, 2014; Forbes, 2014). *Leadership* (and *leaders*) has been studied extensively (Schwandt & Szabla, 2007; Yukl, 2011) and the study of *followership* (and *followers*) is a growing field (Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014), but there is no similar examination of *advisership* (and *advisers*), despite the fact that strategic advisers have become ubiquitous across the Federal government (Radin, 1997).

The importance of wise counsel was recounted in mankind's earliest writings. The *Epic of Gilgamesh*, the oldest western literature (Mark, 2010), tells how the King of Uruk received advice from the council of the elders (Tablet 2) and later traveled to seek the counsel of the sage Utnapishtim (Tablets 9 and 10) (Thompson, 1928; van der Crabben, 2010). China's oldest book, the *Shu Ching* (Book of History) included two chapters on consultations between Emperor Yu the Great (founder of China's first dynasty) and his ministers (Legge, 1879). In his seminal work, Goldhamer (1978) looked across four millennia to describe the functions of the counselor to the king as "friend, educator, conscience, eyes and ears, executor, and adviser" (p. 8).

This interest in *how to advise* changed over time. Goldhamer (1978) noted that ancient Chinese, Indian, and Greek writers, as well as those in Europe during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, provided "thoughtful reflections on the advisory *process*," [emphasis added], while nineteenth and twentieth century advisers showed "a much greater interest in recording historical events than in pausing to reflect in a generalizing vein on their experiences…. They did not have the sustained interest in analysis that characterized many early [advisers]" (pp. 4-5). Goldhamer noted several reasons: earlier advisers traveled from court to court as counselors to various kings and princes, while modern advisers work only in their own nation; development of specialized social science disciplines constrained policy advisers from writing in those areas; and the decline of absolutism reduced interest in the relations of advisers to rulers ("the change from a king who was the prime consumer of advice and advisers to one who as a constitutional monarch is said to retain the right to *give* it" [p. 5, emphasis in original]).

In his study of scientific advisers in the American political policy process, Smith (1992) observed that America's experiment in republican democracy broke from the tradition of authority based on the divine right of kings to establish a government based on the free choice of enlightened citizens. Political legitimacy in the United States was to be established on the basis of "scientific reasoning, empiricism, and a neutral and apolitical expertise" (p. 12). Article II of the U.S. Constitution provided both that the President "may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices," and that the President could nominate and appoint such "Officers of the United States" only with the "advice and consent of the Senate." The positions of Secretary of War and Secretary of Foreign Affairs had existed under the Articles of Confederation, with both reporting to the Congress, as there was no executive branch of government. Fearing a strong executive, the new Constitution established that "Officers of the United States" were accountable both to the President and to Congress, a reality that applies to this day.[1]

[1] For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee requires all flag and general officers complete a confirmation form, which asks several questions to ensure they understand their obligation to provide their military advice to Congress, even if it differs from administration policy. The Senate will not confirm anyone if they fail to promise, under oath, to provide such candid advice. (Feaver, 2014) These questions include: "Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power? Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as ….? Do you agree to ensure that

Ward (1962) noted that the first Congress to convene after the adoption of the Constitution reestablished the positions of Secretary of State and Secretary of War (see also De Caindry, 1878). President Washington nominated Thomas Jefferson and John Knox for those posts, and received the consent of the Senate to appoint them (Senate History: Nominations). Washington initially sought to use the Senate as his council of advisers. Disappointed by their inability to provide timely advice, he "chose to develop a council of his own." Jefferson and Knox (with Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, one of Washington's staff officers during the Revolution) became his inner cabinet (Ward, 1962, pp. 113-114). In addition to advising on military and naval affairs, the Secretary of War was responsible for intelligence. Washington had relied on Knox as the "fountain of intelligence" when he provided information on the present and potential capabilities of the British during his tenure as the Secretary at War during the Revolution and again during Shay's Rebellion in 1783 and the Indian uprisings in the Ohio territory in 1785 (Ward, 1962). Thus, the need for strategic advisers in the diplomatic, military, and intelligence domains was established by the first President at the very start of our nation's history.

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testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?" (Senate Armed Services Committee, *Advance Questions for General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 26 July 2011)

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's confirmation form for the Director of National Intelligence and all Presidential nominees includes the following: "Describe in your own words the concept of Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence activities. In particular, characterize what you believe to be the obligations of the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence committees of the Congress, respectively, in the oversight process." (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees*, 20 July 2010)

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has no similar requirement for Presidential nominees to State Department positions or as U.S. ambassadors overseas (Polt, 2015). This may stem from the fact that the first U.S. ambassador was not appointed until 1893 (Office of the Historian, Department of State).

Statement of the Problem

History is replete with examples of successful strategic leaders failing as advisers because they are not credible in that role (e.g., General Jones as National Security Adviser [Marsh, 2012] and Admiral Blair as Director of National Intelligence [Fund, 2013; Ignatius, 2010]). The result can be a significant disconnect between policy makers and their advisers (Davidson, 2013), misperceptions (Weiss & Shanteau, 2001, 2014a), friction between advisers and leaders (Kassop, 2013), and the expansion of the Executive Office of the President at the expense of those who should perform the advisory function (DeYoung, 2015; Humphreys, 2014; Reich, 1997; Thrush, 2013).

The goal of an adviser is to effectively communicate their advice to a target audience (either an individual, such as the President, or a group, such as the National Security Council). Numerous studies since the mid-1940s demonstrated that effective communication depended on the credibility of the source (in this case, the strategic adviser). This credibility was originally viewed as unidimensional, dichotomous (high or low), and based on objective characteristics of the source. However, over time the orientation of source credibility theory changed to the interaction of the source with the audience (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969-70; Kelman & Hovland, 1953), because credibility also involved a reaction on the part of the target audience, which resulted in a *perception of trustworthiness* and a *perception of expertise* (Sereno, 1983; Umeogu, 2012). Kouzes & Posner (1990, 1993, 2007, 2012) showed that leaders must also demonstrate the same source credibility traits to their followers.

While perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise are the two main elements of source credibility, we do not know how these develop in the dyadic relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. This is not surprising, given the paucity of material on *advisership* and *advisers*. Policy advising in the government is touched on in the political science, foreign policy, and public administration realms (Barker & Peters, 1993; Burke, 2005; Davidson, 2013; George, 1972 & 2008; Peters & Barker, 1993; Pfiffner, 2009 & 2011; Redd, 2002). Advice given to specific strategic leaders is mentioned in biographies, memoirs, and autobiographies (such as Albright, 2003; Gates, 2007, 2014; Rice, 2011; and Rumsfeld, 2012, to name only the most recent). The broader topic of *advisership*, much less empirical studies about advising national strategic leaders on the use of instruments of national power to implement national security strategy and policy, is conspicuous by its absence from social science journals. Some literature focuses on the trusted counselor to the CEO in the private sector (Leontiades & Tezel, 1989; Lukaszewksi, 2008; Nadler, 2005; Nees & Greiner, 1985; Simon & Kumar, 2001), but not the diplomatic, military, or intelligence advisers to the President in the public sector. This study begins to fill that gap.

Purpose and Research Question

The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that developed perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the dyadic exchange relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. The context was the national security policy domain, with particular emphasis on the diplomatic, military, and intelligence instruments of national power. It sought to understand how the development of trustworthiness and expertise were experienced by individuals who have been both strategic advisers and recipients of such advice (e.g., both advisers and national-level leaders). The lens through which the interplay is examined was the Leader Member Exchange between strategic advisers and leaders at the national level. The research question is: What are the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders?

Statement of the Potential Significance of the Study

Notwithstanding the fact that advising is seen as the most important function (or among the most important functions) performed by national-level strategic leaders, we still know relatively little about advisership in general, much less advising at the national strategic level. Advising in the public vice private sector remains under-researched, despite the proliferation of advisers throughout the executive branch of the Federal government. Existing professional development programs designed to groom the most promising of the next generation of the nation's military and civilian leaders for service at the strategic level are silent on the critical role they will play as advisers. This study calls attention to the gap in our understanding of advisership and begins to fill it in a manner that will inform theory, research, and practice.

This research is *significant to theory* in several ways. It adds to the literature on source credibility theory by describing the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise, from both the perspective of strategic advisers and the national-level leaders who receive that advice; defining perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise at that level; describing the breadth of experiences which led national-level principals to perceive their strategic advisers as being trustworthy and having expertise; and describing the relative importance of perceptions of trustworthiness versus perceptions of expertise. It also adds to the leadership literature by extending LMX theory to national security advising and by expanding the behaviors discussed in LMX theory to include experiences, characteristics, and themes. Further, it adds to the literature of political science, military studies, and international relations by providing a better understanding of two aspects of the dynamic of advising at the national strategic level—perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise. Finally, it proposes the development of a theory on advisership at the national strategic level.

This study is *significant to research* in that it is the first empirical study of advisership at the national strategic level. It describes the developmental trajectory of experiences, over time, that are involved in becoming a strategic adviser, describes the complex and interrelated characteristics of those experiences, and proposes that the definitions of trustworthiness and privileged expertise used in research be redefined to reflect the context of the national security policy domain

This research is *significant to practice* by articulating the previously unexplored relationships between strategic advisers and national-level principals in the security policy domain, as well as by describing the developmental trajectory together with the characteristics of the experiences of advisers that allowed them to be perceived as being trustworthy and having expertise.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for this study (Figure 1.1) is set within the domain of national security policy advising. It includes as constructs the two components of source credibility theory: perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. Leader Member Exchange theory was the lens used to explore the characteristics of the experiences in the dyadic relationship between advisers and leaders at the national level that result in the development of those perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.

Figure 1.1. Conceptual Frame of the Study



The goal of an adviser is to effectively communicate advice to a target audience. Source credibility theory states that effective communication depends on the credibility of the source (in this case, the strategic adviser). Source credibility depends on two components: the extent to which the source presented valid assertions (described as their *expertise*) and the confidence with which the source considered those assertions to be valid (described as their *trustworthiness*) (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Schulman & Worrall, 1970; Whitehead, 1968). Credibility was originally viewed as unidimensional, dichotomous (high or low), and based on objective characteristics of the source, but this orientation changed to the interaction of the source with the audience (Berlo et al., 1969-70; Kelman & Hovland, 1953). In addition to the qualities and characteristics of the source, credibility also involves a reaction by the target audience, resulting in a *perception of trustworthiness* and a *perception of expertise* (Sereno, 1983; Umeogu, 2012).

Perceptions of the credibility of one source were not be identical for any two listeners or even for a single listener at different times (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976) because source credibility changed over time (Applbaum & Anatol, 1973). Kouzes & Posner (1990, 1993, 2007, 2012) showed that leaders must also demonstrate the same source credibility traits to their followers. McGinnies and Ward (1980) showed that dimensions of trustworthiness and expertise might have different weights in terms of determining source credibility. Thus, the two constructs framing this study were perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. The characteristics of the experiences in the dyadic exchange relationship between the strategic adviser and the leader at the national level that develop these two perceptions were explored through the lens of LMX.

Trustworthiness consistently appeared in a comparative analysis of the biographies and memoirs of more than 40 individuals who served as national-level strategic advisers from 1947 to the present.[2] The literature described how trust occurs when a party observes the actions of another and reconsiders one's trust-related attitudes and subsequent behaviors based on those observations (Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005). The complexity, volume, and speed of information with which strategic leaders must deal require that they are able to turn to advisers who are *perceived to have expertise* in the areas under consideration (Wirtz, Morello & Turner, 2014). The literature explained expertise as elite, peak, or exceptionally high levels of performance on a particular task or within a given domain (Bourne, Kole, & Healy, 2014). It was perceived as either something that was objective and measurable (the lens of expert performance described

[2] The current national security strategy process was established by the National Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security Council, Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency. The biographies, memoirs, and autobiographies reviewed are listed in References.

by Ericsson, 2014) or something that was neither objective nor measurable, but rather conferred via education or experience (the lens of privileged expertise described by Weiss & Shanteau, 2012, 2014b). *LMX* is a continuous, integrative, multidimensional, reciprocal, dyadic exchange relation developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles (the 'leader' element of LMX—in this case, the national-level leader who receives the advice) and those in followership roles (the 'member' of LMX—in this case, the strategic adviser) (Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Jacobs, 1970).

In dyadic relationships, perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise are experienced reciprocally (Kourzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012). Does the adviser trust the leader enough to 'speak truth to power,' and does the leader trust the adviser to do so? Does the leader perceive the adviser as having sufficient expertise to give meaningful advice? Does the adviser perceive the leader as having sufficient expertise to understand the advice being given?

The context of this study was advising within the national security policy domain. National security policy refers to how, when, and where the nation engages in the defense of territory, population, and natural resources (Hook, 2014). National security policy is implemented by means of various strategies (e.g., national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, national intelligence strategy). In the national security policy domain, strategy refers to the context-specific harmonization of the tools of statecraft to accomplish objectives in support of national interests. Hard and soft instruments of national power include diplomacy, intelligence, military, economic, financial, information, and law enforcement (*National Military Strategic Plan for the*

War on Terrorism, 2006). Strategy operates within international and domestic contexts, addressing threats to and opportunities for national interests while accounting for risks and costs associated with interacting with creative adversaries (Diebel, 2007).

Summary of the Methodology

The methodology was a basic interpretive study, conducted at the individual level of analysis (Merriam, 2009). The aim of this type of study is to understand the meaning a phenomenon (in this case, advisership) has for those involved, with that meaning being constructed by individuals as they engage with the world. To that end, this methodology aims to learn how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and the meaning they attribute to those experiences (Merriam, 2009). Historical documents, particularly memoirs, autobiographies, and biographies of individuals who served as strategic advisers at the national level, provided background for the study.

Participants were recruited from such groups as the National Defense University Foundation, the National Intelligence University Foundation, and the American Foreign Service Association. Study participants were individuals who have served both as strategic advisers to national-level leaders and as national-level leaders in their own right (depending on their own strategic advisers) within the diplomatic, military, and intelligence communities. Participants were individuals who served in these positions after September 2001, as the U.S. national security structure was significantly reorganized in response to the terrorist attacks on the nation (e.g., the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence). They were initially recruited from individuals known to the author, with snowball sampling then used to recruit additional individuals (Merriam, 2009).

Participants had retired from Federal service, which allowed them to speak freely and not be constrained by the duties of a current office. Maximum variation sampling (Merriam, 2009) was used in recruiting interview participants, thereby aiding in developing the broadest possible understanding of the experience of advising at the national strategic level through inclusion of multiple perspectives. Specifically, effort was made to include both career professionals in a given domain and those who were appointed to serve as strategic advisers / national-level leaders despite having no prior experience in that particular domain. Examples of the former included long-serving, career Foreign Service officers, military officers, and intelligence offices. Examples of the latter included political appointees chosen to serve as ambassadors, senior uniformed and civilian members of the Defense Department, and senior members of the intelligence community.

Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were the primary data sources used to answer the research question (Merriam, 2009). Two interviews of approximately 90 minutes each were conducted. The first focused on the participant's experience advising, while the second focused on their experience while being advised. Two interviews were used for two reasons. The first was the time necessary to cover all the interview questions and the difficulty of getting more than 90 minutes on the calendar of the participants on any given day. The second was the need to have the participants focus on their experiences as a strategic adviser and then to focus on their experiences as a national-level leader, which could be done more effectively in two different interview sessions. Data analysis included first- and second-cycle coding of interview transcripts, development of categories and themes, and interpretation. Trustworthiness practices included a reflexivity statement, use of a wide range of informants and maximum variation of participants, member checks, peer and chair review of transcripts from the first two sets of interviews, peer and chair review of coding of the first two sets of interviews, and use of quotes to provide thick, rich descriptions.

Limitations

This research study was bounded within the executive branch of the Federal government of the United States, and within that branch was focused on the national security domains of the diplomatic, military, and intelligence instruments of power. Transferability of the study's results to other organizations in the Federal government, or to organizations outside the government, or to foreign governments is largely an empirical question based on context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The study's conclusions may be transferable outside of the specific context, but such transferability will be limited by the extent to which dyadic relationships exhibit similar characteristics. Assessing such transferability will best be done by others who can evaluate their own relationships.

The study participants were selected based on meeting the criteria of having served both as strategic advisers and also being national-level leaders who relied on their own advisers, within one of the three domains, in the period after September 2001. The availability of qualified subjects limited the range of experiences that were captured.

Despite not having any direct affiliation with the participants, researcher bias could result from the researcher's enthusiasm for the topic (Merriam, 2009), as well as the researcher's own personal experience serving as a strategic adviser and teaching about this topic at the National Defense University, as noted in the reflexivity statement.

Table 1.1. Definitions of Key Terms

Term	***Definition***	***Source***
National security policy domain	How, when, and where the nation engages in the defense of territory, population, and natural resources.	Hook (2014)
National security strategy	The context-specific harmonization of the tools of statecraft (hard and soft instruments of national power, such as diplomacy, information, military, economics, intelligence, and law enforcement) to accomplish objectives in support of national interests.	Boal & Hooijberg (2001); Dieble (2007); Jacques (1996)
National-level leader	Individuals who lead national-level organizations and have the authority to approve a national-level strategy (e.g., National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Intelligence Strategy, National Military Strategy, etc.). This includes the President and the members of the Principals' Committee (cabinet secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence), as well as U.S. ambassadors, combatant commanders, and heads of national intelligence agencies.	While this term is used throughout the national security establishment, it is not defined in any one document. This definition is derived from the discussions of national-level leaders in the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), Title 10 U.S. Code, Title 50 U.S. Code, Joint Publication 1, Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Publication 5.0, and Executive Orders 12333, 13355, and 13470.
Strategic adviser	Individuals who provide advice to national-level leaders. This includes national-level leaders (who advise their superiors), internal advisers (both staff officers and others), and formal and informal external advisers.	Corbett (2014)
Leader-member exchange	A continuous, integrative, multidimensional, reciprocal, dyadic social exchange relationship developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles and those in followership roles.	Dienesch & Linden (1986); Graen & Uhl-Bien (1995); Jacobs (1970)
Trust	The perception of the degree to which an exchange partner will fulfill the transactional obligations in situations characterized by risk or uncertainty.	Bailey, Gurak, & Konstan (2003)
Source credibility	Effective communication depends on the credibility of the source, which in	Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland, Lumsdaine,

	turn depends on the extent to which the source is seen as presenting valid assertions (described as perceptions of their *expertise*) and the confidence that the source considers those assertions to be valid (described as perceptions of their *trustworthiness*)	& Sheffield, 1949; Hovland & Weiss, 1951-52; Schulman & Worrall, 1970; Whitehead, 1968
Trustworthiness	From the perspective of the trustor, trustworthiness is an objective quality governing the degree to which transactional obligations will be fulfilled in situations characterized by risk or uncertainty. From the perspective of the trustee, trustworthiness is an attribution of trust.	Bailey, Gurak, & Konstan (2003)
Expertise	The ability to accurately diagnose complex situations of ill-structured problems in uncertain conditions (expert judgment), make appropriate recommendations (expert prediction), and convey knowledge (expert instruction) within a particular domain. This ability is gained through education or experience, rather than repeated practice of a given task.	Weiss & Shanteau (2003)

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature related to the research question: What are the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trust and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders? It also reviews the literature on LMX, the lens that is used to explore the dyadic exchange relationship between strategic advisers and national level leaders. The chapter also addresses the context of the national security policy domain and advising at the national level.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The introduction discusses the search strategies for the literature review. The second describes and critiques the literature that addresses the context (the national security policy domain) and advising at the national strategic level, as well as the literature that underpins the conceptual framework (source credibility theory and its two components—perceptions of trust and perceptions of expertise, and LMX). The final section discusses inferences for the study.

Although advisers have become ubiquitous at the national strategic level (Radin, 1997), the subject of advising (much less advising at that level) is not well understood. The last book on the subject was published more than thirty years ago (Goldhamer, 1978). As noted earlier, policy advising in the government is touched on in political science, foreign policy, and public administration, and advice given to specific strategic leaders is mentioned in biographies, memoirs, and autobiographies, but the broader topic of *advisership*—much less empirical studies about advising national-level leaders on the use of instruments of national power to implement national security strategy and policy—is conspicuous by its absence from social science journals.

The paucity of relevant articles is apparent from two literature reviews. The first was conducted between May 2012 and January 2014 to develop an elective course for the National Defense University. The second was done using a computer-aided search and conducted between August 2013 and January 2015 at The George Washington University. The databases searched included EBSCO Business Source Complete, ABI/INFORM PROQUEST, Google Scholar, and Social Science Citation Index. The date range of the literature on LMX was from 1958 to 2009, with most of the literature in the 1990s /2000s. The earliest article discovered was Homans (1958), who began exploring the dyadic relationship as an exchange, though he did not focus specifically on leaders and members within an organization. The literature on reciprocal trust ranged in date from 1946 to 2012, with most of the literature in the 1990s /2000s. The earliest article was Heider's (1946) psychological research into interpersonal behavior, which provided the foundation of modern and postmodern trust research. The literature on perceptions of expertise ranged from 1946 to 2014, with most of the literature in the last ten years of that period. The earliest was de Groot (1946/1978), which explored the differences between expert and novice chess players. The debate regarding whether expertise should be perceived in terms of expert performance (based on objective, measurable standards) or privileged expertise (based on education and experience) dates from the period between 1991 and 2014.

For the computer-aided search, the general keywords used (alone and in combination) were *advisor* [or] *adviser* [or] *advising, counselor* [or] *counseling, strategic*

[or] *strategy, leader* [or] *leadership,* and *executive. Follower* [or] *followership, followership theory,* and *followership behavior* were also search terms, since Uhl-Bien et al. (2014) identified advising as a type of followership behavior. There were several hundred articles in peer-reviewed journals that included the word *follower* or *followership*, but most simply mentioned that word and noted the subject was not as well studied as *leadership,* and only one (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) identified *advising* as a followership behavior. Likewise, the term was used almost exclusively in relation to the private sector (e.g., the trusted counselor to the CEO as described by Nees & Greiner, 1985; Leontiades & Tezel, 1989; Simon & Kumar, 2001; Nadler, 2005), but not the diplomatic, military, or intelligence advisers to the President in the public sector. When narrowed to *followership theory*, the number of articles dropped to less than half a dozen. There were similar results for *followership behavior* (less than 10), *followership+counselor* [or] *counseling* (less than five), and *followership+strategic* [or] *strategy* (less than a half dozen). *Leadership+advisor* [or] *adviser* [or] *advising*, and *followership+advisor* [or] *adviser* [or] *advising* returned more articles (about 50 each for the *leadership* and the *followership* combinations). The term *adviser* was almost always used in a very narrow context (legal adviser, financial adviser, scientific adviser, faculty adviser, technical adviser, medical adviser, spiritual adviser) and had no reference to *followership* or *leadership*.

Using the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 1, this literature review begins by addressing the context (the national security policy domain) in terms of advising at the national strategic level. It then describes and critiques the literature that underpins the conceptual framework (perceptions of trustworthiness, perceptions of expertise, and LMX).

The Context: Advising Within the National Security Policy Domain

National Security Policy and Strategy

National security policy refers to how, when, and where the nation engages in the defense of territory, population, and natural resources (Hook, 2014). National security policy is implemented by means of various strategies (e.g., national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, national intelligence strategy).

At the national level, strategy refers to the context-specific harmonization of the tools of statecraft (hard and soft instruments of national power, such as diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) to accomplish objectives in support of national interests, within international and domestic contexts, by addressing threats to and opportunities for those interests, while accounting for the risks and costs of the proposed strategy and interacting with creative adversaries (Diebel, 2007). Modern concepts of national-level strategy in the United States resulted from decisions made in the aftermath of World War II in an effort to avoid mistakes made after 1919, when President Wilson's hope for U.S. leadership in the League of Nations was derailed. Those decisions shaped the modern world, resulting in the United Nations, Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, as well as the National Security Council, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency. They also completely reformulated how foreign affairs strategy and national security strategy were developed (Rothkopf, 2004; see also Baylis, Wirtz, & Gray, 2013; Kane &

Lonsdale, 2012; and Marcella, 2010). Due to definitional differences, social science literature does not address *strategy* as that term is used at the national level.

There is a hierarchy of national-level strategies, shown below (Deibel, 2007, p. 9):

- *National Strategy* includes the entire range of public policy—domestic and international
  - *Foreign Affairs Strategy* includes goals that advance the nation's external relations and interests
    - *National Security Strategy* includes goals that advance the nation's security interests
      - *Grand Strategy* encompasses the broadest planning for and conduct of war
        - *National Military Strategy* covers only the use of the military instrument of power

On the same level as national military strategy are national-level strategies for domestic and homeland security interests, as well as national-level strategies for the use of the diplomatic, economic, or intelligence instruments of power to achieve the foreign affairs and national security goals of the nation. National-level strategy guides policy formulation. The perception of the domain expertise of strategic advisers allows them to have a voice in providing the *input* to national policy. Policy includes statements and actions to implement strategy; it can be considered as *output*. Policy also drives the creation of strategy at lower levels. For instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff describe the *National Military Strategy* as employing the armed forces "to secure the objectives of national *policy*" (Deibel, 2007, p. 12).

Advising at the National Strategic Level

This section discusses different types of strategic advisers to national-level leaders and the focus of advice at the national strategic level. For the purposes of this study, national-level leaders include those who lead national-level organizations and have the authority to approve a national-level strategy (e.g., National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Intelligence Strategy, National Military Strategy). This includes the President, the members of the Principals' Committee (cabinet secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence), U.S. ambassadors, combatant commanders, and heads of national intelligence agencies. While the term *national-level leaders* is used throughout the national security establishment, it is not defined in any one document. The definition above was derived from the discussions of national-level leaders in the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), Title 10 U.S. Code, Title 50 U.S. Code, Joint Publication 1, Joint Publication 3, Joint Publication 5, and Executive Order 12333.

All of these national-level leaders are supported by strategic advisers, who fall into the four broad categories described below. Regardless of the category into which they fall, strategic advisers to national-level leaders focus on strategic matters (thus being differentiated from functional advisers, such as the director of human resources or the inspector general of an organization).

Categories of National-level Strategic Advisers

There are four types of strategic advisers at the national level (Corbett, 2014). The first includes strategic leaders (below the level of the President), each of whom simultaneously receives advice (as they lead their own organizations) and provides strategic advice to other national-level leaders. The second consists of the directors of the principal staff elements within the organization led by the individual they are advising. The third consists of individuals who are external to the organization, but formally designated as advisers to the leader of that organization. The fourth are informal advisers to national-level leaders. The focus of the strategic advice may be domain specific (e.g., diplomatic, military, intelligence) or overarching (e.g., should the

United States conduct a military raid on Abbottabad, Pakistan based on circumstantial intelligence information that Osama bin Laden is there, with all the consequences of such a raid). Each area is addressed in turn.

National-level leaders as strategic advisers. The requirement for national-level leaders to serve as strategic advisers to their superiors can be established in law, in executive orders, regulations, or directives, or by custom. Examples of strategic advisers established by law include the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (50 U.S. Code § 3023 and 10 U.S. Code § 151, respectively). Strategic advisers established by executive orders, regulations, or directives include the directors of various defense and intelligence agencies. The designation of strategic advisers based on custom rather than in any written order includes the advisory role of cabinet officers and ambassadors. In all these examples, the advisers also have the significant responsibility of leading complex organizations in dealing with very complex situations (Martinez, 2009; Uhl-Bien and Marion, 2009; Uhl-Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007)). Nonetheless, national-level strategic leaders consistently rank advising as their *most important* duty (Bolden, 2014; Clapper, 2014; Jumper, 2013; Myers, 2014) or *one of their most important* duties (Casey, 2014).

In the case of cabinet officers, the appointments are political in nature; there is no requirement that the incumbent have any expertise in the area for which they will be responsible (Cohen, 1996). Secretaries of State Powell, Rice, Clinton, and Kerry had no prior experience in the Foreign Service; Secretaries of Defense Gates and Panetta had no prior experience in the armed forces. The same is often true of non-cabinet officers who serve on the Principals' Committee. Of the five Directors of National Intelligence since the position was established in 2004, three had no prior experience in the Intelligence Community (Ambassador Negroponte, Admiral Blair, and David Gompert). Among those national-level leaders outside the Principals' Committee, the level of expertise varies. About half of the U.S. ambassadors are career Foreign Service Officers; the other half are political appointees with no prior diplomatic experience (Kelemen, 2014). Only among the armed forces is it a consistent practice to appoint only individuals with long years of experience to the most senior positions (Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chiefs of the armed services, and combatant commanders).

Internal strategic advisers to national-level leaders. The lack of domain-specific expertise by many national-level leaders is compensated for, to some extent, by the professional staff of their organization. Political appointees are outnumbered more than five to one by long-serving members of the Senior Executive Service, Senior Foreign Service, Senior Intelligence Service, and general and flag officers of the armed forces (Cohen, 1996). The directors of the principal staff elements serve as strategic advisers to national-level leaders. Examples include the principals on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), the State Department (such as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (such as the Deputy DNI for Intelligence Integration), and the Joint Staff (such as the J-5/Director of Strategic Plans and Policy). Each of these staff elements is governed by the internal regulations and policies of the executive Department or agency in which they exist.[3]

[3] Examples of internal directives that govern principal staff elements within the Executive Offices of the Federal government include DoD Directive 5111.1 (The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy); 1 Foreign Affairs Manual 041 (The Under Secretary for Political Affairs); Intelligence Community

In addition to the principal directors of their own staffs, national-level leaders have additional special staff elements dedicated to providing advice on issues of national strategy. Examples include the members of the National Security Staff (providing advice through the National Security Adviser to the President), the National Intelligence Council (providing advice to the Director of National Intelligence), the Policy Planning Staff (providing advice to the Secretary of State), and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (providing advice to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). As is the case with the principal staff elements, each of these special staffs is governed by the internal regulations and policies of their parent executive Department or agency.[4]

The individuals who serve either as principal directors on these staffs, or as members of the special staffs, consistently have extensive experience within the domain in question (Best, 2011a; Best, 2011b; Rothkopf, 2004). This provides a good example of the consistent use of individuals deemed to have achieved privileged expertise status, based on education and experience, in the positions of strategic advisers.

External strategic advisers to national-level leaders. Across the Federal government, external advisers have been put in place to provide strategic advice to national-level leaders. Examples include the nearly 100 Foreign Service serving as foreign policy advisers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and in the services (while remaining assigned to the Department of State),

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Directive 1 (Policy Directive for Intelligence Community Leadership); and Joint Staff Manual 5100.01 (Organization and Function of the Joint Staff).

[4] Examples of internal documents that govern special staff elements include Intelligence Community Directive 207 (The National Intelligence Council), 1 Foreign Affairs Manual 023 (The Policy Planning Staff), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1801.01D (for INSS).

and more than 500 military officers who serve as military advisers to the Secretary of State and to ambassadors around the world (while remaining assigned to the Department of Defense). These individuals normally function under a letter of instruction from their parent organization or under a memorandum of agreement between their parent organization and the organization where they are serving as a strategic adviser. Other external advisers are found in the members of the more than 1,200 Federal advisory committees and boards (so many that Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1972 and the President issued executive order 11686 to ensure openness, achieve a fair balance in points of view, and to guard against conflicts of interest [Smith, 1992]). There are 52 of these Federal advisory committees for the Department of Defense, 24 for the Department of State plus two for the Agency for International Development, and seven for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (GSA, Federal Advisory Committee Management, n.d.).

As with the case of the principal staff directors and members of special staffs, these external strategic advisers are consistently chosen from the ranks of individuals with significant experience in the domain for which they will be providing advice. While more than half of the U.S. ambassadors serving at embassies around the world are political appointees with no prior diplomatic experience (Kelemen, 2014), all foreign affairs advisers to the military are long-serving, career Foreign Service officers (Marks & Greenlee, 2013). Likewise, the officer serving as the military adviser to the Secretary of State is the Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (a three-star), and the defense attachés serving as military advisers to ambassadors around the world all have decades of experience in the armed forces (Brannen, 2013). This provides another instance of the consistent use of individuals deemed to have achieved privileged expertise status, based on education and experience, in the positions of strategic advisers.

Informal strategic advisers to national-level leaders. National-level leaders can call on a wide array of informal advisers operating outside of the official structure of the U.S. government (Gailmard & Patty, 2013; Newman, 2003). In some instances, these individuals provide strategic advice through a semi-formal advisory board, such as the members of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board, and the Foreign Affairs Policy Board. These exist to provide advice to national-level leaders, and are independent of formal governmental agencies. In other cases, national-level leaders turn to individuals outside of government whose expertise and counsel they value.

The very concept of informal strategic advisers to national-level leaders means that a wide variety of individuals, with varying levels of expertise, can be called upon (Gailmard & Patty, 2013; Newman, 2003). In some cases, they are individuals with long years of experience and great expertise; in other cases, they may have no experience or expertise in that domain. As an example, the co-chairs of President Obama's Intelligence Advisory Board in 2016 were Jami Miscik (who capped a 20-year career at the Central Intelligence Agency as the Deputy Director of Analysis—the most senior intelligence analytic position in the Intelligence Community at the time of her retirement) and Shirley Jackson (the President of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute—who had no experience in the Intelligence Community).

Summary of the Literature on Advising within the National Security Policy Domain

At the national level, there are a wide variety of strategic advisers who develop and communicate options to national-level leaders about how, when, and where the nation engages in the defense of its territory, population, and natural resources. These strategic advisers include other national-level leaders who advise their superiors while leading their own organizations; internal advisers, both staff officers and others within their organization; and formal and informal external advisers (Corbett, 2014). While functional advisers focus on narrow organizational issues (e.g., manpower, finance, information technology), strategic advisers address broad national and international issues. They advise on how best to harmonize hard and soft instruments of national power to accomplish objectives in support of national interests. Such advice must consider the international and domestic context, address threats to and opportunities for the national interests, account for the risks and costs of the proposed strategy, and evolve due to interactions with creative adversaries. Through the advice they communicate to national-level leaders, these advisers provide *input* to national policy (Diebel, 2007).

The goal of an adviser is to effectively communicate advice to a target audience (either an individual, like the President, or a group, like the National Security Council). The effectiveness of that communication depends on the credibility of the source—the strategic adviser in this case—with the perceived credibility of the source influencing the intention of the recipient to accept or reject the suggestion (Suzuki, 1978). To understand how an adviser's credibility is perceived, it is necessary to review Source Credibility Theory.

Source Credibility Theory

Source credibility theory states that effective communication depends on the credibility of the source (in this case, the strategic adviser). Such credibility, in turn, depends on two components: the extent to which the source is seen as presenting valid assertions (described as perceptions of their *expertise*) and the confidence that the source considers those assertions to be valid (described as perceptions of their *trustworthiness*) (Hovland et al., 1953; Schulman & Worrall, 1970; Whitehead, 1968). Source credibility is most important in situations where there are no instrumental distinctions between alternatives (MaatHovlandhuis, Rodenburg & Sikkel, 2004). Source credibility has been studied both as a unidimensional and a multidimensional construct. Those who approached it as a unidimensional construct found that enhanced source credibility led to greater attitude change; those approaching it as a multidimensional construct focused on the underlying dimensions, most often trustworthiness and expertise (Wilson & Sherrell, 1993). While most studies on source credibility were done in the areas of marketing, advertising, and the media, it is also applicable to counselors, public policy makers, and diplomacy (Mor, 2012; Pornpitakpan, 2004).

Interest in why propaganda was deemed sufficiently credible to change attitudes and opinions dates back to the time of World War I (Sproule, 1997), but source credibility theory itself is grounded in large-scale scientific studies of persuasion and attitude change conducted during World War II (Breakwell & Rowitt, 1982; Hovland et al., 1953). In the summer of 1941, a Research Branch was established in the U.S. Army's Information and Education Division. Its mission was to systematically assess the attitudes and opinions of soldiers. The Carnegie Foundation president, Frederick

Osbourne, was commissioned a brigadier general and put in charge of the division. Osbourne leveraged his relationships to enlist the aid of top social scientists. Dr. Samuel Stouffer (University of Chicago) headed the Research Branch, and he persuaded Dr. Carl Hovland to take a leave of absence from the Yale Institute of Human Relations to become the chief psychologist and director of experimental studies (Clausen, 1984; Schramm, 1997; Schwartz & Marsh, 1999; Sproule, 1997; Williams, 1989). Hovland's specific task was to study the effectiveness of the Army's "Why We Fight" films (produced by Frank Capra) in changing the attitudes and opinions of civilians who had been drafted into the Army (Breakwell & Rowitt, 1982; Schramm, 1997; Sproule, 1997). His experimental studies group conducted research from 1942-45, surveying and interviewing hundreds of thousands of soldiers to ascertain the causative factors that produced changes in opinions and attitudes (Hovland et al., 1953; Hovland et al., 1949; Lumsdaine, 1984; Sproule, 1997). They quickly determined that the films were effective, that there was initially a pronounced superiority in the amount of opinion and attitude change produced when soldiers saw the communicator (the narrator of the films) as "trustworthy" rather than "untrustworthy" (the difference tended to disappear with the passage of time), and that presenting a two-sided view (the counter-argument along with the argument) was more effective in changing opinion and attitude among the skeptical than was presenting just one side (Breakwell & Rowitt, 1982; Schramm, 1997; Sproule, 1997).

During the war, the sole focus of the Research Branch was on the war effort; little thought was given to publication or to potential scientific contributions. The day after Japan's surrender, General Osbourne called together the members of the Research Branch to determine how the data obtained during the war (all of which had been captured on

IBM punch cards) could contribute to social science (Clausen, 1984; Schramm, 1997; Sproule, 1997). The Carnegie Foundation and the Social Science Research Council made resources available to produce a four-volume series, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (1949). This series captured the results of the wartime studies of the Research Branch (Clausen, 1984; Sproule, 1997). The third volume (*Experiments in Mass Communication*), authored by Hovland, Dr. Arthur Lumsdaine and Dr. Fred Sheffield, contained the results of the controlled experiments they had conducted during the war (Uhlaner, 1968/1977).

Hovland returned to Yale after the war and continued his study of persuasion. Along with others who had worked in the Research Branch (such as Lumsdaine, Sheffield, Dr. Irving Janis, and Dr. Harold Kelley), Hovland formed the Yale Communication Research Program (Breakwell & Rowitt, 1982; Schramm, 1997; Sproule, 1997). After Merton, Fiske, and Curtis (1946/2003) published their study of the spectacular success of a war bond drive done by entertainer Kate Smith, Hovland and Dr. Walter Weiss became interested in the impact of source credibility on attitude change (Breakwell & Rowitt, 1982). During the course of a marathon 18-hour radio program in September 1943, Smith made 65 appeals (each of only one to two minutes) to about 23 million listeners. This resulted in $39 million in war bond pledges (Merton et al., 1946/2003), far more than earlier drives which had raised $1 million to $2 million (Breakwell & Rowitt, 1982; Morgan, 2013). Merton et al. (1946/2003) discovered that the sincerity of Smith's appeal (that is, her high credibility) stood out against the plethora of insincerity, phony appeals, and virtual frauds to which radio listeners had become accustomed. In 1951, Hovland and Weiss published an article that first used the term "source credibility" and examined the extent to which opinions were influenced by high- and low-credibility sources of information. The first detailed look at source credibility came in 1953 (Hovland et al.) and concluded that reactions to communication were "significantly affected" by credibility. The authors also noted that "it is not possible to disentangle the effects of the two main components of credibility—trustworthiness and expertise—but it appears that both are important" (p. 35).

Based on the work done during the Second World War (Hovland et al., 1949) and subsequent work at Yale after the war (McGuire, 1996; Schramm, 1997; Sproule, 1997), source credibility was originally viewed as unidimensional, dichotomous (high or low credibility), and based on objective characteristics of the source. Hovland conceptualized the audience of persuasive communication as being passive receivers of information from a particular source. Even before his death in 1961, this view was challenged (McGuire, 1996).

Over time, the orientation of source credibility theory evolved to include the interaction of the source with the audience (Berlo et al., 1969-70). In addition to the qualities and characteristics of the source, it was shown that credibility involved a reaction on the part of the target audience, which resulted in discussions of the *perception of trustworthiness* and the *perception of expertise* (Sereno, 1983; Umeogu, 2012). As Gass and Seiter (2009) noted, "credibility does not reside in a source. It is bestowed on a source by an audience" (p. 156).

Source credibility, in and of itself, does not produce opinion change. Rather, a source perceived as credible enhances the validity of the message, and a source that is viewed as non-credible attenuates the effect of the message (Anderson, 1971; Mahone, 2014). Arguments from sources perceived as non-credible are more likely to be dismissed, whereas arguments from sources deemed to be credible are more likely to be accepted (Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The influence of experts on opinion formation has been shown to exceed that of peers (Kumkale, Albarracín & Seignouriel, 2010), though "source credibility has a much stronger influence on attitudes when message recipients form attitudes toward new topics than when they change attitudes toward well-known topics" (Albarracín & Vargas, 2010, p. 410, emphasis added). The effect of source credibility is stronger when the source is shown to be credible before the message arguments are made, and more likely to be superficial and short-lived if the source's credibility is presented after the arguments (Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004). However, source credibility has an impact even if it is presented after individuals have formed a response to a message based solely on the strength of the argument presented. Where a strong argument is seen to have come from a high-credibility source, it leads to an even more favorable attitude. However, when a weak argument is shown to come from a high-credibility source, it results in even less persuasion (Tormala, Briñol & Petty, 2006).

Source credibility changes over time (Applbaum & Anatol, 1973). As a result, the perceptions of the credibility of a particular source would not be identical for any two listeners or even for a single listener at different times (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976). In addition, Kouzes & Posner (1990, 1993, 2007, 2012) showed that leaders must also demonstrate the same source credibility traits to their followers. Finally, McGinnies and Ward (1980) showed that while a source perceived as being both trustworthy and expert elicited the most opinion change, the dimensions of trustworthiness and expertise have different weights in terms of determining source credibility. A source perceived as trustworthy was more influential than one perceived as untrustworthy, regardless of the perceive expertise (McGinnies & Ward, 1980). This was consistent with an earlier quantitative study (Whitehead, 1968) that indicated trustworthiness was consistently the first factor to emerge in descriptions of high credibility, and that a trustworthy source could be perceived as being competent even if they were not an expert. This finding was reinforced by a later quantitative study (Lui & Standing, 1989) that demonstrated a source perceived to be trustworthy (but with no apparent expertise) enjoyed high credibility, whereas a source perceived as having expertise (but not high trustworthiness) had no more impact than a neutral speaker (that is, someone with no expertise). However, other studies showed that trustworthiness alone was not enough or was less important than expertise (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993).

Perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise are evaluated differently. Expertise is evaluated cognitively (finding reasons someone or something is credible). Depending on the situation, trustworthiness can be evaluated either cognitively or affectively (emotional feelings that someone or something is credible) (Maathuis, Rodenburg & Sikkel, 2004).

The two constructs framing this study are the components of source credibility: *perceptions of trustworthiness* and *perceptions of expertise*. The next two sections review the literature on perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. The character of the experiences in the dyadic exchange relationship between the strategic adviser and the national-level leader that develop these two perceptions is then explored through the lens of LMX.

Perceptions of Trustworthiness

The dictionary defines *trustworthiness* simply as being worthy of trust or dependable (Collins, 2015; Merriam-Webster, 2015). The terms *trust* and *trustworthiness* are used interchangeably in the literature (Smith, 2007) and, within source credibility literature, the terms *reliability* or *safety* are sometimes substituted for trustworthiness (Maathuis et al., 2004; Whitehead, 1968). Bailey, Gurak, and Konstan (2003) differentiated trustworthiness from the perspectives of the trustor and that of the trustee. For the trustor, it was an "objective quality governing the degree to which transactional obligations will be fulfilled in situations characterized by risk or uncertainty." For the trustee, it was "an attribution of trust" (p. 313). The literature on the credibility of a source who is trying to communicate an idea does not define the term *trustworthiness*, but uses it to reflect "the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid" (Whitehead, 1968, p. 59) or "the degree to which an object [the communicator] is considered to be an honest source of information" (Maathuis et al., 2004). This was originally based on objective characteristics of the source, but evolved to consider the interaction of the source with the target audience (Berlo et al., 1969-70), and the reaction of the audience to the source, which resulted in a *perception of trustworthiness* which "resides in the audience" (Sereno, 1983, p. 532). Such perceptions change over time (Applbaum & Anatol, 1973) and perceptions of the credibility of a particular source are not identical for any two listeners, or even for a single listener at different times (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976).

Kouzes and Posner (1990, 1993, 2007, 2012) showed that perceptions of credibility flow in both directions between leaders and followers, and argued that leaders must also be perceived as trustworthy by their followers. As noted earlier, perceptions of trustworthiness are experienced reciprocally in the relationship between the strategic adviser and the national-level leader (Kourzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012). Does the adviser trust the leader enough to 'speak truth to power,' and does the leader trust the adviser to do so?

This section addresses the various theories of trust, discusses the seminal roots and evolution of the theory of reciprocal trust, presents three influences on the formation of reciprocal trust (relative power, risk, and time), and describes the key debates in the literature (whether or not it takes time to develop reciprocal trust, and how quickly such trust can be destroyed). It concludes with a discussion of the interplay between perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise.

Situating Reciprocal Trust within Trust Theories

Many definitions exist for what is meant by the word *trust*. Wagoner (1999) identified more than forty definitions; several of the most significant are shown in Table 2.1, below. Wagoner found several common or closely related components or factors across the various definitions, including ability, expertness or competence, intention, honesty or integrity, reliability, consistency or dependability, openness, predictability, and benevolence or concern. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) noted trust is not necessarily mutual—it can be asynchronous (i.e.., trust can be reciprocal or unilateral). As the definitions in Table 2.1 show, trust is defined using other terms, rather than as a term on its own.

Reciprocal trust is defined as trust which results when a party observes the actions of another and reconsiders one's trust-related attitudes and subsequent behaviors based on those observations (Serva et al., 2005). Reciprocal trust refers to two users trusting each

Table 2.1. Definitions of Trust

(Adapted from Wagoner, C.J. (1999), A context dependent theory of trust: A resolution of the definitional conundrum? *Proceedings of the Conference on Human and Organizational Studies – September 19, 1999.* George Washington University Center for the Study of Learning [Table 1])

Researcher(s)/Date	***Definition of Trust***
Deutsch (1958)	"An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequence if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed" (p. 266).
Wrightsman (1964)	Trustworthiness is "the extent to which people are seen as moral, honest, and reliable" (p. 744).
Farris, Senner, & Butterfield (1973)	Trust is "a personality trait of people interacting with the peripheral environment of an organization" (p. 145).
Schlenker, Helm, & Tedeschi (1973)	"[I]nterpersonal trust may be defined as a reliance upon information received from another person about uncertain environmental states and their accompanying outcomes in a risky situation" (p. 419).
Butler & Cantrell (1984)	"...multidimensional nature of trust..."; "...five dimensions of trust..."; "The dimensions include (a) integrity, honesty and truthfulness; (b) competence, technical and interpersonal knowledge and skills required to do one's job; (c) consistency, reliability, predictability, and good judgment in handling situations; (d) loyalty or benevolent motives, willingness to protect and save face for a person; (e) openness or mental accessibility, willingness to share ideas and information freely" (p. 19).
Zucker (1986)	"From a sociological perspective, trust is defined as a set of expectations shared by all those involved in an exchange" (p. 54).
Shapiro (1987)	"Trust is a social relationship in which principals—for whatever reason or state of mind—invest resources, authority, or responsibility in another to act on their behalf for some uncertain future return" (p. 626).
Bradach & Eccles (1989)	"Trust is a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one's exchange partner will act opportunistically" (p. 104).
Michalos (1990)	"...Trust as a relatively informed attitude or propensity to allow oneself and perhaps others to be vulnerable to harm in the interests of some perceived greater good" (p. 619).
Sitkin & Roth (1993)	Trust refers to "belief in a person's competence to perform a specific task under specific circumstances..." (p. 373).
Mayer et al., (1995)	"...Trust... is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (p. 712).
McKnight, Cummings & Chervany (1998)	"...Trust ...means that one believes in, and is willing to depend on, another party" (p. 474).

other, and usually represents a stronger relationship between the connected users than unilateral (one-way) trust (Viet-An, Ee-Peng, Hwee-Hoon, Jing, & Aixin, 2010).

Trust has been conceptualized differently when applied at the individual, team, or organizational level,with most literature focused on the individual level (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Reciprocal trust has been shown to exist at both the individual and team levels (Serva et al., 2005).

Seminal Roots and Evolution of Reciprocal Trust

As Wagoner (1999) noted, the construct of trust has received attention from scholars in many relevant disciplines over the past 60 years, including anthropology, education, management, psychology, and sociology. Interest in trust also extends beyond academics, to include practitioners in fields such as human resources development, economics, health care, and customer relations. Wagoner observed that an enduring and defining characteristic of trust literature was the lack of consensus on how to define the trust construct, which reflects the complex, multi-dimensional nature of that construct.

The foundation of modern and postmodern trust research was the psychological research of Heider (1946), in which he described the relationships between two individuals as dynamic and identified positive or negative valance states. He postulated that a balanced state existed if all parts had the same dynamic characteristic (i.e., all were positive or all were negative) or if entities with different dynamic characteristics were segregated.

Deutsch (1957, 1958, 1960, 2000) explored the interplay between trust and suspicion. He provided one of the earliest definitions of trust (see Table 2.1). Using a quantitative study of college students playing a trust game, he demonstrated that the phenomena of trust could be captured and studied. Based on the results of that study, he described the circumstances under which mutual trust was likely to occur, including the role of communication, power, the influence of third parties, and personality characteristics on co-operative trust formation.

Rotter (1967) developed and tested one of the earliest scales by which interpersonal trust could be measured. He identified high-trust and low-trust individuals through a quantitative study using a questionnaire given to college students. The resulting scores related significantly to factors such as position in the family, socio-economic level, religion, and religious differences between parents, all of which were outside the reciprocal trust relationship at hand.

More recently, Butler (1991) conducted a mixed-methods study that identified conditions that influenced perceptions of trustworthiness in a relationship (such as availability, consistency, discreetness, loyalty, receptivity, etc.) and developed scales to measure them. Currall and Judge (1995) developed a multidimensional measure to assess trust between individuals who provide linking mechanisms across organizational boundaries. At the same time, McAllister (1995) used a qualitative study of managers and professionals from various industries to assess levels of affect-based versus cognition-based interpersonal trust in organizations and found strong support for the distinction between the two. Affective foundations included emotional bonds, while cognitive foundations constituted the "available knowledge" that allowed individuals to determine what constituted "good reasons" for affording specific trust to another individual in a particular situation. The author argued that competence, reliability, and dependability expectations "must usually be met for trust relationships to exist and develop … and evidence to the contrary provides a rational basis for withholding trust" (p. 26).

Also in the mid-1990s, research began on reciprocal trust (as differentiated from unilateral trust). Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) conducted a quantitative study of trust and reciprocity in an investment setting by playing a one-time investment game (no history) with pairs of students, and a second one-time investment game (using social history) with additional pairs of students. They observed that reciprocity was a basic element of human behavior which was accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart. When social history was added in the experiment, reciprocal trust increased.

Serva et al., (2005) conducted a longitudinal, controlled field study on development of an information systems project using questionnaires given to teams of systems analysts and design students. They observed that reciprocal trust can form at the team level, and resulted when a party observes the actions of another and reconsiders one's trust-related attitudes and subsequent behaviors based on those observations (including risk-taking behaviors).

Bijlsama-Frankema and Costa (2005) wrote that in intra- and inter-organizational situations where formal control mechanisms are inappropriate, reciprocal trust becomes increasingly important. This is significant to the study of national-level strategic advisers because there are few formal control mechanisms in place at that level. Their study was consistent with the work of Das and Teng (1998), which showed that trust and control were parallel concepts when it came to partner cooperation in alliances. Likewise, Sitkin and Roth (1993) demonstrated that legalistic remedies (a form of control mechanisms) were ineffective in restoring trust because they only responded to task-specific reliability and did not address value congruence.

Influences on Reciprocal Trust Formation

Several factors influence the formation of reciprocal trust. Among these are the relative power of the parties, risk, and time.

The influence of relative power. Trust differs depending on the relative power of the parties. Bonoma (1976) determined that trust differed depending on whether the power situation involved a strong source imposing influence on a weak target (a unilateral power system), partially equivalent individuals bargaining to reach agreement or deadlock (a mixed power system), or individuals formulating joint policy programs (a bilateral power system).

This is relevant to national-level strategic advisers who may operate in all three of these types of power systems. An example of the unilateral power system would arise in instances where the President overrides the recommendations of his strategic advisers and directs a course of action to which they are opposed. A mixed power system can be seen in the deliberations of the members of the Principals' Committee, where each member operates at an equivalent level of power and the goal is to reach agreement. A bilateral power system exists in deliberations between Combatant Commanders and the policy staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to jointly formulate contingency plans to accomplish the goals of the National Security Strategy. At the national level, there is often a disparity between the relative power of the strategic adviser and the recipient of that advice, though this is not always the case (e.g., Principals' Committee members have relatively equivalent power).

The influence of risk. Another influence on the development of trust is risk. Mayer et al. (1995) found that the tendency to enter into a reciprocal trust relationship is a function of the associated risk, noting that "the need for trust only arises in a risky situation" (p. 711). The authors also noted that there was no consensus on the relationship of risk to trust (e.g., is risk an antecedent, is it trust, or is it an outcome of trust?). Schneider (1999) similarly agreed that risk is related to trust formation while also noting that there is no consensus on *how* risk and trust are related.

Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer (2009) explained that trust is not synonymous with cooperation, confidence, or predictability— and differentiated trust by the extent of perceived risk involved in participating in the relationship, the control over the trustee, and the willingness or capability of the trustor to be vulnerable. Schneider (1998) argued that the tendency of a trustor to enter into a trust relationship was a function of the associated risk, described as the probability a hazard would arise and the consequences of that hazard. Low probability of a hazard (or low consequences) results in a lower trust risk (and an increased the propensity of a trustor to enter into a trust relationship); high probability of a hazard (or high consequences) results in a higher trust risk (and a reduced propensity to enter into a trust relationship).

By definition, national-level leaders deal with high-risk situations, where inaccurate, incomplete, or untimely advice can have dramatic and negative consequences (George, 1980; Hess, 1976/2002; MacGeorge, Feng, & Thompson, 2008; Porter, 1980; Sorensen, 2005; Walcott & Hult, 1995). In the weeks leading to the decision to go to war, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenent assured President Bush that there was a "slam dunk case" that Iraq had a viable, ongoing weapons of mass destruction program, and that there was solid evidence of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda (Woodward, 2004, pp. 249, 300-301). Both assertions proved inaccurate. Attorney General Eric Holder's and White House Counsel Craig's advice to President Obama resulted in his Executive Order (on his second day in office) directing closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo within a year and transfer of all unlawful combatants to the United States for trial. Both of which later were rescinded in the face of overwhelming Congressional and public opposition (Kassop, 2013).

The influence of time. Uslaner (2002) is asserted that trust formation between individuals unfolds over an indeterminate period of time. Jones and George (1998) examined how this happened through the interaction of values, attitudes, moods, and emotions between both parties. Adopting a symbolic interactionist perspective, the authors observed that people do not initially assume that the other party is trustworthy; rather, both parties suspend belief that the other's values may be different from their own and that they may not be trustworthy. The authors termed this "conditional trust." Successful behavioral exchanges resulted in positive moods and emotions. These, in turn, helped cement the experience of trust and set the scene for building greater trust. Negative moods and emotions accompanied unfavorable evaluations of the other party, and these signaled a lack of trust. Over time, parties may develop strong confidence in one another's values and trustworthiness, favorable attitudes toward each other, and experience positive affect in the context of the relationship. Once that happened, the reciprocal trust relationship was termed "unconditional trust." The authors characterized unconditional trust as abandoning the pretense of suspended belief because shared values now structured the situation. Trustworthiness has been assured because confidence in the other's values can be based on empirical evidence derived from repeated interactions. It must be noted that not everyone agreed that it takes time to be seen as trustworthy (Maister, Green, & Galford, 2001). The debate on whether time is needed to establishment of trust is discussed in the next section.

The issue of how long it takes to build trust is significant for those serving as national-level strategic advisers, because they are often assigned to those positions (e.g., an individual serving as the President's daily intelligence briefer, the ambassador serving as foreign policy adviser to a Combatant Commander), and usually must gain the trust of the leader in a very short period of time. Each President forms his team of advisers between his election and when he takes office, often beginning with a team of friends and personal loyalists—who are suddenly responsible for very different portfolios than during the campaign for office—and adding others, to include key opponents from the campaign or even members of the opposition party in an attempt at bipartisanship. Domestic and international crises, however, do not wait for reciprocal trust relationships to mature (e.g., the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the economic crisis that faced President Obama the day he was inaugurated).

Key Debates in the Literature

As noted above, there is disagreement as to whether it takes time to develop reciprocal trust. A related debate addresses the speed at which reciprocal trust—once established—can be destroyed. Both of these debates are addressed below.

The role of time in developing reciprocal trust. The most widely held perspective presumes reciprocal trust depends on information and experience, which can only be accumulated over time. Yamigishi and Yamigishi (1994) called it knowledge-based trust. Offe (1999) stated that reciprocal trust resulted from past experiences by the individuals involved in the relationship. Uslaner (2002) reiterated that individuals can only develop reciprocal trust in people they know. Individuals must interact over time to develop a trust relationship; a single encounter will not suffice to develop trust. Each successive cooperative decision increases mutual faith in the other party. Even while individuals are getting to know each other better, their mutual trust will be limited to what they know about each other at that point.

An opposing view was presented by Maister et al. (2001). Coming from a business background, where they had seen multi-billion dollar acquisitions made on the basis of a one-time, two-hour meeting between the two principals, the authors argued it was a myth that it takes time to be perceived as trustworthy. Of the four components found in their description of trust relationships, they argued that only *reliability* requires time (*credibility*, *intimacy*, and *other-focus* do not).

This raises the issue of the degree of reciprocal trust possible between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, some of whom have a limited (or non-existent) history of interaction. For example, a new President inherits the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation appointed by his predecessor. Similarly, a new Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense or Director of National Intelligence is advised by key professional staff they inherit from their predecessor, and with whom they may have no prior relationship.

The role of time in destroying reciprocal trust. Uslaner (2002) also suggested that trust, having taken time to develop, can be destroyed easily and quickly. A bad experience may not only destroy the reciprocal trust between two individuals, but might also lead either or both of them not to trust others in the future.

Maister et al. (2001) argued the opposite, asserting it was a myth that once trust has been established, it could easily be destroyed. They observed that in rich-trust situations, where credibility, reliability, intimacy, and low self-orientation existed, trust was not destroyed even by a grave violation (e.g., being able to forgive an adulterous spouse). It was only in thin-trust situations that it was possible for trust to be quickly destroyed (e.g., being billed by Amazon for a book that was never ordered).

This highlights the fact that the ability to establish a rich-trust relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders may be impacted by the duration of the adviser's tenure in that position. The fact that either the adviser or the leader is new to their position may preclude the establishment of a rich-trust relationship. In those cases, perceptions of expertise may play a role in creating a reciprocal trust relationship.

Summary of the Literature on Perceptions of Trustworthiness

Perceptions of trustworthiness are reciprocal in the dyadic exchange relationships between leaders and followers (Kouzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012). Research on reciprocal trust has been ongoing since the mid-1990s (Berg et al., 1995; Serva et al., 2005; Bijlsama-Frankema & Costa, 2005). The formation of reciprocal trust is influenced by the relative power of the parties (Bonoma, 1976), the associated risk (Mayer et al., 1995; Schneider, 1998), and time (Jones & George, 1998; Uslaner, 2002). Some argued that it takes time to develop reciprocal trust (Uslaner, 2002; Yamigishi & Yamigishi, 1994), while others disagreed (Maister et al., 2001). Likewise, there was disagreement regarding how long it takes to destroy reciprocal trust once it has been established.

Uslaner (2002) suggested it can be quickly destroyed; Maister et al., (2001) asserted that was a myth in rich-trust situations.

The literature supports a connection between perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise. Hovland et al. (1953) argued that credibility was dependent on both *trustworthiness* and *expertise*. Expertise (a critical characteristic of the trustee) was defined as separate and distinct from trustworthiness. Trustworthiness, in turn, affected credibility in dyadic relationships (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2009)—which could include the LMX between a strategic adviser and national-level leader—and indirectly influenced interpersonal performance (Dirks, 1999).

More recently, Solomonson (2012) explored the effect of several variables on trust as a mediator to relationship commitment in the context of a client-consultant relationship. One was the hypothesis that the *perceived level of expertise* of the consultant was positively related to *trust* by the client. The results of the study showed a moderate, positive correlation. As the perceived level of expertise increased, participants were more likely to be disposed to trust. While Solomonson's study focused on the relationship between consultants and clients in a business setting, it provided an interesting template for a similar examination of the relationship between trust and expertise between a strategic adviser and the national-level leader being advised.

Perceptions of Expertise

This section discusses the roots of the contemporary concept of *expert/expertise*, describes how expertise has been differentiated by types or dimensions, considers how experts differ from novices (in use of information, problem solving strategies, ability to 'see' things differently, epistemological standpoint, trust judgments, and behavior), addresses five misperceptions about expertise, and describes the key debate in the literature (whether the perception of expertise should be based exclusively on expert performance which can be measured, or more broadly on privileged expertise within a domain for which there is no objective criteria against which performance can be measured). It concludes with a discussion of the interplay between perceptions of expertise and advising.

Roots of the Concept of Expert/Expertise

The concept of *expert* has evolved—from "someone who is *expert* in a field" (a verbal adjective) to "someone who is *an expert* in a field" (a noun). *Expertise* is a much more recent addition to the English language.

The earliest surviving use of the word *expert* (used as a verbal adjective) in English appears in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* (which dates to 1392), with the meaning of someone who was "skilled" (Murphy, n.d.):

Of maistres hadde he mo than thries ten,	*more than thirty*
That weren of lawe *expért* and curious,	*skilled*
Of which ther were a duszeyne in that hous	
Worthy to been stywardes of rente and lond	
Of any lord that is in engelond,	

It entered Middle English from the Old French word *espert* ("skillful"), with an etymology that traces to *expertus*, the past participle of the Latin verb *experiri*, meaning "to test, to try" (Skeat,1898). In the early 15th century, the word began to be used in English as a noun meaning "a person wise through experience" (Harper, 2014). The word reappeared in 1825 in the legal sense, meaning "a person who, by virtue of special acquired knowledge or experience on a subject, presumably not within the knowledge of men generally, may testify in a court of justice to matters of opinion thereon, as distinguished from ordinary witnesses, who can in general testify only to facts" (Smith, 1910). By the 1840s, expert was defined as someone who was "skillful," having been "taught by trials" (Oswald & Keagy, 1840). It was only in the 1880s that the word acquired the modern meaning of "one skilled or thoroughly informed in any particular department of knowledge or art" (Whitney, 1889).

The noun *expertise* ("the quality or state of being an expert") has an even more recent origin, being imported into English in 1868 from the French *espertise* ("expert appraisal, expert report"). Its original use in English was closer to the French, with the meaning of "an examination by experts; a survey by a board of skilled examiners of any obscure or doubtful case in order to establish a foundation upon which the court may base an intelligent and definite judgment" (Smith, 1910).

Williams (1983) noted that the transformation of the word *expert* from an adjective, closely related to *experience*, into a noun was the result of the specialized division of labor that resulted from the industrialization of Europe and North America in the 19th century. Ash (2010), while acknowledging Williams' point that one could originally only "be described as *being* expert in a given art, but could not yet be labeled *an* expert in that art" (p. 4), nonetheless grounded the concept of *expertise* to a much earlier time, in early modern Europe during the Enlightenment, Renaissance, Age of Discovery, and the Scientific Revolution beginning in the 17th century. This is relevant to the study of the role of strategic advisers because many of the experts mentioned were providing advice to national-level leaders as the concepts of nation states was being established after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Goldhamer, 1968).

Carr (2010) proposed an adaptation of the meaning, writing that "expertise is something people do rather than something people have or hold" (p. 18). He noted that expertise was inherently both interactional (involving the objects, producers, and consumers of knowledge) and ideological (requiring hierarchies of value in order to legitimate how one knows who was an expert). Within the anthropological domain that Carr discussed, expertise involved both becoming intimate with something that was relatively inaccessible or illegible to laypeople and also being able to relay that publicly. This aligned with the views of MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995) regarding the importance of both tacit and explicit knowledge. While explicit knowledge is information that can be formulated in words or symbols and transferred by impersonal means, tacit knowledge cannot be formulated explicitly, and must be transmitted person to person. The "harder" the task to be performed (such as providing strategic advice on complex national security issues), the less likely it was that explicit knowledge alone would be sufficient (as MacKenzie and Spinardi noted, watching someone else ride a bicycle does not enable one to learn the skills of being a cyclist). Ericsson and Smith (1991) also differentiated between outstanding performance of a task and domain-specific expertise.

For the purposes of this study of strategic advisers to national-level leaders, expertise is defined as the ability to accurately diagnose complex situations of ill-structured problems in uncertain conditions (expert judgment), make appropriate recommendations (expert prediction), and convey knowledge (expert instruction) within a particular domain. Expertise is gained through education or experience, rather than repeated practice of a given task (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). This is termed *privileged expertise* (Weiss & Shanteau, 2012).

Differentiating Expertise

This section discusses several ways in which expertise is differentiated in the literature. This includes identifying multiple types of expertise, dimensions of expertise, and the differences between within-domain and between-domain expertise.

Types of expertise. The literature described several approaches to differentiating among types of expertise. Collins and Evans (2007) discussed contributory and interactional expertise. Contributory expertise was that of an elite who have the knowledge that allowed them to make substantial contributions to technical decision making. Interactional allowed others to engage with contributory experts to suggest alternative interpretations and critical evaluations.

Bourne et al, (2014) took a different approach to identifying types of expertise, articulating slightly nuanced meanings that varied in their emphasis on experience or constitutional factors as the source of high levels of performance. The term chosen to characterize superior performance carried with it an implied cause. *Expert*, *virtuoso,* and *master* resulted from hard work and long training. In contrast, *prodigy* and *genius* resulted from an endowment, which normally appeared early in life without the benefit of training. (The authors also included the term maven, but this has evolved from the original Hebrew meaning of "someone who understands" to now describe those who are intense gatherers of information and impressions, and so are often the first to pick up on new or nascent trends [Gladwell, 2000].)

Weiss and Shanteau (2003) took a still different approach to identifying types of expertise, focusing on four types of tasks that require expertise. Expert *performers*, such as chess masters or Olympic athletes or opera singers, have learned to *do something* better than most people, normally through thousands of hours of practice. Expert *judges*, such as doctors, have learned to *make diagnoses* more accurately than most. Experts in *prediction*, such as meteorologists or members of parole boards, learned to *forecast or make recommendations*. Expert *instructors*, such as university professors, have learned how to *train and mentor* novices and aspiring experts.

Dimensions of expertise. In addition to these different types of expertise, Collins (2013a) proposed three dimensions of expertise, rather than the one-dimensional approach that treated expertise as the property of special individuals who had devoted far more time than the average individual to specific skill accomplishments. This was similar to the contributory expertise described by Collins and Evans (2007) and the expert performers described by Weiss and Shanteau (2003). Collins (2013a) added two other dimensions: the degree of exposure to tacit knowledge of the domain and esotericity (the extent to which the domain is esoteric with ubiquitous domains). Collins (2013a, 2013b) argued that expertise can lie along all three of these axes (as depicted in Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Dimensions of Expertise



(Collins, 2013a, p. 257)

Within-domain versus between-domain expertise. In addition to the different types and dimensions of expertise, there are two other important differences. Shanteau

(2002) noted that there were significant and predictable differences in the expected levels of expert competence *between* domains, because experts in different domains performed different tasks. He also discussed (2000, 2001) why experts *within* a given domain disagreed with each other, arguing that what he termed the 'Experts-Should-Converge' hypothesis (consensus or between-expert reliability) was faulty due to both structural factors (how experts functioned in the real world) and functional factors (how experts thought about choices and judgments). Shanteau (2000) proposed a 'Multiple-Solution-Model,' which recognized that experts understood that complexity and constantly changing factors precluded a single correct answer. Alternate paths to desired goal states were possible, so agreement among experts within a given domain should not be expected, and disagreements should not be a reason to mistrust experts.

The issue of within-domain differences and between-domain differences among experts is relevant to the discussion of strategic advisers to national-level leaders because those leaders receive advice both from differing domains (for example, from diplomatic, military and intelligence advisers) and from within a given domain (the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders all offer advice on defense-related issues [10 U.S.C. § 113; 10 U.S.C. § 151; 10 U.S.C. § 164]). The result, predictably, is a lack of consensus among strategic advisers (George, 1980; Hess, 1976/2002; Pfiffner, 2009, 2011).

Weiss and Shanteau (2001) addressed this, arguing that *consensus* was neither necessary nor sufficient for expertise, given that history was replete with examples of false consensus (see Gardner, 1957; Janis, 1971, 1972, 1982). Weiss and Shanteau (2001, 2003, 2012) viewed *consistency* in an acknowledged expert's opinions as more important than consensus among experts, and argued the two most necessary characteristics of expertise were "discriminating among the stimuli within the domain" and "internal consistency" in how similar stimuli are treated by a given expert (2003, p. 104). They identified validity as a third necessary criterion, but noted it was "much more problematic to assess [because] direct measures of validity are seldom available" (2012, p. 305).

How Experts Differ From Novices

Experts differ from novices in a variety of ways. This includes how they use information to address problems, the problem-solving strategies they adopt, their ability to "see" things differently, their epistemological standpoint, their trust judgments, and their behavior patterns. Each of these is considered in turn, as well as the implications for advising national-level leaders, who may be novices regarding the topic.

Use of information. Shanteau (1992c) reviewed multiple studies comparing how experts and mid-level novices used information to address problems. Contrary to assumptions that experts should use more information and utilize more complex models to arrive at decisions, these studies showed experts often use the same or fewer significant cues and simple linear decision models. Shanteau concluded that expertise was not about *how much* information was used, but the *ability to separate relevant from irrelevant information in a given context*.

Problem-solving strategies. Sanchez-Manzanares, Rico, and Gil (2008) identified quantitative and qualitative differences in how experts and non-experts engaged in problem-solving strategies. Experts added constraints to resolve organizational design problems based on knowledge of key variables, whereas non-experts sought to transform the problem into a familiar task. Experts were also more likely to justify their proposals based on specialist knowledge, while non-experts either did not justify their proposals, or did so based on general beliefs and intuitions.

Ability to "see" things differently. "Novices see only what is there; experts can see what is not there" (Klein & Hoffman, 1992, p. 203). The reason experts can see things that others cannot is because they are able to see typicality, distinctions, antecedents and consequences which are missed by novices. Experts know what is normal and what is exceptional (seeing typicality), which is important for problem solving and decision making. They are significantly better at making fine perceptual discriminations (seeing distinctions). Finally, experts are able to visualize how a situation developed and will continue to develop (seeing antecedents and consequences), whereas novices have difficulty seeing anything other than the current situation because they lack a basis for anticipating changes or generating expectancies. This ability is important for arriving at judgments (Klein & Hoffman, 1992).

Epistemological standpoints. Luntley (2009) explored the qualitatively different epistemological standpoint of an expert compared to a novice. He argued that what differentiated an expert from a novice was not simply that the expert had much more knowledge of the domain, or even the qualitative difference in that knowledge and how it was used, but rather the expert's capacity for *learning* rather than *knowing*. "The expert is the subject who never stops learning" whereas a novice "has stopped learning [when they found an answer that appeared to be plausible], if only for the time being" (p. 367). Luntley argued that it was this capacity for learning that differentiated the epistemic standing of experts, rather than that they possessed more domain-related knowledge or used that knowledge differently.

Trust judgments. Lucassen and Schraagen (2011) conducted a study of trust judgments of domain experts and novices based on three user characteristics: experience with the source, experience with the domain, and informational skills. They produced a 3S model (source, semantic, and surface features). Results of the study indicated that applying any one of these three characteristics led to different features of what information was used. The study showed that trust judgments of domain experts differed from those of domain novices. Experts were observed trying to align their domain knowledge with their judgments about the information presented, with the result that the trust of domain experts was influenced by the accuracy of the information they were presented. When the factual accuracy of the information presented was manipulated, the percentage of experts who trusted that information decreased, while there was no change in the trust among novices.

Behavioral patterns or styles of experts. Shanteau (1987, 1992a, 1992b, 2014) identified behavioral patterns or styles that were observable in experts.[5] These included the ability to simplify complex problems, communicate one's expertise, handle adversity, and adapt to changing conditions, together with a strong sense of responsibility, self-confidence, creativity, experience, and problem selectivity (Abdolmohammadi & Shanteau, 1992; Shanteau, 1987, 1992a). Of these, creativity, self-confidence, and communication emerged as being of particular importance to recognition as an expert (e.g., perception of expertise) in a given domain (Shanteau & Peters, 1989).

[5] In correspondence with the author (October 2014), Shanteau said he had referred to these as *psychological characteristics* (1987), *psychological traits* (1992b), and *personal attributes* (1992a); he stated his objective was to describe observable behavioral patterns above and beyond the knowledge base derived from training or experience.

While behavioral patterns or styles of experts were clearly observable, they were difficult to measure, and numerous examples existed of individuals who demonstrated those behavioral patterns but were not experts (Shanteau, correspondence with author, October 2014). As a result, Shanteau (1992b) proposed what he termed the Theory of Expert Competence. After arguing that literature on judgment/decision making "paint[ed] a dismal picture of the ability of experts" (p. 253), while cognitive-science literature had "shown expert superiority over novices in nearly every aspect of cognitive functioning" (p. 254), he proposed a middle path. Expertise depended of five factors: domain knowledge (necessary but not sufficient in itself), behavioral patterns or styles (listed above), cognitive skills ("highly developed attention abilities, a sense of what is relevant, the ability to identify exceptions to rules, and the capability to work effectively under stress" [p. 257]), decision strategies (which help systematize decision making), and task characteristics (some tasks are far more difficult, even for experts).

While individuals serving in national-level leadership roles are likely to be generally familiar with sources of the advice they receive, they may be novices regarding specific domains (Campbell & Steinberg, 2008; Garrison, 2001; Garrison, 2005; McGraw & Pinney, 1990). Since the time of the Nixon and Carter administrations, "there has been a trend away from selecting experts [as Cabinet secretaries] and an increasing emphasis on selecting generalists whose primary allegiance would be to the White House rather than to their departments and departmental clientele" (Best 1981). This raises the issue of how a novice (non-expert) can comprehend whether someone actually has expertise in a field in which they themselves are not an expert. Berger and Luckmann's (1966) classic book on the sociology of knowledge posed precisely that question and concluded that "I require not only the advice of experts, but the prior advice of experts on experts. The social distribution of knowledge thus begins with the simple fact that I do not know everything known to my fellowmen, and vice versa, and culminates in exceedingly complex and esoteric systems of expertise" (p. 46).

These points are relevant to consideration of the importance of the perceptions of the expertise of strategic advisers, because those advisers may not be experts in the area for which they are responsible (e.g., the first Director of National Intelligence was Ambassador Negroponte, an experienced diplomat with no experience in the intelligence community, or Secretary of Defense Gates, who was an experienced intelligence officer with no experience in the defense domain, or Secretary of State Clinton, who had no prior experience as a diplomat). Individuals in national-level leadership positions (the President, cabinet secretaries, general officers, ambassadors, etc.) may be unwilling to yield to experts who defend their monopoly on a body of knowledge, especially when it conflicts with what Berger and Luckmann (1966) termed "natural attitude."

Misperceptions of Expertise

Over the years, Shanteau and Weiss identified five common misperceptions of expertise. One was that "experts should use more information than non-experts" (Shanteau, 1992c, p. 76). Instead, expertise should be perceived as the "ability to evaluate what information is relevant in a given context" (1992c, p. 83). A second was that "*consensus* (between-expert reliability) was a necessary condition for expertise" (Shanteau, 2000, p. 186), leading decision makers to view disagreements among experts (e.g., not presenting a single-answer solution) as evidence of incompetence. Instead, expertise should be perceived as the ability to "recognize patterns and find consistencies in a dynamic problem space" that involves "multiple, constantly changing factors" where "unique solutions do not exist" and there are "multiple solution paths" (2000, pp. 193-4). When it comes to perceptions of expertise, consistency of an acknowledged expert's opinions was more important than consensus among experts in a particular domain (Weiss & Shanteau, 2001, 2003). A third misperception among some leaders was that expertise was generalizable (Weiss & Shanteau, 2001). Expertise should instead be perceived as domain specific (Shanteau, 1992b) and varying significantly between domains, depending on whether the domain is more static—thus allowing for use of decision support systems, like weather forecasters, or more dynamic—like stockbrokers (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014b). A fourth misperception was to see expertise in domains as dichotomous; rather, it should be seen as a continuum and as something which changes over time (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014b). A fifth misperception was to think "someone who has demonstrated expertise in one of the facets of a domain will also be expert in the others" (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014b, p. 453).

Key Debate in the Literature

A major debate was whether expertise should be determined by *expert performance* (reproducible superior performance that can be measured), as advocated by Ericsson (2005, 2008, 2014), or whether that definition was so narrow that it encompassed only one of four different types of expertise. Three other categories (*expertise in judging*, *expertise in prediction*, and *expertise in teaching*) encompassed most professions where subjective judgments must be made, but cannot be measured using expert performance criteria (Shanteau, Weiss, Thomas, & Pounds, 2003; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003; 2012; 2014a; 2014b).

Expert performance. Ericsson (correspondence to author, September 2014) noted that while most early research focused on *perceived* expertise, judged by experience, reputation, and perceived mastery of knowledge and skill (see also Ericsson & Moxley, 2012; Williams & Ericsson, 2008), little relation was found between the perception of expertise and actual performance evaluated against objective standards (Ericsson, 2008). The *expert performance* approach was a direct reaction (Ericsson, correspondence to author, September 2014); it focused on why expert *performance* (by athletes, musicians, doctors, chess masters, etc.) differed from non-expert performance (de Groot, 1946/1978; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Simon & Chase, 1973), rather than on the more general *concept* of expertise or how expertise was *identified* or *perceived* by others. Ericsson and Charness (1994) endorsed the idea of *expert performance* based on extended, deliberate training (presupposing the domain of expertise studied was one where extended deliberate practice is possible).

Unlike sports, music, or chess (where individuals practice an activity thousands of times to develop expert performance), national-level strategic advisers provide their expertise "under uncertainty" (Johnson, 1988, p. 212) to address "ill-structured problems" (Voss & Post, 1988, p. 261), without objective standards to determine whether the expert advice was correct or incorrect, nor any way to deliberately practice the same action repeatedly over time.[6] Most examples of deliberate practice involve motor skills or perceptual-motor skills—not knowledge work like that required of strategic advisers

[6] While exercises are used to practice for specific scenarios (e.g., how would DoD respond to a tsunami along the Pacific Northwest coast or an earthquake along the New Madrid fault), simulations cannot capture the complexities of national-level strategic situations (e.g., how to respond to events occurring simultaneously in North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Russia—involving not only all elements of the U.S. executive and legislative branches, but also allies). (Conversation with the Director of Wargaming, National Defense University, 22 October 2014).

(Fadde & Klein, 2010). A means of addressing the sort of expertise expected of strategic advisers was the focus of the other side of the debate.

Privileged expertise. Shanteau (correspondence to author, October 2014) disagreed with the view that individuals could become experts by acquiring sufficient knowledge of a particular domain or by practicing a particular skill thousands of times. While domain knowledge and experience were necessary, they were not sufficient conditions for establishing expertise (Shanteau & Peters, 1989), unless everyone meeting those criteria attained expert status (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014a). Weiss and Shanteau (2012) discussed the concept of *privileged expertise*. Unlike domains in which expert performance can be regularly evaluated, they identified domains in which the work of *privileged experts* was "rarely, if ever, evaluated"; instead, their status as experts "is conferred via criteria such as education or experience" (p. 300). At the national level, strategic advisers are more often privileged experts (based on experience); they have no ability to repeatedly practice a particular skill due to the nature of the problems they are addressing (e.g., it is not possible to "practice" until you perfect the right advice regarding a course of action in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea or Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons or efforts by the Islamic State to gain control of portions of Syria and Iraq—once a course of action has been taken, it cannot be recalled) (Anderson, 1983; Gray, 2009).

Weiss and Shanteau (2012) specifically noted that rather than "thinking generically of people as *experts*, we prefer to say that a person has demonstrated *expertise* in a specific set of tasks" (p. 307, emphasis added). This evolution in thinking (from an *expert* to *expertise*) was analogous to the evolution from considering the traits of a *leader* to *leadership* more generally (see Schwandt & Szabla, 2007), and from thinking about the characteristics of a *follower* to *followership* more generally (see Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Understanding the dimensions and limitations of expertise, the commonly held misperceptions of expertise, and the differences between experts and novices are all important to the study of the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders.

Perceptions of Expertise and Advising

Strategic advisers must counsel national-level leaders regarding unique, non-reproducible situations where success or failure may be debated for decades—what Tetlock (2005) calls "quantifying the unquantifiable" (p. 1). For example, the advice to impose a peace constitution on Japan after World War II resulted in renunciation of the threat or use of force and creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) under the police, rather than as the nation's armed forces. While the JSDF does not threaten its neighbors, it is also unable to participate in counterterrorist missions with the United States, or protect Japanese interests abroad. Should the original advice be judged a success or a failure?

As Weiss and Shanteau (2003) noted, "experts are needed in precisely those domains where no correct answers exist" (p. 105). For this study, the concept of *privileged expertise* is adopted as most relevant to describe how national-level leaders perceive the expertise of their strategic advisers. Perceptions of expertise based on repeatable performance against objective standards are irrelevant to situations for which there is no objective standard and where the problem is non-reproducible.

In addition, because expertise cannot be defined in a way acceptable to all, only those *in* a given domain can define who are experts, based on their recognition of the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform at the highest level in *that* domain (Shanteau, 1987). Thus, the status of who should be perceived as a privileged expert can only be afforded to strategic advisers by others within the domain in question (e.g., military, diplomatic, intelligence).

Achieving the status of a privileged expert by a strategic adviser within a particular domain does not necessarily imply impartiality in their advice. Krishna and Morgan's (2001) study depicted informed experts offering advice to a decision maker whose actions would affect the welfare of all. Not surprisingly, the experts were biased in favor of their specific domain of knowledge. This is to be expected, as expertise should be perceived as being domain specific (Shanteau, 1992b) and to vary significantly between domains (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014b). Decision makers can reduce the effect of this bias by consulting multiple experts, presuming that all of them are not biased in the same direction.

With regard to Weiss and Shanteau's (2003) four types of expertise, strategic advisers to national-level leaders are best perceived as being able to accurately diagnose complex situations of ill-structured problems in uncertain conditions (*expert judgment*), make appropriate recommendations (*expert prediction*), and convey knowledge (*expert instruction*) within a particular domain (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003).

At the national level, strategic advisers are called upon to understand the nuances of complex problems for which there is incomplete information, forecast the possible outcomes and consequences of various courses of action, and convey that to national-level leaders (e.g., under what circumstances will Russia use military force against Ukraine and what should the U.S. reaction be, or is Iran negotiating in good faith regarding their nuclear program and what should the U.S. do in response) (Tetlock, 2005). Expertise is gained through education or experience, rather than repeated practice of a given task. There is no way to practice until one develops an expert level of performance as a strategic adviser. Complex problems, by their nature, only permit a one-time approach; the result of any action taken (or of not taking any action) alters the underlying problem from that point forward. Privileged experts were shown to be better able to forecast outcomes than non-experts by consistently discriminating between various stimuli in their domain and demonstrating consistent treatment of similar stimuli.

Summary of the Literature on Perceptions of Expertise

As with perceptions of trustworthiness, perceptions of expertise were reciprocal in the dyadic exchange relationships between leaders and followers (Kouzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012). Research on perceptions of expertise has been ongoing since the mid-1970s (Ericsson, 2005, 2008, 2014; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich & Hoffmann, 2006; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Shanteau, 1987, 1992, 2000; Shanteau & Peters, 1989; Simon & Chase, 1973; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Williams & Ericsson, 2008). Within source credibility literature, the terms *competence* or *reliability* or *qualification* are sometimes substituted for expertise (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976; Maathuis et al., 2004; Whitehead, 1968). Expertise has been differentiated by types (Bourne et al., 2014; Collins & Evans, 2007; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003) and dimensions (Collins, 2013a). Within-domain differences among experts demonstrated that an 'Experts-Should-Converge' hypothesis was faulty due to both structural and functional factors (Shanteau, 2000, 2001). In addition, significant between-domain differences among experts demonstrated that expertise is domain specific (Shanteau, 2002). Consensus was neither necessary nor sufficient for expertise; consistency in an acknowledged expert's opinions was important (Weiss & Shanteau, 2001, 2003, 2012). Differences between experts and novices have been discovered in the use of information (Shanteau, 1992c), problem solving strategies (Sanchez-Manzanares et al., 2008), ability to 'see' things differently (Klein & Hoffman, 1992), epistemological standpoint (Luntley, 2009), trust judgments (Lucassen & Schraagen, 2011), and behavior patterns (Shanteau, 1987, 1992a, 1992b, 2014). A major debate in the literature revolved around whether perceptions of expertise should be based only on measurable expert performance (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson, 2008), or whether privileged expertise exists for expert judgement, expert prediction, and expert instruction (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Research has uncovered and corrected several misperceptions. Experts should be perceived as being able to evaluate what information was relevant in a given context, rather than as using more information than non-experts (Shanteau, 1992c). Expertise should be perceived as the ability to recognize patterns and find multiple solutions paths within dynamic problem spaces, rather than that various experts should achieve consensus (Shanteau, 2000). Consistency of an acknowledged expert's opinion was more important than consensus among experts within a domain (Weiss & Shanteau, 2001, 2003). Expertise should not be perceived as generalizable; it was domain specific (Shanteau, 1992b; Weiss & Shanteau, 2001). Expertise should not be perceived as dichotomous, but rather as a continuum that changes over time (Weiss &

Shanteau, 2014b). Expertise in one facet of a domain should not be perceived as evidence of expertise in other facets of the same domain (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014b).

The literature supports a connection between expertise and trustworthiness. Hovland et al. (1953) argued that credibility was dependent on both *expertise* and *trustworthiness*. Expertise, a critical characteristic of the trustee, was defined as separate and distinct from trustworthiness.

Leader-Member Exchange

The first section of this literature review set the context of this study: strategic advising within the national security policy domain. The next sections explored the literature on the constructs of perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise. This section examines the literature on Leader-Member Exchange (LMX), the lens through which this study examines characteristics of the experiences in the dyadic relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. LMX allows us to understand the dyadic exchange relationship developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles (in this case, the national-level leader receiving the advice) and those in followership roles (in this case, the strategic adviser providing the advice) (Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Jacobs, 1970).

This section situates LMX within the various leadership theories, discusses the seminal roots and evolution of the LMX theory, describes the key debates in the literature (whether LMX should focus on single dyads or on larger groups / networks and whether it should be measured as having unidimensional or multidimensional properties), and explores influences on LMX relationships, such as member versus leader perceptions of

LMX relationships and leader versus supervisor perceptions of LMX relationships. After presenting a process-oriented model of LMX, it concludes with a discussion of the interplay between LMX and perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.

Situating LMX within Leadership Theories

Theories of leadership and followership have evolved over the past 150 years (Schwandt & Szabla, 2007; Yukl, 2011). The *person/role* view in the latter half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century was leader focused and prescriptive, emphasizing the traits and characteristics of great leaders (Carlyle, 1841; Galton, 1869). The *tools of influence* view in the second half of the 20th century focused on the sources and use of power and authority (Barnard, 1938, 1945, 1948, 1952; French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). The *situational accommodation* view explored how the relationship between leadership styles and the situation combined to produce task-oriented or relationship-oriented leaders (Fielder, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969, 1977; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The *relational processes* view at the end of the 20th / beginning of the 21st century shifted from a focus on the leader as an individual to a collaborative view of the interaction between leaders and followers (Fletcher, 2004). Leadership came to be viewed as "a dynamic that transcends the capabilities of individuals alone; it is the product of interaction, tension, and exchange rules governing changes in perceptions and understandings" (Lichtenstein, et al., 2006, p. 2).

LMX is a major theory within the view of leadership as a relational process (Schwandt & Szabla, 2007; Yukl, 2011). It is described as a continuous, integrative, multidimensional, reciprocal, dyadic social exchange relationship developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles and those in followership roles

(Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Jacobs, 1970). These relationships exist within and across organizational boundaries, develop over time (Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009), and are built on perceptions of the abilities, benevolence, and integrity of both parties (Brower, Schoorman, & Tan, 2000).

Seminal Roots and Evolution of LMX Theory

The roots of contemporary LMX theory trace back to Homans (1958), who explored the dyadic relationship as an exchange, though he did not focus specifically on leaders and members within an organization. Jacobs (1970) described how an exchange relationship between leaders and members expanded role theory beyond the role-taking process which Katz and Kahn (1966) had described as employees accepting roles prescribed by their employer.

Among the earliest studies of what became LMX were those focused on work socialization (Graen, Orris, & Johnson, 1973; Johnson & Graen, 1973) and Vertical Dyad Linkage (Cashman, Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Dansereau et al., 1975; Graen & Cashman, 1975; Graen, Cashman, Ginsburgh, & Schiemann, 1977; Rosse & Kraut, 1983; Vecchio, 1982, 1987; Vecchio and Gobdel, 1984). Contrary to earlier studies on effective supervision at Ohio State and Michigan, which had measured average leadership style across the organization, this research discovered that management processes often occurred on a dyadic basis, and leaders showed variations in style depending on the particular member of their organization and the specific situation they were dealing with (a “particular relationship position” rather than an “average style” [Graen, Dansereau, & Minami, 1972, p. 217]). Originally called the Vertical Dyad Linkage (VDL) theory (Dansereau, Cashman, & Graen, 1973; Dansereau et al., 1975), this was later renamed Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory (Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, research investigated and tested the dyadic relationship between leaders and members of organizations. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) categorized this as two lines of investigation: studies evaluating the characteristics of the LMX relationship and studies analyzing the relationship between LMX and organizational variables. In their review of LMX research from 1996-2006, Bernerth, Armenakis, Feild, Giles, and Walker (2007) also described two focal areas, though these differ from those identified by Graen and Uhl-Bien. One was *vertical dyad linkage* ("the degree of latitude that leaders grant members in negotiating work roles" after "leaders [have tested] subordinates through a series of role-making episodes in which subordinates demonstrate their competence" [p. 980]). The other was *social exchange theory* ("recipients of positive actions experience a sense of indebtedness," but "subordinates do not have to prove their competence or trustworthiness before engaging in exchanges" [p. 980]) (see also Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Bernerth, et al. (2007) noted that most research measured LMX using scales designed to assess VDL, not social exchange.

While those studies were about "in-groups" and "out-groups" (the differentiation identity originally identified in VDL theory), Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) reported that LMX research had begun moving to a focus on leadership making (Graen et al., 1982; Scandura & Graen, 1984; Graen et al., 1986; Graen et al., 1989). Rather than emphasizing how managers discriminated among their subordinates, leadership making looked at how best to work with each individual, one-on-one, to develop partnerships.

This happens as a process, with individuals moving from being strangers, to being acquaintances, and (sometimes) to being partners.

Most recently, LMX has begun to be viewed not as just a dyadic relationship between one leader and one subordinate, but as systems of interdependent dyadic relationships, or network assemblies (Scandura, 1999). This is consistent with the evolution of leadership theory to take account of the complexity of modern organizations, in which "leadership is characterized most often by a leader and multiple members working together in some type of interacting collectivity" (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1989, p. 233).

Key Debates in the Literature

There have been several debates regarding LMX. One was over whether LMX should be studied as single dyads of one leader and one member, or whether LMX should be expanded to include the study of triads, or of leaders working with several members, as in networks. Another debate was whether LMX should be measured uni-dimensionally or multi-dimensionally.

Dyads versus triads or networks. Early articles about VDL and LMX (Dansereau et al., 1973; Dansereau et al., 1975; Graen et al., 1982) focused on single dyads of someone more senior and someone more junior. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) argued that LMX should be expanded to include leaders working with several individuals, as in network assemblies. Offstein, Madhavan, and Gnyawali (2006) proposed introducing a triadic level of analysis of LMX, looking at competitive and collaborative interdependence, transitive triads, and the notion of multiplexity within LMX triads.

Dyadic, triadic, and network LMX relationships can be discerned between strategic advisers and those who are recipients of their advice. The President has dyadic LMX relationships with individual strategic advisers like the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, but there are also advisory LMX relationships with multiple individuals (e.g., the President receiving advice from all the members of the National Security Council). In addition, there are triadic advisory relationships, such as when the Director of National Intelligence presents the daily intelligence briefing to the President and National Security Advisor. There are also networked advisory relationships, as when members of the Principals' Committee serve as strategic advisers to their peers in other departments, and rely on their own network of strategic advisers, rather than just a single individual adviser.

Measuring LMX. As the theory of LMX evolved over time, so too did the instruments used to measure it. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) catalogued a wide variety of LMX scales, from two items (Dansereau et al., 1975) to sixteen items (Uhl-Bien et al., 1990; Wakabayashi, Graen, & Uhl-Bien, 1990). The addition of experimental items represented an attempt to test the dimensionality of LMX. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) concluded that the seven-item LMX scale, with the centroid item of "How effective is your working relationship with your leader?" was the most appropriate and recommended measure of LMX (p. 236).

The attempt to test dimensionality led to a debate on whether LMX should be measured uni-dimensionally or multi-dimensionally. Dienesch and Linden (1986) proposed that LMX was multi-dimensional (perceived contribution, loyalty, and affect). Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) agreed LMX was a multi-dimensional construct (their three dimensions were respect, trust, and obligation), but concluded these dimensions were so highly correlated that they could be addressed with the uni-dimensional LMX 7 scale. Others disagreed, and development of multi-dimensional measures of LMX (LMX-MDM) and supervisor LMX (SLMX-MDM) has continued (Linden & Maslyn, 1998; Greguras & Ford, 2006).

Influences on LMX Relationships

Regardless of one's views on whether LMX should focus on dyads, triads, or networks, and whether it should be measured uni-dimensionally or multi-dimensionally, it is important to consider what might (or might not) influence LMX relationships. Graen & Uhl-Bien (1995) noted that LMX changed the focus from the *characteristics* of leadership to the *dyadic relationships* between leaders and members. These relationships are not homogenous—rather, the social relationship between each member and his/her leader is unique.

To explore what might influence these uniquely individual LMX relationships, Bauer and Green (1996) reported a longitudinal test of LMX that examined dyadic gender and personality similarity, member performance, and leader delegation for new members and their supervisors. They found gender was not tied to the quality of the LMX relationship, and that good member performance may precede leader delegation. Similarly, Linden, Wayne, and Stilwell (1993) found demographic similarity between leaders and members had no significant effect, but expectations, perceived similarities, and liking were accurate predictors of the LMX relationship. Brower et al. (2000) presented a model that asserted the LMX relationship was built on perceptions of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of both parties, and those perceptions influence behaviors within the LMX relationship.

These influences on the LMX relationship are an important consideration at the national level, where strategic advisers often have little in common with recipients of their advice. During the Obama administration, the Director of National Intelligence, a 75-year old white, male, career military intelligence officer (DNI biography, 2015, dni.gov website), was the principal intelligence adviser to the National Security Advisor, a 52-year old female, African-American academic/diplomat (Susan Rice, 2015, biography.com website) and the President, a 55-year old male, African-American politician (Barack Obama, 2015, biography.com website), neither of whom had any military or intelligence background. The influence that the benevolence, integrity, and ability of both parties have on the LMX relationship is reminiscent of what was found in the discussion of perceptions of trust and perceptions of expertise.

Member versus leader perceptions of LMX relationships. Greguras and Ford (2006) noted that LMX research typically measured the perception of the *member*. They explored the *supervisor* perceptions of the LMX relationship, based on Linden and Maslyn's (1998) multi-dimensional *subordinate* LMX scale, and confirmed four distinct dimensions of the relationship for both leaders and members (affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect).

Strategic advisers can simultaneously serve as national-level leaders. For example, the Secretary of Defense leads the defense department and also advises the President on issues of national defense (10 U.S.C. § 113); the Secretary of State leads the foreign service and also advises the President on issues of foreign policy (22 U.S.C. §

2651); and the Director of National Intelligence leads the intelligence community and also advises the President on issues of intelligence (50 U.S.C. § 3024). In all three instances, they would experience LMX from the perspectives of both the subordinate (as strategic advisers to their superiors) and leader (as individuals who have their own subordinate strategic advisers).

Leader versus supervisor perceptions of LMX relationships. Graen & Uhl-Bien (1995) distinguished between *leadership* and *supervision* in the vertical dyadic relationships between superiors and subordinates. Supervisors perceive LMX as a transactional activity, using material exchange as the basis of the relationship. Leaders can move to a transformational level in the LMX relationship, using all the contingencies in the system with subordinates, thereby creating a long-term commitment from followers to the organization.

This is relevant to the relationships between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. Strategic advisers may have both leadership and supervisory relationships with different national-level leaders (Albright, 2003; Gates, 2007, 2014; Helms, 2003; Powell, 2012; Rice, 2011; Rumsfeld, 2012). An example would be the relationship between the ambassador who serves as foreign affairs adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but works for the Secretary of State, or between the general who serves as military adviser to the Secretary of State but works for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

LMX and Perceptions of Trustworthiness and Expertise

Perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise were reciprocal in the dyadic exchange relationships between leaders and followers (Kouzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012). Perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise were positively correlated to higher-quality LMX relationships. This line of thought dates back to the early research into the VDL theory. Liden and Graen (1980) included trust as one of the three ways in which leaders differentiate among subordinates in VDL relationships, the other two being competence/skill and motivation. Leaders and subordinates who trusted each other had higher-quality relationships than those who did not. In discussing the dimensions of LMX, Dienesch and Linden (1986) listed the degree of trust between leader and member first, with other dimensions being subordinate competence, degree of loyalty, degree of perceived equality of exchange, degree of mutual influence, and amount of interpersonal attraction.

Nahrgang et al. (2009) noted that reciprocal trust was significant to LMX relationships, with higher levels of reciprocity of trust in higher-quality relationships and lower levels in lower-quality relationships. The authors characterized higher-quality LMX relationships as those in which the exchange extended beyond what was specified in the formal job description. In addition to reciprocal trust, the other factors that were significant to higher-quality LMX relationships were interaction, support, and rewards.

Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995), in their review of 25 years of the development of LMX theory, made repeated reference to the significance of trust (and reciprocal trust) in the relationships between leaders and members. Currall and Judge (1995) developed and tested a way to measure assessed trust between individuals who were the linking mechanisms across the boundaries of organizations. This is significant to a study of strategic-level advisers, because they frequently function at the boundaries between their own organization and that of the individual receiving the advice (e.g., the State Department ambassador serving as the foreign policy adviser to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, or the defense attaché serving as military adviser to an ambassador). However, Brower et al. (2000) noted that the intersection between leadership and trust had not been adequately addressed, and asserted that the "assumptions and interests of LMX theory are closely aligned with theories of interpersonal trust" (p. 228). Subsequently, Martinko, Harvey, and Douglas' (2007) review of studies noted that "reciprocal relationships require trust" (p. 580).

Summary of the Literature on LMX

LMX is a major theory within the view of leadership as a relational process (Schwandt & Szabla, 2007; Yukl, 2011). It is described as a continuous, integrative, multidimensional, reciprocal, dyadic social exchange relationship, developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles and those in followership roles (Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Jacobs, 1970). LMX has been studied both as dyads of a single leader and member (Dansereau et al., 1973; Dansereau et al., 1975; Graen et al., 1982) and as triads (Offstein et al., 2006) or networks (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Various instruments have been developed to measure LMX, and there are differing views on measuring it multidimensionally (Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Greguras & Ford, 2006; Linden & Maslyn, 1998) or unidimensionally (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995).

LMX changed the focus of the study of leadership from the characteristics of leaders and leadership to the dyadic relationship between leaders and members (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). These relationships were built on perceptions of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of both parties (Brower et al., 2000), rather than on demographic or gender similarities (Bauer & Green, 1996; Linden et al., 1993). In addition to perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity, reciprocal trust has consistently been identified as being significant to LMX relationships, with perceptions of competence/ability playing a lesser role (Currall & Judge, 1995; Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Linden & Graen, 1980; Martinko et al., 2007; Nahrgang et al. 2009).

Summary of the Literature

This chapter reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature associated with the context of strategic advising within the national security policy domain, the constructs of perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise within source credibility theory, and LMX as lens that is used in this study to explore the dyadic exchange relationship between strategic advisers and national level leaders.

The LMX relationship between a strategic adviser and the national-level leader who is the recipient of that advice is tied to perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. Perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise are reciprocal in the dyadic exchange relationships between leaders and followers (Kouzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012). Likewise, though trustworthiness and expertise are separate and distinct, there is a connection between the two (Hovland et al., 1953; Schulman & Worrall, 1970; Whitehead, 1968). Trustworthiness affects credibility in dyadic relationships (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2009) such as LMX, and the perceived level of expertise is positively related to trustworthiness (Solomonson, 2012).

The importance of perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise in the reciprocal, dyadic exchange relationship with national-level leaders emerges from a review of the literature. However, these studies did not address the characteristics of the experiences that develop these two constructs as they are experienced in the relation developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles (the ‘leader’ element of LMX—in this case, the national-level leader who receives the advice) and those in followership roles (the ‘member’ of LMX—in this case, the strategic adviser). An adviser’s credibility is grounded on *expertise* and *trustworthiness* (Hovland et al., 1953). The complexity, volume, and speed of information with which strategic leaders must deal requires that they can turn to advisers with expertise in the areas under consideration, though the literature has revealed differing views as to how expertise is perceived (Ericsson, 2005, 2008, 2014; Shanteau et al., 2003; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003; 2012; 2014a; 2014b). At the same time, strategic advisers and national-level leaders consistently highlighted the importance of reciprocal trust (Bolden, 2014; Casey, 2014; Clapper, 2014; Jumper, 2013; Myers, 2014).

Exploring the characteristics of the experiences in the relationship between strategic advisers and the recipients of that advice at the national level that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise is the centerpiece of this study. At that level, advisers can be either ‘members’ of the organization they are advising—as when an ambassador advises the Secretary of State—or can have a cross-boundary relationship with the person being advised—as when an ambassador is appointed by the Secretary of State to be the foreign affairs adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Kelemen, 2014; Marks & Greenlee, 2013). In addition, strategic advisers must be able to transfer very complex information to the national-level leader they are advising. Strong LMX ties promote the transfer of complex knowledge between the two parties (Hansen, 1999).

Trust was positively related to reciprocal LMX relationships (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Martinko et al., 2007), such as the reciprocal relationship between national-level strategic advisers and individuals they are advising. A higher level of trust engendered a higher quality of LMX (similar to a higher perception of trustworthiness engendering a higher level of source credibility). Stronger levels of reciprocal trust were found in higher-quality LMX relationships and weaker levels of reciprocal trust were found in lower-level relationships (Nahrgang et al. 2009). Of significance to an exploration of reciprocal trust between a strategic adviser and a national-level leader was the observation that trust was not necessarily a mutual relationship (with either an implicit or explicit expectation on the part of both participants in the relationship). There can also be an asynchronous trust relationship, akin to a patient-physician relationship (Mayer et al., 1995). Studies also suggested that trust developed over time as the trustee and trustor observed each other and interacted (Ulsaner, 2002), though that concept was not universally accepted (Maister et al., 2001).

Perceptions of expertise are generally domain dependent (Shanteau, 2000, 2001, 2002). One might view a career Foreign Service officer serving as an ambassador as being an expert regarding the country in which he was serving, but not more broadly as an expert on the entire region, much less an expert on the diplomatic instrument of national power as a whole. For the purposes of this study, perceptions of privileged expertise are adopted as being most applicable (Weiss & Shanteau, 2012, 2014). The perceived level of expertise was positively related to trust (e.g., a higher level of perceived expertise engendered a higher level of trust) in relationships between consultants and clients in a business setting (Solomonson, 2012), and this study looks at whether this is also the case in the LMX relationship at the national strategic level.

Strategic advising in the context of the national security policy domain takes place in a reciprocal, dyadic exchange relationship between the strategic adviser and the national-level leader who is the recipient of that advice. The adviser attempts to communicate their advice to a target audience (either an individual, such as the President, or a group, such as the National Security Council). The effectiveness of that communication depends on the credibility of the source (in this case, the strategic adviser), and that credibility depends on the audience's perceptions of the expertise and trustworthiness of the source (Hovland et al., 1953; Hovland et al., 1949; Hovland & Weiss, 1951-52; Schulman & Worrall, 1970; Whitehead, 1968). Perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness are reciprocal (Kouzes & Posner, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012); the national-level leader perceives the trustworthiness and expertise of the strategic adviser, and the strategic adviser perceives the trustworthiness and expertise of the national-level leader. These perceptions vary depending on the dyadic relationship (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976)—for example, the President's perceptions of the trustworthiness and expertise of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will not be identical to the perceptions held by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State. They also vary over time (Applbaum & Anatol, 1973). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's perceptions of the trustworthiness and expertise of the President or Secretary of Defense evolve between their first day on the job and a point several years later. Finally, McGinnies and Ward (1980) showed that dimensions of trustworthiness and expertise might have different weights in terms of determining source credibility.

In a review of the literature, the connection between perceptions of trust and expertise emerged as contributing to higher-quality LMX relationships (Dirks, 1999; Dirks & Skarlicki, 2009; Hovland et al., 1953; Solomonson, 2012; Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1995). Noticeably absent from these studies was any discussion of the characteristics of the experiences that developed these perceptions in the LMX between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. Consequently, this study addresses this gap by gathering data from individuals who have served in those roles regarding the characteristics of those experiences in such relationships, from the perspectives of both the strategic adviser and the national-level leader.

Inferences for the Current Research Study

This final section of this review integrates the key outcomes that informed the methodology for the study. The purpose of the study is to understand the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the dyadic exchange relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders in the national security policy domain. With a better understanding of the characteristics of these experiences, it may be possible to help strategic advisers in the executive branch of the Federal government avoid failure.

The study is qualitative in nature, since the topic has not yet been investigated. Data collection focused on using the lens of LMX to explore the experiences, reflection, and conceptualization of the participants. Using LMX as the lens allowed the study to focus on the characteristics of those experiences in the dyadic, reciprocal relationship that was developed and negotiated between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. It also allowed exploration of how the characteristics of those experiences varied depending on the relationships between the adviser and the recipient of that advice, as well as how those experiences developed within organizations, across organizational boundaries, and over time.

The nature of the relationships between strategic advisers and the national-level leaders who are recipients of their advice calls for a *social interactionalist* perspective. This perspective envisions individuals negotiating their identities in a social context. Being designated as an adviser to a national-level leader is only the first step; the characteristics of the experiences that lead to the development of perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise are determined by the interaction of the individuals involved. As Cronkhite & Liska (1976) pointed out, the characteristics of these experiences probably differ depending on who is being advised (e.g., a combatant commander will have different experiences in his advisory relations with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and President). Applbaum & Anatol (1973) noted that even the characteristics of the experiences with a given national-level leader change over time (e.g., the director of an intelligence agency will have different experiences in his advisory relationships with a new Director of National Intelligence than he does once the DNI has been in position for several years). And a social interactionalist perspective also allows for the discovery of the reciprocal nature of perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise as seen from the perspectives of both the strategic adviser (what were the characteristics of the experiences that led to his perceptions of the trustworthiness and expertise of the person being advised?) and the national-level leader (what were the characteristics of the experiences that led to her perceptions of the trustworthiness and expertise of her advisers?). Discovering the characteristics of those experiences provides examples of how trust is gained and on what it is based, as well as how expertise is perceived, which can be woven into professional development programs. The research methodology for the study will be described in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Methods

Research Design

This basic interpretive study sought to improve understanding of *advisership* at the national strategic level. The goal was to gain an understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the dyadic exchange relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. The context of the study is the national security policy domain, with particular emphasis on the diplomatic, military, and intelligence instruments of national power. The understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders is based on descriptions of the experiences of individuals who have served both as strategic advisers and as recipients of such advice (i.e., both advisers and national-level leaders). This chapter identifies the research design, including study procedures to manage participant selection, data collection, data analysis, trustworthiness, and human participant and ethics precautions.

Epistemological Orientation

The study was conducted from an interpretivist perspective, based on a social constructivist epistemology. Knowledge is known through the subjective experience of people (Creswell, 2013). The interpretivist perspective assumes reality is an emergent, socially constructed process (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), that there are multiple interpretations of events, and a social constructivist epistemology recognizes these multiple meanings are negotiated socially through interactions with others (Merriam, 2009). In this epistemological view, the purpose of research is to describe, understand,

and interpret the multiple, context-bound realities of how the phenomenon being studied is experienced (Merriam, 2009).

Social constructivist research paradigms view humans as creators of their own reality, which occurs through social processes and culturally constructed symbols (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Reality is viewed as a social construction which can be understood and explained only from the perspective of those being studied. As a result, the basic assumption of the constructivist research paradigm is that researchers should attempt to understand that perspective (Schwandt, 2000). Likewise, the social constructivist paradigm recognizes that research does not exist independently from the values of the researcher (Mertens, 2010).

Qualitative research in the interpretivist perspective aims to understand how people interpret and assign meaning to their experiences and understand their environment (Merriam, 2009). The methodology used, with the aim of understanding the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the dyadic relationship between the strategic adviser and the national leader who is the recipient of that advice, is detailed in the following section.

Basic Interpretive Study Methodology

The methodology is a basic interpretive study, conducted at the individual level of analysis (Merriam, 2009). The aim of this type of study is understanding the meaning a phenomena (in this case, *advisership*) has for those involved, with that meaning being constructed by individuals as they engage with the world. The methodology was selected to allow the researcher to learn how people interpret their experiences both as strategic advisers and as the recipients of that advice, construct their worlds, and attribute meaning to those experiences (Merriam, 2009).

Participant Selection

Selection Criteria

Participants were selected from the pool of former public officials who served both as strategic advisers (providing advice to national-level leaders) and as national-level leaders in their own right (receiving strategic advice from others) in the diplomatic, military, and intelligence communities of the national security policy domain. Examples included members of the Principals or Deputies Committees of the National Security Council (e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence); ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries of State; combatant commanders and chiefs of the armed services; and directors of intelligence agencies. In each of these examples, the individual was simultaneously receiving advice while leading their own national-level organization and providing strategic advice to other national-level leaders.

Participants who had served in these positions were only considered if they had served after September 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. national security structure was significantly reorganized. This included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, September 2001 marked the transition from the so-called "peace dividend" that followed the end of the Cold War to a state of war, as authorized by Congress in their *Authorization for the Use of Military Force* (2001).

Participants were limited to those individuals who had retired from Federal service. This was designed to allow the participants to speak freely, unconstrained by the duties of a current office. Interviews covered only participant experiences as strategic advisers / national-level leaders while they were serving as public officials.

Recruitment Methods

This study sought to interview a total of twelve to fifteen participants drawn from the ranks of former public officials in the diplomatic, military, and intelligence communities of the national security policy domain (approximately four to five from each domain). These three communities are interconnected; at the senior level, individuals often cross from one community to another (e.g., a general subsequently serving as an ambassador or the head of an intelligence agency, a career ambassador becoming Director of National Intelligence, or a career intelligence officer being appointed Secretary of Defense). Maximum variation in recruitment of participants (Merriam, 2009) was used to develop the broadest possible understanding of the experience of strategic advising at the national level through inclusion of multiple perspectives.

The recruitment process began by using publicly available sources to compile a list of everyone who had served in one of the relevant positions since September 2001 (e.g., all former Directors of National Intelligence and heads of intelligence agencies, all former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and chiefs of the military services, all former Assistant Secretaries of State and key ambassadors). This list was refined to remove everyone still serving in the executive branch of government. It was further refined to remove those individuals who had moved away and did not regularly travel back to the local area (as the researcher did not have a travel budget to interview people living outside the national capital region). In consultation with institutions such as the National Defense University, the Foreign Service Institute, and the National Intelligence University, the list was further refined to delete individuals who consistently refused invitations, or who charged a fee for their time.

The researcher then did a search of publicly available information on each of the potential participants to gain a thorough understanding of their careers, the positions they had held during their careers, and especially their duties after September 2001. This allowed the researcher to extend the initial invitations to individuals who had experience in more than one national security domain (e.g., intelligence officers who had also served as ambassadors, military officers who had also led intelligence agencies).

From this final list, recruitment began with individuals who met all the criteria and who were known to the researcher. During the course of the study, purposeful recruitment (Merriam, 2009) included inviting both career professionals in each of the three national security domains, as well as those who had been political appointees despite having no prior experience in that domain, such as politically appointed ambassadors, non-career intelligence officers appointed to lead intelligence organizations, and politically appointed seniors in the Department of Defense. A deliberate effort was made to initially recruit one participant from each of the three national security domains addressed in this study, then a second participant from each domain, then a third participant from that domain, then a fourth. When the researcher exhausted the list of individuals for whom he had contact information, snowball sampling was used (Merriam, 2009) to recruit additional individuals in the three national security domains until data saturation was achieved. All of the participants, though retired from

Federal service, still worked in positions of significant responsibility (at various think tanks, consulting firms, in universities, etc.). Where the researcher had either an e-mail address or phone number for the participant, the invitation was sent directly to that individual. In other cases, the only way to extend the invitation involved working through their executive assistants. Once initial contact was made, all the participants were willing to interact directly with the researcher rather than going through their executive assistant. The invitation to participate and overview of the study sent to each participant can be found in Appendix A.

During the course of six months, invitations were extended to 26 individuals who met the criteria. Five of those individuals did not respond to the invitation, four responded but declined to participate, and one responded after the researcher had reached data saturation. The 16 who accepted are shown in Chapter 4.

Data Collection

Using Documents to Set the Context

Historical documents (memoirs, autobiographies, and biographies of individuals who served as strategic advisers at the national level) were used as background for the environment of this study. Not surprisingly, these accounts focused on advice given to particular individuals, rather than on the experience of advisership (Goldhammer, 1978). Notwithstanding that fact, the accounts provided a useful context for the study of strategic advisers at the national level.

Data Collection Process

Two pilot interviews were conducted during the B-level methodology course in spring 2015, which informed the development of interview questions for this study. The next step was to purposefully identify potential participants to achieve maximum variation and refine that list (as indicated below). The third step was to extend invitations to participate in the study. Mikecz (2012) noted that "the success of interviewing elites hinges on the researcher's knowledgeability of the interviewee's life history and background" (p. 482). To that end, once individuals had agreed to participate in the interview, the fourth step was to conduct an in-depth review of their biographical information to inform the researcher of specific instances when they functioned as a strategic adviser and as a national-level leader. As indicated in the selection criteria, all of the possible interview participants were public figures. Such individuals had well-documented biographies available to the public. Personally identifiable information about each participant was captured, but kept separate from the transcripts of the interviews. This information was keyed to the relevant interview transcripts, with that key stored with the field journal in a locked container to which only the researcher had access. Participants were afforded the choice of the interviews being conducted *in true name* (for attribution) or *using a pseudonym* (not for attribution), and this was noted on the consent form (see Appendix B). All of the participants agreed to be interviewed in true name and for attribution. The fifth step was to schedule and conduct two semi-structured, open-ended interviews (a third interview was found to be unnecessary). Participants were asked to avoid reference to specific individuals other than by title or position, rather than name. Any inadvertent references by participants to the names of individuals were edited from the transcript. The audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed by a third party (see Appendix F for the Transcribers Letter of Confidentiality). The transcripts were then reviewed against the digital audio recordings by the researcher to check for errors. Copies of the transcripts were provided to the participants to check for errors. The transcriptions of the two interviews with the first two participants were reviewed by a peer and the chair to check for any bias, leading, or incomplete probing on the part of the researcher, and the technique was modified as needed. Interviews with additional participants were continued until data saturation was reached.

Semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were the primary data sources used to answer the research question . Two interviews, averaging approximately 90 minutes each, were used. The first focused on their experience giving advice and the second on being advised while serving as a national-level leader. While the invitation mentioned the possibility of conducting a third interview to resolve any outstanding issues, this was not necessary.

Scheduling the interviews at a time and location that was mutually convenient for the participant and researcher was a major challenge. Without exception, all of the participants still are very actively engaged, travel frequently, and their free time was always very limited. To accommodate their schedules, the researcher sometimes had to conduct interviews early in the morning (7:00AM) or late at night (7:30PM), make last-minute changes to the planned date or time of the interview when the participant's schedule unexpectedly changed, or conduct an interview in the morning (with one participant) and another in the afternoon (with another participant) because that was the only dates when they were available. In most cases, interviews were conducted in a variety of neutral locations which afforded privacy and the ability to digitally record the interview. This posed a challenge in its own right, as the researcher did not control any of these venues and had to work through third parties to ensure they were scheduled and remained available. In six instances, the participant's daily calendar was such that they did not have time to travel to and from a remote location, so the interview could only be conducted at their private office.

Every participant was provided a copy of the respective interview protocol, including the list of questions, in advance of each interview. All participants expressed appreciation for the opportunity to reflect on the questions, and most came with notes to ensure they did not forget points they felt were particularly relevant. Surprisingly, several of the participants had gone out of their way to do an open-source background check on the researcher in preparation for the first interview, so they knew as much about the researcher as the researcher knew about the participant. In addition to the questions in the interview protocol, follow-on questions were used to delve into points raised by the participants, or to seek clarification.

Field journal. A field journal was kept throughout the data collection process. This allowed the researcher to identify reactions of participants that might not have been apparent from simply reading the interview transcripts (Merriam, 2009).

Saturation. Qualitative methodology literature provides little guidance for determining data saturation. Rather than aiming for an arbitrary number, qualitative research requires engaging with participants who best represent or have knowledge of the topic being researched. To that end, this study purposefully employed maximum variation in recruitment of individuals from three domains of national security policy (diplomatic, military, and intelligence) who had served both as strategic advisers and as national-level leaders (e.g., recipients of advice). By definition, qualitative research looks more for quality than quantity; more for information richness than information volume (O'Reilly & Parker, 2012). As Erlandson et al. (1993) noted, "There are no rules for sample size" (p. 83). The bulk of the literature indicates that qualitative research studies should continue to collect data until data replication or redundancy is reached. Termed the point of diminishing returns, this occurs when nothing new is being added and additional data only confirms those categories, themes, and conclusions already reached (Creswell, 2013, 2014; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006; Mason, 2010; O'Reilly & Parker, 2012). Mason (2010) noted that "as the study goes on more data does not necessarily lead to more information." While some specific sample size guidelines have been suggested (Mason, 2010; Morse, 1994), other authors point out that doctoral students often seem to collect an arbitrary number of interviews to achieve saturation rather than simply determining the point of diminishing returns (Guest et al., 2006). For this study, no arbitrary number of interviews was presupposed. Interviews with additional participants continued until it became apparent that additional collection was not adding anything new. Consistent with other studies (Guest et al., 2006; Mason, 2010; O'Reilly & Parker, 2012) this occurred after interviews with 15 participants (the 16th participant responded to the invitation at a very late date, and the researcher decided to conduct the interview because of that individual's seniority).

Data Coding and Analysis

This study followed Creswell's (2014) six-step process for data analysis. The first step was the organization and preparation of data for analysis, including transcription of interviews, reviewing field notes, and sorting and arranging data by sources of information. The next involved reading all the data (in a set of interviews and the relevant field notes) to obtain a general sense of the information and reflect on its overall meaning, depth, credibility, and usefulness. The third step involved coding, that is, beginning the process of organizing the material into categories and labeling those categories. Coding began after interviews were completed and participants had the opportunity to check the transcript for accuracy. Initial coding (making notations on transcripts and field notes of data that might be potentially relevant to answering the research question) and second-cycle coding (classifying, prioritizing, integrating, synthesizing, abstracting, and conceptualizing the initial codes where relevant) were done in this step. A codebook was developed based on the full set of coded interviews with the first two participants; it was updated as additional interview sets were coded. The fourth step used the coding process to generate the characteristics of the experiences and then to identify overarching *themes* that emerged. Themes were supported by diverse quotations from multiple participants. These themes were subsequently interconnected into a storyline that articulated the various characteristics of the experiences that led to the development of perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. Creswell's fifth step is to begin to determine how the descriptions and themes will be represented in the narrative, such as the discussion of several themes, interconnected themes, multiple perspectives, or specific illustrations. The final step in his suggested data analysis process is making an interpretation of the data's meaning.

Data Coding

Methods. "The process of data collection and analysis is recursive and dynamic" (Merriam, 2009, p. 169). In this study, first- and second-cycle coding were used (Saldaña, 2013).

Of the five specific types of first-cycle coding within what Saldaña (2013) termed "elemental methods," *process coding* was used for this study. Process coding uses gerunds to connote action in the data. It can include both observable activity and more general conceptual action. Process is about things "people do rather than something people have" and "a search for consequences of action/interaction is also part of the process" (p. 96). There is no 'right number' of first-cycle codes (Friese, 2012). For this study, 593 first-cycle codes were identified.

Second-cycle coding was accomplished using what Saldaña (2013) called *pattern coding*. "Pattern coding develops the 'meta-code' – the category label that identifies similarly coded data" (p. 209). "[They are] a way of grouping summaries into a smaller number of sets, themes, or constructs" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 69, quoted in Saldaña, 2013, p. 210). During this step, first-cycle codes were reassessed, and those that were similar were grouped together into five pattern codes that described either a pattern of action or network of interrelationships. Some of the first-cycle process codes were grouped under more than one of the second-cycle pattern codes.

Process/sequence. First-cycle "process" coding was done on the first two sets of interviews, as discussed above. Notations were made on the transcripts (and field notes) of data that might be potentially relevant to answering the research question. Second-cycle "pattern" coding later grouped relevant marginal notes and comments. A peer and the chair reviewed the coding of the first two sets of interviews. These reviews identified a significant number of possible first-cycle codes which the researcher had overlooked, recommended using the study's conceptual framework as a means of grouping first-cycle codes, and suggested defining the term "characteristics of experiences" as a way to facilitate second-cycle coding. This feedback was incorporated into the coding of the remaining sets of transcripts.

Codebook. In conjunction with coding the first two sets of interviews, an initial codebook was developed. It was also reviewed by a peer and the chair, who provided suggestions which were incorporated into subsequent versions. The codebook was updated after the set of interviews with each subsequent participant, for a total of 16 rounds. All newly created codes were noted, as well as any changes to existing code definitions. Lists from individual interviews were merged to form a master list of codes.

Theme Development

First-cycle codes reflected the individualized experiences recounted by the 16 participants, viewed both from the perspective of being strategic advisers and from the perspective of being national-level principals who had advisers of their own. Second-cycle coding grouped similar experiences, mentioned by multiple participants, in terms of the study's conceptual framework (e.g., experiences that led a principal to perceive their adviser as trustworthy or as having expertise, experiences that led an adviser to believe they were perceived as trustworthy or as having expertise, experiences that derailed perceptions of trustworthiness or expertise). *In vivo* coding was used to capture quotations from participants that were particularly relevant. At this point, a working definition of "the characteristics of the experiences" was developed, and each of the groups of experiences was reviewed with that definition in mind to identify the relevant characteristics. Finally, the characteristics of the experiences of each of the groups of experiences were reviewed, and themes emerged that had recurred across multiple groupings of experiences.

Analytic Memos

Analytic memos were used to document and reflect on the process of coding the data that was collected. These memos provided the opportunity to reflect on the research question, articulated the relationship between the researcher and individual participants, reflected on and define code choices, identified and connected emerging themes, document problems that were encountered, noted any ethical or personal dilemmas that emerged, contemplated possible future directions for the study, and considered implications of the data that has been collected to the possible findings and conclusions of the study (Saldaña, 2013).

Trustworthiness

Berry (2002) noted that interviewing elites required special care to ensure the data being collected were not compromised by validity or reliability issues arising from participants who were either unrevealing or misleading in their answers. Several practices were used to enhance trustworthiness.

Critical reflection by the researcher on his own biases, dispositions, and assumptions was used to enhance the credibility of this study. The researcher's subjectivity statement is provided at Appendix G.

Credibility was also enhanced by using a wide range of informants (Shenton, 2004), and maximum variation of participants was used to enhance transferability by allowing "for the possibility of a greater range of applications by readers or consumers of the research" (Merriam, 2009, p. 227). In this study, a wide range of informants and maximum variation of participants was accomplished by means of purposeful sampling of career professionals in three different national security domains (diplomacy, military and intelligence). Purposeful sampling also included strategic advisers and national-level leaders who *were not* career professionals in the domain in which they were operating, such as politically appointed ambassadors, or military officers assigned as directors of intelligence agencies.

Member checks were also used to enhance credibility (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Participants were provided copies of the transcripts of their interviews and asked to check the transcripts of both interviews for accuracy. All participants acknowledged receipt of the transcripts, but only four had any suggestions, and those were clarifications of points that the participant thought might be ambiguous in the transcript, or factual corrections, or correcting a word or phrase that had been inaccurately transcribed, or deleting a comment regarding another individual (who was not part of the study). Subsequently, the researcher solicited the views of two participants about the themes to rule out misinterpretation of the meaning of what was said, as well as identifying the biases and misunderstandings of the researcher (Merriam, 2009). Both responded very positively.

Dependability was enhanced by a review of the transcripts of the first two sets of interviews by a peer and the chair to check for any bias, leading, or incomplete probing on the part of the researcher. The chair and a peer also reviewed the coding of the first two sets of interviews to check whether the coding was supported by the data. The peer review of the coding was done by having someone familiar with the methodology (though not necessarily knowledgeable of the topic) assess whether the first- and second-cycle codes were plausible in light of the data (Merriam, 2009) and to pose questions about the study so it might better resonate with readers other than the researcher (Creswell, 2014). Written accounts of the peer review were maintained (Creswell, 2013).

Transferability was enhanced by the use of rich, thick descriptions, which will allow others to assess whether the study at hand represents a context that is similar to another (different) situation familiar to the reader (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This study anticipated that participants would present detailed descriptions of the nature of their experience when they served as strategic advisers and as national-level leaders receiving advice from others; this turned out to be the case. Specifically, analysis of the interviews generated quotations describing the nature of those experiences that led to development of perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.

Nonetheless, transferability to other organizations in the Federal government, to organizations outside the government, or to foreign governments is largely an empirical question based on context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). While the study's conclusions may be transferable outside the specific context, such transferability will be limited by the extent to which dyadic relationships exhibit similar characteristics. Assessing such transferability will best be done by others who can evaluate their own relationships.

Human Participant and Ethics Precautions

The research study was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of The George Washington University. Participants were informed of the nature of the study, invited to ask questions prior to participation in any interviews. Informed consent was obtained from all study participants (Appendix B). Participants, all of whom were former public officials, were allowed the option of the interview being conducted *in true name* (for attribution) or *using a pseudonym* (not for attribution) and this was noted on the consent form. All of the participants chose to participate in true name and for attribution.

Data was protected in several ways. Audio recordings of interviews, transcripts constructed from those interviews, and field notes taken during the interviews were stored in a locked container accessible only by the researcher. A participant key was used to mask data that could be used to identify participants, and that key was accessible only to the researcher and kept in a separate, locked location. To further protect the identity of the participants, the transcriber was required to sign a confidentiality statement (Appendix F). The participant key and all data collected for the study will be destroyed once the dissertation has been defended and any related papers, presentations, and submissions for publication have been completed.

Summary

This basic interpretive study seeks to understand the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, from the perspectives of those involved. The goal of a strategic adviser is to communicate their advice to a target audience (either an individual, such as the President, or a group, such as the National Security Council). As noted in Chapter 1, numerous studies have demonstrated that effective communication depends on the credibility of the source (in this case, the strategic adviser), and such credibility depends on the extent to which they present valid assertions (that is, the perceptions of their *expertise*) and the confidence that they considered those assertions to be valid (that is, the perceptions of their *trustworthiness*). Other studies have shown that in dyadic relationships, perceptions of expertise and perceptions of trustworthiness are reciprocal. Nonetheless, there is little understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of expertise and perceptions of trustworthiness in the dyadic relationships between strategic advisers and the national-level leaders who are the recipients of that advice. The primary data source for this study was interviews of individuals who have served both as strategic advisers and as national-level leaders who were dependent on the advice of others. This research study was bounded within the executive branch of the Federal government of the United States, and within that branch was focused on the national security policy domains of the diplomatic, military, and intelligence instruments of power.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of a basic interpretive study addressing the research question: *What are the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders?* The findings emerged from pairs of semi-structured interviews with sixteen participants conducted over six-months, followed by twelve weeks of data coding and analysis. Background for the interviews was provided by a review of memoirs, autobiographies, and biographies of individuals who served as strategic advisers at the national level.

The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the study participants. Following this is a section on the development trajectory that led participants from the start of their career to the point where they were strategic advisers and national-level principals. This is followed by a section on how participants defined perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise, as well as the relative importance of both. The bulk of the chapter focuses on the experiences that build perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise, as described by the participants, as well as experiences that can derail those perceptions. Each experience is described, verbatim text from relevant interviews is provided, and then the characteristics of that experience are identified. The characteristics are highly repetitive, constituting a set of themes that are defined. The chapter concludes with a summary.

All quotations are verbatim from transcriptions of interviews. Ellipses (…) were used to indicate where significant amounts of irrelevant text were omitted. Repetitious comments were eliminated to improve readability. Where necessary, the researcher's words are added [in square brackets] for clarification, to substitute for proper names of individuals other than the participants or the researcher, or to provide transition. Words emphasized by participants during interviews are *italicized*.

Study Participants

As discussed in Chapter 3, study participants were individuals who had served both as strategic advisers and as principals at the national level in their own right (dependent on their own strategic advisers) in the diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities of the national security policy domain. Participants (see Figure 4.1) all agreed to be interviewed in true name and for attribution, rather than pseudonym and not for attribution. Several served in more than one community (e.g., an intelligence officer serving as an ambassador, an ambassador serving as a senior leader in a military command, and military officers leading intelligence agencies). Participants included both career professionals and those appointed as strategic advisers / national-level principals without prior experience in that particular community. All participants served after September 2001, as the national security structure was significantly reorganized after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (e.g., the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence). Study participants no longer served in the executive branch (all but one was retired from government), allowing them to speak freely.

The interview questions focused on the perceptions of the adviser's trustworthiness and expertise, not the trustworthiness or expertise of the principal being advised. The questions asked about their <u>experiences as an adviser</u> establishing their

Table 4.1. Study Participants (in alphabetical order)

Participant	***Domain***	***Significant positions as advisers / principals****
Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA (ret)	Intelligence	Director of DIA Director of the Intelligence Staff Director of Intelligence/J2, Joint Staff Director of Intelligence/J2, USSOCOM Director of Intelligence/J2, USSOUTHCOM Executive Officer to DCoS/G2, US Army
General George W. Casey, Jr. USA (ret)	Military	Chief of Staff of the Army Commander, MNF-I Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Director of the Joint Staff Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy/J5, Joint Staff Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army
Ambassador R. Daniel Coats (ret)	Diplomacy	U.S. Ambassador to Germany Senator Congressman
Ambassador Joseph DeTranni (ret)	Intelligence / Diplomacy	Special Envoy to Six-Party Talks with DPRK Director, NCPC (CIA) Director, Crime and Narcotics Center (CIA) Director, Office of Technical Services (CIA) Director of Public Affairs (CIA) Executive Assistant to DCI
Honorable Michèle Flournoy (ret)	Military	Undersecretary of Policy, DoD PDASD for Strategy and Threat Reduction DASD for Strategy
General Michael W. Hagee, USMC (ret)	Military	Commandant of the Marine Corps Director, Strategy and Policy/J5, USPACOM Deputy Director, Operations/J3, USEUCOM Executive Assistant to DCI Senior Military Assistant to DepSecDef
General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (ret)	Intelligence	Director of CIA Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Director of NSA Commander, Air Intelligence Agency Director of Intelligence/J2, USEUCOM DCoS, UN Command and US Forces Korea Director of Security Policy, National Security Council
Lieutenant General Mary A. Legere, USA (ret)	Intelligence	Director of Intelligence/G2, U.S. Army Commanding General, U.S. Army INSCOM Director of Intelligence/C2, MNF-I Director of Intelligence/J2, USFK Special Assistant to Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK
Honorable Letitia A. Long (ret)	Intelligence	Director of NGA Deputy Director of DIA Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence DCI Executive Director for IC Affairs
Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, USA (ret)	Military / Intelligence	Director of DIA Vice Director of the Joint Staff Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, U.S. Army Aide-de-Camp to CG, U.S. Army Readiness Region VII

Participant	*Domain*	*Significant positions as advisers / principals**
Ambassador Carmen Martinez (ret)	Diplomacy / Military	Political Adviser to USSOUTHCOM U.S. Ambassador to Zambia *Charge d'affaires ad interim* to Burma
General Richard B. Myers, USAF (ret)	Military	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander, USSPACECOM/NORAD CG, Pacific Air Forces Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Peter Pace, USMC (ret)	Military	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander, USSOUTHCOM CG, USMC Forces Atlantic/Europe/South Director of Operations/J3, Joint Staff Deputy Commander/CoS, USFJ Executive Assistant to C/J/G-3, CFC/USFK
Ambassador Michael Polt (ret)	Diplomacy	U.S. Ambassador to Estonia U.S. Ambassador to Serbia and Montenegro PDASS, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, DoS DCM, U.S. Embassy Berlin, Germany DCM, U.S. Embassy Bern, Switzerland Executive Assistant to U.S. Ambassador, Germany
Honorable Caryn A. Wagner (ret)	Intelligence	Undersecretary of Intelligence and Analysis, DHS ADNI for Management, ODNI Executive Director for IC Affairs Senior DIA Representative to USEUCOM / NATO Director of Analysis, DIA Director of Military Intelligence Staff
Ambassador William B. Wood (ret)	Diplomacy	U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan U.S. Ambassador to Columbia PDASS, Bureau of International Organizations Political Counselor, U.S. Mission to the UN Negotiating Delegation, CSCE Helsinki Summit

*** *Legend:***

ADNI - Assistant Director of National Intelligence
CFC - Combined Forces Command (Korea)
CG - Commanding General
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CoS - Chief of Staff
CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DASD - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCI - Director of Central Intelligence
DCM - Deputy Chief of Mission
DCoS - Deputy Chief of Staff
DepSecDef - Deputy Secretary of Defense
DHS - Department of Homeland Security
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD - Department of Defense
DoS - Department of State
DPRK - Democratic People's Republic of Korea
IC - Intelligence Community
INSCOM - Intelligence & Security Command
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
MNF-I - Multi-National Forces – Iraq
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCPC - National Counter-Proliferation Center (CIA)
NGA - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NORAD - North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSA - National Security Agency
ODNI - Office of the Director of National Intelligence
PDASD - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
PDASS - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
UNC - United Nations Command (Korea)
USEUCOM - U.S. European Command
USFJ - U.S. Forces Japan
USFK - U.S. Forces Korea
USMC - U.S. Marine Corps
USPACOM - U.S. Pacific Command
USSOCOM - U.S. Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM - U.S. Southern Command
USSPACECOM - U.S. Space Command

trustworthiness and expertise with a principal, as well as their experiences as a principal regarding what made an adviser appear to be trustworthy or an expert. The questions did not explore the adviser's perceptions of a national-level principal's trustworthiness and expertise for a practical reason. If the principal doubts the trustworthiness or expertise of their adviser, they can (usually) dismiss the adviser and replace them with someone else. Even if they cannot dismiss an adviser they don't find trustworthy or deem not to be an expert, they can ignore that individual or bypass them. The reverse is not true; if an adviser doubts the trustworthiness or expertise of the principal they are advising, they cannot fire them. At most, they can offer to resign their advisory post, but that offer may not be accepted. Likewise, the adviser cannot ignore or bypass the principal. National-level leaders (as defined in Chapter 1 of this study) are normally appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. An adviser's views of the trustworthiness or expertise of a principal is irrelevant. In fact, many national-level leaders, especially at the Cabinet level, have little to no experience, much less expertise, in the domain for which they have become responsible.

Development Trajectory of Advisers and Principals

All participants served in positions of progressively greater responsibility during their careers. While each had individualized experiences, all followed a discernable progression: formative experiences, transformative experiences, mid-level advising/principal experiences, and strategic advising/ national-level principal experiences (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2. Career Trajectory of Adviser / Principal Experiences

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Serving only as an adviser</th><th colspan="2">Serving simultaneously both as adviser and principal</th></tr>
<tr><th>Formative experiences that build reputation</th><th>Transformative experiences that expand horizons</th><th>Mid-level advising experiences that refine awareness</th><th>Strategic advising experiences that enhance effectiveness</th></tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="3">• Successfully completing wide variety of assignments
• Taking advice
• Giving advice
• Communicating complex ideas
• Building relationships
• Carefully observing others
• Working for different bosses
• Undertaking complex projects
• Learning how to “learn while doing”</td>
<td rowspan="3">• Shadowing strategic leader 24/7
• Learning while doing
• Being mentored
• Serving as principal’s sounding board
• Seeing world through principal’s eyes
• Attending to details / getting it right
• Being “in the room” for everything
• Observing how seniors receive information and make decisions
• Voicing an opinion
• Recognizing own limitations</td>
<td>• Learning while doing
• Thinking “for” the principal
• Being engaged all the time
• Seeing connections
• Engaging circles of advisers
• Having “hard” conversations
• Adding value to discussions</td>
<td>• Learning while doing
• Anticipating principal’s needs
• Reflecting on own experiences
• Seeing opportunities, risks and threats
• Observing impact of politics
• Utilizing existing relationships
• Focusing on strategic perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr><th>Mid-level principal experiences that refine awareness</th><th>National-level principal experiences that enhance effectiveness</th></tr>
<tr>
<td>• Learning while doing
• Playing the hand you are dealt in terms of advisers
• Recognizing advisers’ blind spots
• Interacting with other principals
• Embracing your advisers
• Seeking input / taking advice</td>
<td>• Learning while doing
• Picking right vs wrong advisers
• Setting right conditions to get the advice you need
• Having broad range of advisers
• Developing your advisers
• Protecting your advisers</td>
</tr>
</table>

Formative Experiences

Participants' careers began with formative experiences. Building on what they had learned growing up and at school, participants spent 10-15 years learning their craft as diplomats, intelligence officers, or military officers and building reputations in the eyes of their peers and superiors. These reputations, in turn, opened the door to future assignments at higher levels.

Transformative Experiences

Near the mid-point in their career, in all but one instance, participants recounted a transformative experience. Examples included assignments such as being the senior military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the executive assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, or serving on the National Security Council Staff. Such assignments afforded participants the opportunity to expand their horizons beyond what they had learned previously by seeing the world through the eyes of the principal they were serving.

Mid-level Advising / Mid-level Principal Experiences

Participants then went on to advisory positions below the national level, where their experiences refined their awareness of what principals expected of key advisers. Examples of such assignments included serving as the deputy chief of mission in an embassy or as a primary staff officer in an intelligence agency, at a combatant command, or on the Joint Staff. At this point, most participants were advising others—normally in their own career domain (military, intelligence, or Foreign Service)—who, in turn, advised national-level principals. For example, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy

(J5) of the Joint Staff advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman, in turn, is the principal military adviser to the President and National Security Council.

In these jobs, participants were also mid-level principals with their own advisers. These experiences refined their awareness of what makes advisers credible. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs not only provides advice to the Secretary of State, but simultaneously leads a large bureau within the State Department—comprised of more than 15 subordinate offices—that develops, directs, coordinates and implements U.S. foreign policy across 30 countries as well as with multi-national organizations like the European Union, NATO, OSCE, OECD, the G-8, and the Council of Europe.[7]

Strategic Advising / National-level Principal Experiences

All the participants rose to become ambassadors, heads of intelligence agencies, or the most senior members of the defense community. They served simultaneously as strategic advisers and national-level principals—advising and being advised. Experiences at this stage focused on enhancing their effectiveness within the national security policymaking process.

As national-level strategic advisers, they provided advice directly to the President and members of the National Security Council. That advice was no longer filtered through anyone in their own career domain. For example, ambassadors are the President's personal representative in the country to which they are accredited. In that role, they are not subordinate to the Secretary of State. They can (and do) call the President directly, especially when they disagree with views being put forward by the

[7] NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization, OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, G-8 - Group of Eight (highly industrialized nations).

State Department. Likewise, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by law, is the principal military adviser to the President. As such, he advises the President directly, rather than submitting his military advice through the Secretary of Defense.

Simultaneously, at this point in their careers, participants were national-level principals in their own right, leading large organizations responsible for a wide variety of activities. For example, U.S. ambassadors coordinate the activities not only of the Foreign Service Officers and staff at the embassy, but all executive branch offices and personnel in that country, except those under a U.S. geographic combatant commander, under another chief of mission, or on the staff of an international organization. At some overseas missions, there are as many as 27 federal agencies working in concert with the embassy staff. When serving at the national-strategic level, each of the participants in this study both advised the President and National Security Council and also had their own team of advisers to allow them to lead their own organizations.

Definition and Importance of Trustworthiness and Expertise

Before discussing the participants' views of the characteristics of the experiences that developed perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, it is instructive to examine how participants described both *perceptions of trustworthiness* and *perceptions of expertise*, and their views of the relative importance of each.

Participants' Views of Perceptions of Trustworthiness at National Strategic Level

Importance of perceptions of trustworthiness. Participants consistently stated that being perceived as trustworthy was *mandatory* to being credible as an adviser at the national strategic level, though they noted that being trustworthy did *not*, in and of itself, mean one was a *good* adviser.

> If you can't be trusted, you're not going to be an adviser – period. To me, that's pretty black and white. You have to maintain that trust. … If I couldn't trust a guy, I wouldn't be asking him for his advice. Period. (Hagee, 9 October 2015) Without trustworthiness, I'm not sure one can be an adviser. Now, just because there's trust between the two individuals does not necessarily mean one's giving or getting good advice. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

> I think trust is the *key* element in an adviser relationship, be it you advising someone else, or someone else advising you. Trust is essential. Without that, it's a losing game. … Yes, [I perceived my advisers as trustworthy] because otherwise, they wouldn't have stayed my advisers. (M. Polt, November 19, 2015)

> [When it is the] military providing advice to senior civilian leadership—our civilian bosses, whether it's the President or the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a Service—to do that effectively, you need a trusting relationship. You have to be both trusting and trustworthy. … [T]rust forms the basis of our relationships. … [I]toss a fundamental pillar of credibility. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

Participants also noted that while perceptions of trustworthiness should be reciprocal, they had to be trustworthy, even when dealing with individuals who they did not consider to be.

> [Trustworthiness] doesn't *have* to be [reciprocal], but it's nice when it is. … *[Y]ou* have to be trustworthy even when you're dealing with somebody who isn't trustworthy. I've been in those situations, and that's *hard*, but then you just have to say, "Well, what's my internal fiber? Do I want to be the kind of person that can be trusted, even if I'm dealing with somebody who's not trustworthy?" (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

Definitions of perceptions of trustworthiness. Participants included a wide range of components in their definition of what it meant to be perceived as trustworthy at the national strategic level. These included being reliably consistent, telling the whole truth, being thoughtful, being discrete, being able to deliver bad news, demonstrating character and values, speaking truth to power, being humble, being reliable and dependable, and adding value.

> [Trustworthiness] is that you are the same person no matter whom you speak to or who your audience is – whether it's your boss, whether it's your boss' boss, whether it's your peers, whether it is your subordinates. In other words, that the reputation that you have is the person that you are – meaning that you do not shade your answers or your interactions depending on what you think the audience wants to hear. … I can trust you if I know that you're going to go ahead and be the same … when you walk out of this room as you are inside this room. (M. Polt, November 10, 2015)

> [Trustworthiness] means that you're dependable. You know, you can be *depended on* to tell the truth, deliver bad news, to have been *thoughtful*. Meaning, for him to trust me, he should know that I have considered a range of options on a topic, done my homework, my due diligence, expressed concerns – *everything* is out in the open. You've got to be able to say, "Boss, I *don't agree* and *here's why*." It's *never* personal. It's *professional*. But, you know, it's much more than "I can keep secret what you've told me." It's that "I've got your back. And you can *believe* what I'm telling you. You can trust that I have – to the *best* of my ability – thought through *all* the options, brought in *all* the experts, *challenged* the assumptions, and I am giving you the *most thoughtful* answer / way ahead / set of solutions, you know – however you want to couch that – and that you can *depend* on me." I mean, that's trustworthiness. (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

> [Trustworthiness is] *integrity in response and advice*. And what that means is that, sometimes you've got to convey a message that *isn't welcome*. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> To me, trustworthiness has a pretty straightforward meaning – which is that I trust you to be *honest*. Give me your *best judgment*. And probably *as* important, I trust you to be honest about when you *don't really know the answer* – and so, don't send me down the garden path because you don't want to admit that you don't know the answer. (C. Wagner, February 17, 2016)

> First of all, trustworthiness means *always* keeping your word. And that sounds like old fashion and corny – but I think it's really, really important. If you *say* you're going to do it, you *do* it. If you *cannot* – for some reason – do it, you let people know, and you give them a reason why. … It should be - your word *really means something*. And I think that's important. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

> Trustworthiness means reliability. It is built, I think, as much if not more on *character* – and *values* – as it is on education and experience – or intelligence. I agreed with [X], when he said [that] intelligence shouldn't be the first criteria when evaluating somebody for a high position – it ought to be character.

> Intelligence is important, but character can be *more* important. … Evaluating the character of an individual that you are overseeing, or that you're reporting to – as well as trying to show your own character to those individuals – is really important. (D. Coats, February 24, 2016)

> *Discretion* is really important when you're being really open with people. And it's something that I think about *myself* when my bosses bring me into their confidence. It's not for me to share. It's for me to react to information I'm hearing. And then, it's *their story* to tell and their thing to share. So, people have disappointed me. Seniors have disappointed me when, you know, as they see me move into this position, they've wanted to exploit it for their own personal, commercial gain. But, that happens. But more than that for, you know, people that have not been *trustworthy* with the confidence that you give them, and you find that information being played back to you in other forums. … [Y]outré just sort of *surprised* by it. At which point, you know, *that sharing stops*. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

> [Trustworthiness] means that you have to *do what you say you're going to do*, or you tell them *why* you can't do it, or *why* it's failed. You need to build a reputation for *reliability*. … Second, I think you have to demonstrate that the experience you bring to the table is *value-added to them*. … So, you have to *avoid parochialism* if you're going to be seen as trustworthy and reliable. And, I think the third element is probably *candor*. … And so, I think those are the three things – reliability is a big part of it, but *reliability with integrity*. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> I think it's someone with integrity – in the more traditional sense of trust … someone I believe will be candid and straightforward and not dissemble or hide or lie. But ideally, it's someone who you can ask to do something or ask for something *once* and you know that you're going to get the *best possible work in response*. I call them the "Fire and Forget Adviser" (chuckle). You ask for something and you know it's going to be done right, and you don't have to monitor, you don't have to check … you don't have to worry about it. It's as good as done just as you'd asked them. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

Participants also noted that, at the national strategic level, the principal's perception of the trustworthiness of the organization their adviser belonged to or led was as important as the perception of the adviser's personal trustworthiness.

> And by that time [when I was Director of DIA], for me it was a trustworthiness not just in *me* as an individual, but a trustworthiness of the *organization* as an entity. How [does the Secretary of Defense] rely on the product that the organization is producing, and the *quality* of the products that I'm receiving, and the *quality* of the responses to the questions that I've asked? So, it's a *quality* of

> the organization *as a whole*, not just as *me as an individual*, okay. … [Y]ou have to build that – the quality of the organization, and what's coming back out, because that really reflects the leader of the organization in so many ways. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

It is worth noting that participants' responses did not include statements that equated trustworthiness with the education, experience, or intelligence of the adviser, nor did they equate it with the adviser agreeing with the principal.

In summary, participants consistently stated that credibility as an adviser at the national strategic level depended on being perceived as trustworthy, though that did not make one a good adviser. Participants also noted that perceptions of trustworthiness did not have to be reciprocal, but the adviser had to be seen as trustworthy by the principal even if the principal was not seen as being trustworthy by the adviser. As noted, participants included different components in their definition of what it meant to be perceived as trustworthy. When operating at the national strategic level, it was equally important that the principal perceived both the adviser and the adviser's parent organization to be trustworthy. Finally, trustworthiness was not equated with the adviser's education, experience, intelligence, or propensity to agree with the principal.

Participants' Views of Perceptions of Expertise at National Strategic Level

Importance of perceptions of expertise. By contrast to their views on perceptions of trustworthiness, participants often stated that being perceived as having expertise, while desirable, was *not necessary* to being a credible adviser at the national strategic level. They often noted that it was impossible to be an expert on everything that transpired across the national security policy arena, even within one's own specific domain, and that being an original thinker was of greater value than specific expertise at the national strategic level.

> I don't know that I ever even *heard* anybody call me "an expert" in anything. Nor would I *want* anybody to say I'm an expert in anything. I appreciate the fact that they ask my advice. And I'll try to give them the best advice I have. But I don't ever recall somebody saying, "Hey, [he]'s the expert on that." I've heard them say that since I have been out in the business world – but not while I was on active duty. I don't think it's a term that we strove for or used in the military. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> You know, I never feel I'm the expert. I mean, to this day, I sit on committees, on panels, and … I talk about North Korea, because I have spent almost 15 years on North Korea. But to this day, I just don't feel I'm the expert on those issues. I feel I know a good deal about the issues. And I feel I know what I don't know. I feel there's *so much* I don't know. (J. DeTrani, January 12, 2016)

> Clearly, bringing your *own* expertise to a situation is important. But there are times and there are issues that simply are outside the boundaries of your expertise. And that's when you have to be able to have the *humility* to reach out and say, "Find me the expert, and have him help me." (D. Coats, February 24, 2016)

> If you think you're an expert, you're on weak ground—no matter what the subject is. … Somebody says to you … "Are you an expert in the field?" If you think you are, you're probably not. It's probably why they use the term "doctors *practice* medicine"—it's because that's what you're doing, *you're practicing*. Advisers *practice* being advisers. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> [My adviser] was *as expert* in counterinsurgency operations *as we had at the time*. I mean, he had a Special Forces background. And he had – I forget his academic background – but, at that point in our institutional learning process as an Army and as a U.S. military, he was the one-eyed man in the land of the blind. So, he was *as good as we had*. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

> In the Undersecretary job, you're covering *every possible* policy issue, every *region* of the world, every *functional* area. You *cannot* be an expert on everything. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

> As [my] adviser … I wanted an individual who could look at things a little bit differently than the normal individual. … So knowing your subject, being an expert if you will, that's important. But to me, especially at that [national strategic] level, what's almost more important is being able to look at it a little bit *differently,* and then to explain *why* looking at it that way makes sense. … I always had my ears *open* for those type of guys – those original thinkers maybe is a better word than an expert. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

In and of itself, being perceived as an expert was *not* equated with being an effective adviser, and vice versa. "[Y]ou can *be* an effective adviser without being an expert. You can *be* an expert without being an effective adviser" (P. Pace, March 22, 2016).

However, participants noted that technical expertise could underlay the perception of trustworthiness of individuals in some domains, though not in others.

> I'd put *trustworthiness* first. You can always *buy* expertise. But you need be *careful*, you know. Maybe it's just because of the kind of adviser I was. I was an Intel guy. We're *fact*-based, so there has to be a *basis* of expertise on which you can begin to offer your views. That might be different – that actually might be different for a political adviser. And I mean that in a genuinely respectful way. But I was an Intel adviser, you know, for the most part. And so, you know, I *had* to work for – I mean, my *entrée* into the room was that I knew *facts*. That was why I was there. And so, that was kind of an essential base. (M. Hayden, February 12, 2016)

Definitions of perceptions of expertise. As with perceptions of trustworthiness, participants included a wide range of components in their definition of what it meant to be perceived as having expertise at the national strategic level. Among these were being grounded in one's profession, being able to look at things differently and explain why that different view made sense, being acknowledged as an expert by others, and providing information that was value added to the principal. Several participants noted that expertise was a derivative of experience, not something that could be learned in a classroom.

> I think expertise is a depth of knowledge on a subject that will help to eliminate [problems] and frame good decision making. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

> Knowing your subject, being an expert if you will, that's important. But to me, especially at that level, what's almost more important is being able to look at it a little bit *differently*, and then to explain *why* looking at it that way makes sense. And those are the type of guys that I sort-of gravitated to and would like to be there when the going got tough – because they just had a different way of looking at things. But both individuals could understand – could be qualified as, quote, "an expert." But it's how they *use* that expertise, if you will, to analyze and come up with what might be a different course of action, or another course of action that one might want to consider. And whether it's a course of action on the ball field,

> or a policy, or a way of achieving something, that's what I was interested in hearing. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)
>
> You have to have *value-added*. And the value-added – the easiest – *one* easy way to have value-added is to have expertise. (W. Wood, March 15, 2016)
>
> [Expertise] is a *combination* of abstract knowledge and practical experience. Because the national security leader [doesn't] want someone who's just got the "book learning." … [W]hat's written on the page and the way things are supposed to work is not always the way they *actually* work. But you need to know the way they're *supposed* to work and what's written on the page, but you also need to be able to *filter that* through your *actual experience*…. So, you really need *both* of those things to have the kind of expertise to be a good adviser at that senior policy level. (C. Wagner, February 15, 2016)
> You're not really an expert until *others* consider you an expert. And, to do that, you have to be *successful*. … people started saying, "*Ooh, maybe this guy knows what he's doing."* But, I mean, you have to – there has to be demonstrated success – some *history* of success. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)
>
> [Expertise] is the one thing that you cannot simply acquire, or go to a course for, or a seminar, or an offsite to gain. You either have it or you don't. I mean, you've either lived long enough to have expertise in something, or you've gone through a certain type of – set of experiences to have expertise in – or you don't. You can't say, "Look, tomorrow were going to have expertise class. All you guys come around and we'll teach you expertise, and then – day after that – you'll be trained people with expertise." … [Y]ou cannot acquire expertise by being taught it. You actually have to have *had* it – meaning you have to have *done* it. (M. Polt, November 10, 2015)

In summary, participants expressed a view of perceptions of expertise that differed from their view of perceptions of trustworthiness. While the consistent view expressed in the previous section was that an adviser *did* have to be perceived as trustworthy by the principal to be viewed as credible, participants often stated that a credible adviser did *not* have to be perceived as having expertise (though it could be desirable). Several participants noted the impossibility of being an expert across the national security policy arena in general, or even within one's own specific domain, due to the breadth, depth, and complexity of the issues under consideration. Of greater value was being seen as an original thinker. Participants also noted that being an expert was *not* equated with being an effective adviser, though expertise could underlie the perception of trustworthiness in some domains. As with trustworthiness, participants included a wide range of components in their definition of being perceived as having expertise at the national strategic level and noted expertise derived from experience, not the classroom.

Participants' Views of the Relative Importance of Trustworthiness versus Expertise

Expertise was *not* equated with being trustworthy, and vice versa. "[C]an you have great expertise and not be trustworthy? Sure, because you could be an expert liar" (M. Polt, November 19, 2015). "There are lots of principals I've seen, all through my career, who have had advisers who they "trusted" and listened to – whether they had the requisite expertise or not. Many of them [did not]" (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016).

Almost without exception, participants consistently ranked being *perceived as trustworthy* above being *perceived as having expertise* when it came to being a credible adviser. "*Trustworthiness* has to come first. And it trumps expertise" (D. Coats, February 24, 2016).

> [Trustworthiness] would be *the* – *key* – *attribute*, if you will. … You could have a *lot* of things going for you. You could have been the *best* Russian analyst in DIA. But if you didn't have that *trustworthiness*, that *integrity* – you weren't going to get through the front door, as far as being an adviser. You might still be the best Russian analyst but, you know, you're not going to have that ultimate seat. (R. Burgess, January 27, 2016)

> Trust *has to be* number one. … [Y]ou could have all the greatest expertise, but I have to be confident you're using that expertise *well*, and you're giving it to me *straight*. *You have to have trust*. You have to have trust in the *person*. (J. DeTrani, February 2, 2016)

> I would say trustworthiness is the *most important*, because if that characteristic and condition doesn't *exist*, you *never have the opportunity* to ever share *any* expertise, okay. It's a foot in the door, if you will. … As long as you possess an understanding of what that person *needs*, you can get the *right* expertise in front

of you – *if you're a trusted adviser*. … And it *does* make a difference. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

I would put trustworthiness above expertise. Expertise can be *learned*. You can go out and study, and learn, and find out something. But if you're *not* trustworthy, that's a character trait. And I don't know how you can teach that. I can't think of anybody I ever thought was *not* trustworthy, who later on became trustworthy. … So, I would put trustworthiness above expertise. (C. Martinez, February 25, 2016)

From my perspective, perceptions of trustworthiness are *clearly* more important. And the expertise, again, doesn't have to reside in the individual. You can *bring your team in* – but I have to be able to *trust* what you're telling me. I have to be able to *trust* that you've done your due diligence. … But *you* don't have to be *the expert*. And, you know, you don't have to be able to answer … the third- and fourth-order questions. Your *team* can answer those. I *have to be able to trust you*. (L. Long, March 9, 2016)

Trustworthiness – absolutely first! You can make people more knowledgeable about different things; you can't make them trustworthy. Once you start having questions about someone's integrity or someone's trustworthiness – forget it! Everything they say to you has got an asterisk by it. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)
If you told me, "[Y]ou could either been seen as trustworthy or expert," I'll take trustworthy every day! I can go out and do my homework and get knowledge. I cannot go out and become more trustworthy. I either am or I'm not! And if you don't trust me, I can be whatever you want to define an expert as, and I'm useless to you. Because if you're an expert, and I don't trust you, for all I know you're using your expertise to bamboozle me. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)
I would say that the higher you get, … *trustworthiness* … becomes more important – because the people are concerned about things being leaked to the press. And [for] people who have a brand, rather than just a professional reputation – like politicians – *trustworthiness is everything*. Expertise is nice, but it's not as important. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

At the heart of your relationship, either as the senior leader being advised and/or the adviser to the senior leader, *trust will be essential* to the candor and growth between the two of you. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)
I'd put trustworthiness above expertise. … As Chairman, there's a lot of things you deal with you don't know much about, you have to get smart on, you have to have people talk to you about it, and then you have to synthesize that, and then work it with the Joint Chiefs and go provide whatever – go work the issue. So I think trustworthiness is by far above expertise. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

Trustworthiness! No question. If you have a great expert but you can't trust them, it's not going to be very helpful. If you have someone you can trust and they have some gaps in their expertise but can go find where to fill those gaps – *easy*! … [Y]es, you'll need them to have expertise that's valuable to you, but it's more important to have someone who will be honest with you – and go find the expertise they don't have, when necessary, than it is to have someone be – know it all from a substantive perspective, but not be someone you can rely on or trust. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

Two participants, however, offered a distinctly different point of view.

> It's really *hard* to rank order. You get the opinion of people you *don't trust* because it's an additional data point. … I would *never refuse* to get the perspective of someone I didn't trust – just because I *didn't trust them*. They might still be *right*. I would never *take* the perspective of someone who was loyal, simply because he was *loyal*. He might be *wrong*. And, the loyal guys can be wrong in some cases – just because they're *too* damn loyal. (W. Wood, March 15, 2016)

> I may not trust you, and I might take your expertise. In other words, you may not get inside my thinking, but I will listen to your technical expertise or your expertise on something. … And that becomes a one-way – that is not as satisfactory to me. As a strategic leader, I want to be able to say, "Let me tell you how I'm thinking about it. What do you think?" I want you and I to be able to have a human-to-human exchange on this. So I suppose with me, I want both. I value the complete candor. I value trustworthiness. But I can live with either. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

The consistent view was that an adviser not seen as trustworthy would rarely have the opportunity to present their expertise, because they would seldom, if ever, get a seat at the table. One contrary view emphasized that an adviser could be right (even if not perceived by the principal as trustworthy); the other that the principal should always be willing to listen to technical expertise, regardless of the perceived trustworthiness of the adviser, but then not give them close access to the principal's thoughts.

> Once you proved yourself as an individual, then they would eventually come to *trust* you. … [I]nside the military family, you are trusted until you prove that you *shouldn't be*. [I]n the interagency environment, you're *not* trusted until you prove you should be. And you just have to be aware of that, so you can give your advice in a way that can be accepted. I mean, it's one thing to be right, if you are right. It's another thing to be heard – and if people don't trust you, no matter *what* you say, you're not going to be heard. You have to understand where you are on the trust scale to know whether or not you're quote "expertise" is going to be accepted. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

Given that repeated view regarding the different weight of trustworthiness versus expertise, it is not surprising participants commented that they (and others) were sometimes perceived as being trustworthy, even though did not have the expertise for the issue at hand. "I never felt that I *wasn't trusted*. There are certainly examples where I wasn't the most *knowledgeable perso*n on a particular topic" (L. Long, February 11, 2016).

> There have been times where I thought I wasn't *adequate*…. I'm sitting down there at the end of the table in the Sit[uation] Room, in what I would call the "Intel Ghetto." Me and [the Director of National Intelligence], right. And I tell the story this way. The President looks down our way and *appears* to be making eye contact with *me*. But I know he's looking beyond me to the guy – the SMEs [subject matter experts] we've got in the next row. And so he asks the question. And then I realize, there *ain't nobody behind me* [chuckle]. He's asking *me*!! And so … I say, well, "Whether *you* think your opinion is worth it or not, *he* does." (M. Hayden, January 13, 2016)

> There are lots of principals I've seen, all through my career, who have had advisors who they "trusted" and listened to, whether they had the requisite expertise or not. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

Differing Perceptions of Career Professionals versus Political Appointees

Several participants—especially those who had served at the most senior levels—commented that the perception of trustworthiness and expertise differed between political appointees and career professionals. Within the diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities, career professionals presumed their advisers were *trustworthy unless they proved they were not*. "I trust people *inherently*, until they prove to me they can't be trusted" (G. Casey, March 16, 2016). "I *presumed* they were trustworthy. The going-in assumption was they were trustworthy. … [T]hey would have to *disprove* that fact, not prove it. Because that's the life *I grew up in"* (P. Pace, March 22, 2016).

By contrast, participants commented at their initial surprise to learn that political appointees presumed career professionals were *untrustworthy until they had proven that they were*.

> [A new Secretary of Defense] had a certain team that was with him, and "all you other general officers were [the last President's] appointees, so obviously you're all Democrats. And so you're really against me and what I'm trying to do here." I mean, that was the atmosphere there. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

> The military person in a leadership position is going to *assume* that his or her subordinates are loyal to them by virtue of the job they have. Whereas, on the political appointee side, they want to be *shown* that you're loyal. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> I wasn't part of the *political team*. [The principal] was *never* going to trust me. … I think she learned to value my judgment on certain "intelligence" things – but I was *never* going to be in the same kind of position that I was with all my previous bosses. Because there was a barrier there that I could *not cross*. I didn't have the political bona fides, even if I had the substantive bona fides. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

> As a 3-star … in the National Security Council process … folks who had never been around the military before … weren't sure whether or not they could trust you and believe you. And that was a *disconcerting feeling* for me. … I'd *never* come across anybody not having the basis being: *"We trust you until you prove us wrong."* The basis then was: *"We're not sure we can trust you. You've got to prove that we can."* And that to me was a total 180 from the way I led my *entire life* before that. But again, after the first crisis – and you showed (one) that you're loyal to the Constitution and the Commander-in-Chief, and that what you said people could rely on, you know, that quickly turned around. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

There was a similar, though less frequently mentioned, view regarding the different perceptions of expertise. Within the diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities, career professionals viewed expertise as "one of the most important qualities that a senior leader looks for in an adviser" but that among political appointees, "personal loyalty can trump expertise" (C. Wagner, February 15, 2016).

Participants commented that, regardless of the initial perceptions of politically-appointed principals, it was the responsibility of the career professional adviser to do the work to build the trusted relationship necessary to be seen as a credible adviser with the appropriate expertise.

> In the military, we don't get to choose our civilian masters. So, you work with whomever. But the goal is always to establish trust. The goal should never be to make it "us and them." And on military matters, we are – in most cases – much smarter. But where military matters meet political decisions, our civilian bosses have a lot to say there. And you've got to navigate that. The best way to do it is when you have a relationship that is – can be – you can mutually trust each other. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

> It's automatic that when my military boss changes, that the new boss *expects* me to be loyal. Not so in the political arena. And it just takes both the military person and the political appointees, or political elected, to appreciate that relationship. … It has nothing to do with political parties, it just has to do with political process versus military process, and one that is kind of helter-skelter, in my mind – winner-take-all – and the other being very much an organization that's just trying to do the best they can for the country. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> I think I probably assumed that I was *seen* as trustworthy. So, I was very surprised once when I was over to see [a member of Congress] on some calls. And [they] said, "General, I'll just be honest with you. I didn't trust some of the things that you told me about Iraq." And I said, "Thank you very much for sharing that. I am amazed, first. But I really appreciate you saying that. Can you tell me more specifically what you were concerned about?" … [Y]ou *never know* how you're being perceived. … In Washington, a lot of times, if you disagree with the view of somebody (tapping table), you're a liar. … [Y]ou assume – unless they're publicly calling you a liar – that people *trust* you. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> The one thing about the civilian political appointees – in my case, in the Pentagon, or anywhere in government – is that they are "Political Appointees." Political would be capitalized, and appointee. So, they do have a different orientation. … But you can't assume, I don't think, that it's the relationship building that over time. … And it's just – you just have to experience it, and find out if they see it the same way. And if they don't, then you'd have to discuss that. Or you'd have to modify the way you, you know, you might see things. But, you might not know initially. Because a lot of political appointees, in the Pentagon maybe, have no military experience – or misunderstand the military – or have preconceived notions that will take time to work off and build the relationship where you can kind of get a more centered view of things. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

Participants who had spent their careers rising through their professions to become a national-level principal noted that there was no one-size-fits-all method for selecting advisers. Rather, they had spent their professional lives learning how to pick good advisers, and then learning how to use those advisers to their best advantage. It was noted that was not the case with individuals who were politically appointed to national-level positions, many of whom had no prior experience selecting or using advisers.

> By the time you [are a general officer], I'm not sure there's a real recipe for [picking advisers] – because they've been, hopefully, getting advice, following advice, ignoring advice their entire careers. … From my experience, an individual that is … plucked out of nowhere because he's a brilliant economist, he's a brilliant intel guy, he's been at a university, he's been at a think-tank, and all of a sudden – boom – he's there [at the national strategic level]. And not only is he advising maybe the president or someone else, but he's also trying to *get* advice from other individuals. That is a much more difficult situation. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

However, career professionals noted that they could find themselves in positions as national-level principals who had no control over who served as their advisers, because those advisers were politically appointed. That was also true, in some circumstances, when advisers were appointed (such as when an officer was selected by their parent service to be a principal staff officer at a combatant command).

> [As] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary [of State], I had no control over [my adviser's] appointment. He was appointed by the [political] bureaucracy and brought to the table. I was – in the leadership rung of the Bureau of Legislative Affairs – the only career Foreign Service officer. He and all the other deputies under me and our Assistant Secretary, who was our boss, were all political appointees. … I was the institutional insider. They were the knowledge holders and the political insiders. For the system to work well, both types of individuals had to be present, and they had to be able to work well together. We never had any trouble in that regard. (M. Polt, November 19, 2015)

> I was CINC [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command] for one year…. As *best* I can remember, I did not interview [officers nominated to serve on the SOUTHCOM staff]. I told the Services that I would take whoever they sent me.

> … I presumed (correctly, in my opinion) that the Service chiefs were only going to send me their very best people. I wasn't going to go out and start asking … questions. First of all, if I was a Service chief, I would have only sent *my* best. And I would have been a little bit *cranky* if someone was checking on … the guy I just sent him. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

This section considered how participants defined perceptions of trustworthiness and of expertise, the relative importance of each, and the differing perceptions of career professionals versus political appointees. The next section focuses on the characteristics of the experiences that built or derailed those perceptions.

Experiences and their Characteristics

There is no accepted definition for the term "*the characteristics of the experiences"* in academic literature. It has been used since at least 1906 (Colvin), but from that early article to the present, authors seldom defined what they meant when using that phrase. Various dictionaries define *characteristic* as "a distinguishing attribute or element" (Webster, 2001), "a distinguishing trait, quality, or property" (Merrian-Webster online), "a feature or quality belonging typically to a person, place, or thing and serving to identify them" (Oxford online), "a typical or noticeable feature of someone or something" (Cambridge online), or "a particular quality or feature that is typical of someone or something" (MacMillan online). With regard to *an experience*, Dewey (1934) differentiated that from *experience* at large. The later was described as occurring continuously because the "very process of living" involved the interaction of individuals with their environment (p. 35). *An* experience, on the other hand, happened once whatever was being experienced had "run its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences" (p. 35).

In describing the findings of this study, *the characteristics of the experiences* of the participants means those distinguishing feature(s) of an experience which led to a strategic adviser being credible because they were perceived by the principal to be trustworthy or have expertise, or which led to that adviser not being credible because they were not perceived to be trustworthy or have expertise.

Perceptions of Trustworthiness

Participants reflected (during one of their interviews) on time they had spent serving as national-level principals being advised by others—specifically recalling advisers who were highly valued and others who were not. This allowed them to describe the characteristics of experiences that led to their perception, as principals, of an adviser's trustworthiness. In the other interview, they reflected on time they spent as a strategic adviser to national-level decision makers. This allowed them to describe the characteristics of the experiences that allowed them to be perceived as trustworthy themselves when serving as advisers. Both sets of experiences are summarized in Table 4.3 below.

Principal's View of What Led to Their Perception of Adviser's Trustworthiness. The first column in Table 4.3 reflects the observations of participants while considering their time serving as national-level principals with advisers of their own. They were asked to reflect on advisers that they valued highly and what made that adviser trustworthy. The column summarizes the principal's views of what experiences by an adviser would lead the principal to perceive that adviser as trustworthy.

Table 4.3. Experiences That Build Perceptions of Trustworthiness

Principal's Views	Adviser's Views
• Adviser's formal and informal reputation • Adviser ability to see big picture (strategic-level view of the issues) • Adviser able to anticipate principal's needs; to tell principal what they "need to know," not what they "want to hear" • Adviser willingness to be honest with the principal, tell the whole truth, and challenge the principal's views • Adviser consistently giving credible advice, admitted mistakes, and being willing to say "I don't know" • Adviser and principal sharing a crisis • Adviser adding value to principal's decision making • Adviser sharing principal's views, agenda, goals, principles and values • Adviser demonstrating discretion	• Learning while doing every job • "Being in the room" with a strategic leader – learning to see the world through principal's eyes • Doing the hard work to develop a reputation for consistent excellence • Thinking "for" the principal; anticipating principal's needs; delivering valuable insights • Observing and learning from own and other's dysfunctional adviser-principal relationships • Being honest with the principal, speaking up, dissenting, challenging and providing grounding for seniors • Knowing own limits and admitting "I don't know, but I'll find out" • Being yourself; being confident • Admitting and learning from mistakes; seeking feedback; accepting criticism • Being humble; giving credit to others • Being discrete; demonstrating loyalty

Adviser's formal and informal reputation. Participants realized that principals often make their initial selection of an adviser (when that is within the power of the principal) based on that adviser's formal and informal reputation. A solid reputation affords an opportunity for someone to be recommended to serve as an adviser. That reputation gives the principal permission to initially trust the adviser.

> My credibility was based on the fact of what I was capable of, not necessarily everything that I knew off-hand. And that gets back to the entire issue of the corridor reputation and what people say about you as to what kind of an officer you are. So, if people say "Mike is a good guy" – I'm a good guy. "Mike is someone you can count on." "Mike is someone you want to work with." "Mike is someone you want to work for." Or, "Mike is someone you want to have work

for you." That is the level that establishes my credibility, my trust, and all the things that I need. (M. Polt, November 10, 2015)

The previous Director [of the Joint Staff] was an individual that I had been an Assistant Division Commander for. He knew me well. He knew where I was. He knew what I was doing. And he – without my knowledge, or any input from me … I got a phone call that said, "Your packet is on the Chairman's desk, and you need to be prepared to move in two weeks, and to go be the Vice Director of the Joint Staff." And so it was one of those [things] where somebody else that I had known – that I'd worked for – was putting me in a position where he thought that my knowledge, my expertise, and my ability could be *leveraged* in something that he knew very well. Whether I knew about it or not, *he* did, okay. And he had that trust and belief in me to put me into *that* position. And so, I became the Vice Director [of the Joint Staff]. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

One of the things that I wanted to highlight was the importance of reputation as a component of being a successful adviser. … [F]irst of all, *having* a reputation in the field on which you're advising is critical to getting the person *who* you are advising to sort of listen to you. … Some of them think they know more than they do – and so you have to establish your bona fides in the first place. And frequently, an important part of that is not how much you actually really know, but whether you're *acknowledged* by *others*.… Credible. … [I]t gives the leader permission to *listen* to you, without looking like a sucker – and also causes them, *possibly*, to be more willing to listen to you when what you're telling them doesn't completely jive with their instincts. So, that's a really, really important component of being *selected* as an adviser and being a *successful* adviser. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

The *Secretary* [of Defense] believed that one of the most important things he did was to select senior officers. And he wanted to make sure that his 3-stars and his 4-stars – regardless of Service – were people he was comfortable with. … And he wanted to be comfortable with them from the get go. Knowing that, you know, *tomorrow's crisis* is going to be in one of their areas – and there's always a crisis. … [T]he Secretary of Defense, the DepSecDef, the Chairman, and Vice Chairman literally reviewed *every single package* to 3-star and 4-star – regardless of whether or not it was a job *inside* the Service or *outside* the Service. Over time, what happened was the Service Chiefs would come in, and they would brief the four of us on all their 2-stars and 1-stars; who their *future* leaders were; the guys they were looking at to be in certain positions. So, over time, we really had a very good feel for the individuals who would best be J-3s [deputy chief of staff for operations], and who would best be J-4s [deputy chief of staff for logistics], who would best be J-5s [deputy chief of staff for strategy and plans]. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

The distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was that it was continuous over a long period of time. Participants noted that the experience of actively determining and considering the reputation of current and potential advisers happened all the time, in every assignment. Over time, a principal became aware of the reputations of individuals by listening to what was said about them. Advisers came and went (as a result of the reassignment policies of the government), and principals moved from one leadership position to another. As a result, the experience of determining and evaluating the formal and informal reputation of advisers—whether those the principal was inheriting (when moving to a new leadership position) or those being considered to fill a vacancy in the principal's organization—was deliberate, never ending, and built on earlier experiences vetting the reputation of other advisers.

Adviser ability to see big picture (strategic-level view of the issues). National-level principals must tackle intractable problems with profound consequences.

> I think, to be a competent leader at that [national strategic] level, you have to be able to have the ability to kind of rise up out of the issue of the day – or the days – or the issue of the month – and take a God's eye view of the issue. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

As a result, participants stated that they trusted those advisers who had demonstrated their ability to take a strategic view, understand the complexity of the situations about which they are providing advice, provide options for achieving the desired national strategic goals, and offer that advice within a larger context.

> I think I probably realized *how important it was* for a senior leader [Army Chief of Staff] to be getting advice from people who saw the *big picture*. Who weren't just looking at the thing from their own silo. They understood how their silo fit, and how the decisions that the Army had to make – and the decisions that the Chief had to make – played across the whole Army, and not just across their own area. (G. Casey, March 5, 2016)

> [There is] a core old saw that you've probably heard before – that you get to lieutenant colonel, maybe even to colonel, by doing things right. In other words, you're efficient. If you're going to go *any further*, that's *no longer* what you will be measured on. That will be *assumed*. And you will be measured not on doing things right, but deciding on the right things [to do]. In other words, it's a higher order function. It's not about narrowly defined performance. But it's about getting the big ideas *right*. And, my sense is that anyone who can do that will then be sought as an adviser. (M. Hayden, January 13, 2016)

> You're not simply looking for a *different knowledge base*. You're looking for a different *perspective*. You're looking for … somebody who will be in sympathy with your vision – in the broadest sense – but who, at any given moment, will have a knowledgeable, reasoned, loyal view as to where this fits into the larger context – and how best this can be moved forward. (W. Wood, March 15, 2016)

> I had someone who advised me on Middle East policy who [was] really terrific. … [H]e was, sort of, my principal Middle East adviser, you know, at a time when we were dealing with Iraq, and Iran, and, you know, a number of our partners in the Gulf States. And he was not only good – sort of in the day-to-day making sure I had the information I needed and making sure that I was well-prepared for the meetings on Middle East issues – but he was also very strategic and forward thinking. He was trying to get out ahead of the current discussion to anticipate where it needed to go and then to build some intellectual capital that would enable us to kind of bring that to the table early – and often *first* – and sort of *shape* the discussion and where it was going. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

> She was one of the people that briefed me during my transition period, while I was getting spun up for my confirmation hearing. And I remember being just *super impressed* by how much she knew and the way she *thought* about the enterprise. … [S]he was one of the few people who seemed to kind of *get* what [the organization] could be and do…. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

Several distinguishing features characterized this experience. The first was the realization that advisers were considering issues and providing recommendations on topics that had exceptionally significant consequences. The second distinguishing feature was that it required higher order thinking. At the national strategic level, it no longer sufficed to have advisers who could do things right; they had to be able to determine the right things to do. That is, they had to have the ability to analyze and evaluate situations and create recommendations; the ability to think critically; and the ability to propose solutions. The third distinguishing feature was that it involved a combination of cognition and behavior. The fourth distinguishing feature was that the ability to take a strategic view of various issues could be contextually or socially dependent, or both.

Adviser anticipating the principal's needs; telling the principal what they "need to know," not what they "want to hear." Together with being able to take a strategic view, participants stated that a trusted adviser was someone who demonstrated that they could anticipate the principal's needs and deliver advice that focused on what they needed to know, even when it was not what they wanted to hear. Principals trusted those advisers who presented the facts, offered their interpretation of those facts, and then recommended a course of action.

> I had a very good Deputy Chief of Mission, who was very intelligent, and savvy, and really knew what he was doing. And I could *count on him* to *anticipate* what we would need – or what *I* might need – and to always give me a judicious reading of what the situation might be, in order to keep us out of trouble. Not in the sense that, you know, "Don't be bold, or don't be brave about something," but just – he had really good judgment. … [I]f I told him something needed to be done, he would do it. And, a lot of times, I didn't even *need* to tell him – because he would anticipate. (C. Martinez, February 25, 2016)

> I had conversations [with my trusted advisers] saying, "Look guys, I don't want you to give me information that you think is going to make it easier for me with [the Secretary]. It's my responsibility, not to *please* [the Secretary], but to tell him what I think is *important* from a military perspective for this operation. That's what you've got to help me with (tapping table)." (G. Casey, 16 March 2016)

> I think [my trusted adviser] was willing to tell me what…. You know, he was willing to be very candid with me. So, he was willing to tell me what I *needed* to hear, as opposed to what I *wanted* to hear. He was willing to *dissent*. He was willing to say "I don't know, but I'll find out." He was willing to, you know, take some *risk* to be as candid as possible, I guess, is what I would say. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

> I valued the fact that he would tell me what I *needed* to hear, not necessarily what I wanted to hear. And, to me, that is extremely important in an adviser. … I mean, you need honest, critical feedback. And, I've always looked for that in an adviser. I don't need a lot of accolades. I need hard-hitting advice. … I like to

> say, "Feedback is a gift. What you do with it is up to you." (L. Long, March 9, 2016)

> Put yourself in the position of the person you're advising. If you were the President of the United States, what would [he] … *need* to hear from you, as his adviser? … [I]f you're advising me, don't tell me everything you know. Tell me what *I need to know*. … Make sure I know when you're telling me what you know to be *fact* – and when you're extrapolating from your *experience*. But give me the *benefit* of that. You know, don't just tell me fact A, B, C and D – and leave it up to me to come up with E. *Tell me* what you think that all means. … I need you to not only tell me what you know the facts to be, but *interpret that for me* based on your experience. It's *up to me* to make a judgment call as to whether or not I'm going to take any action, or whether or not I agree. But if you're advising me, I need *not only* the presentation of facts, but I need your *experience and wisdom* to take those facts then and to come to a conclusion. To the best you can come to one – as an adviser to me – about what I might be *doing about that*. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> [When I was Deputy J5,] I took the briefing into the Chairman. … And the issue was *so complex*, and *so hard*, that I didn't make a recommendation. I said, "Those are the options. What do you think?" And he looked at me and said (chuckle), "You mean, I don't get a recommendation?" And as soon as he said it, I said [to myself], "*What a dumb a*** [I had been]!" And I really appreciated it as the Chief [of Staff of the Army], because you *need* someone to say, "This is what I think you should do" – so you have something to push against. And he doesn't care if it's right or wrong – he wants to know what you think, so he has something to push against. (G. Casey, March 5, 2016)

The distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was that it demanded the national leader to develop a mental closeness with their strategic adviser. The principal needed to know that their adviser understood of what the decision maker was thinking in order for the adviser to be able to anticipate the principal's needs, determine what the principal actually needed to know to deal with the situation, and then provide advice that added value to the principal's decision making process.

Adviser willingness to be honest with the principal, tell the whole truth, and challenge the principal's thinking. In addition to being able to think strategically and anticipate the principal's needs, participants stated that they trusted an adviser who demonstrated they could be honest with the principal. That meant telling the whole truth and not omitting bad news. Telling the truth included the trusted adviser being blunt when they thought the principal was veering off course or doing something that was wrong. Participants noted that they trusted an adviser who demonstrated a willingness to take risks in order to challenge the principal's thinking about or approach to issues. This went so far as principals encouraging their own advisers to present views contrary to those of their principal in front of even more senior leaders—thus ensuring that the decision maker had the benefit of all points of view. Participants cautioned against surrounding oneself with advisers who agreed with them—noting that they actively sought trusted advisers willing to present dissenting viewpoints. Participants trusted those advisers willing to endure the principal's displeasure in order to deliver the truth.

> [Trusted advisers must] always be *honest*. Tell the *truth*. And tell the *whole truth*. You know, it's just as bad to *omit* a fact or a piece of information as it is to not tell the truth. [G]et *comfortable in delivering bad news*. (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

> I selected [a trusted adviser], primarily after watching him perform for a while, for a couple of reasons. One, he was really quite intelligent…. But probably more importantly, he was fearless as far as making recommendations. He had no problem saying, "Hey general, have you really thought about this, and what the consequences would be?" And I think that is *unbelievably* valuable. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

> I had a Chief of Staff. Very smart. … He ended up being *my* Chief of Staff at DNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence]. And then, when I went to CIA, I brought him *with me* as Chief of Staff. Very smart; very plugged in; very, very candid and honest in his advice to me. Not afraid to say, "No." Not afraid to kind of say, "Well, let me tell you how this looks from *his* point of view" kind of conversation. … I am pretty confident when I think I'm right. And occasionally, these guys will point out [that] *sometimes right is not enough*. "*Let me tell you how this is going to look."* (M. Hayden, February 12, 2016)

> I've made a decision. The room is vacated. My key adviser stayed behind. And he looked at me and said, "Are you *sure* you want to do that?" *That's a gift*! That's *really* a gift because … he didn't say it publicly; he didn't countermand me;

didn't *say* I was wrong. Just simply said, "Are you *sure* you want to do that?" (M. Hayden, January 13, 2016)

I admired most those individuals who came *closest* to what I try to demand of *myself* – which was straight shooters who told me what they knew, and told me what they didn't know, and told me what they were extrapolating, and told me when they'd made mistakes, and fleshed in the details when they went away and had a chance to think about it. I mean, [my executive assistant] … knows me probably better than anybody other than my family. And I *know* that if I make a decision about something, and she knows that that's not who I want to be, she'll tell me. Or she'll come back and say, "Mmm, I want to give you another chance to think about this one." (chuckles) And, it's beautiful. … I need people, not only to fulfill their *specific* role of advising on whatever the topic is, but probably – *more importantly* – to help keep me on track. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016 – B)

[The] President was actually famous for soliciting dissent. And once you get a reputation as someone who's *willing* to speak up and break – you know, and speak *apart* from the consensus view, you know, it became almost a joke. Where he's like, "Okay, do you agree?" (laughs) There were a couple other people too – it was not just me – but there were a few people he would sort of, you know, kind of know that if we were becoming victims of Groupthink, there were a few people he would turn to and say, "Okay, tell us what we're missing." I think that was a sign of trust. I took that as a real sign of trust. Even though it was irritating to other people, sometimes. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

My last executive assistant was an Army field artillery officer – Army colonel. … The thing that [he] had that I loved … [he] would come in periodically and say, "I know were kind of heading down this path on this particular policy – or whatever – and I think that's wrong." … [T]he Army colonel was not intimidated by the Air Force 4-star, who pretty much had a lot of control over what's going to happen to him next (chuckle). … [H]e would come in, and he would give me his opinion. His opinion would be informed by the other colonels and [Navy] captains on the close staff. And he'd come in and deliver the message. Or sometimes, it was his message. … To have somebody like [him] being able to walk in that office and tell me that was just invaluable. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

I had a couple of bosses who rewarded – even when they got angry – they *rewarded* people taking risk to give their best advice. [T]he Undersecretary [of Defense for Policy] at the time … had something he called the Memo of Conscience (chuckle). He said, "You can't write them every other week. But, on the rare occasion where you think that my advice … to the Secretary is really, *really wrong*, and you think were about to make a *huge* mistake, I will sponsor you. I will forward to the Secretary, along with my own memo, your Memo of Conscience that states your dissent, and why. So the Secretary has the benefit of that view, even though I will also say I don't agree with it. But I will make sure

> the Secretary hears that dissent if it's really, really important." That's pretty good! (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

> If you find yourself with advisers that are constantly agreeing with everything you do (chuckle), you need to get a reality check and get some more criticism around you. … I mean, it's human nature to want that, but it's *really dangerous*. … I need to bring in some people that are pretty critical of my work. Those people are *really important* … because you can see where you *might* fail before you actually do. I wish I would have, earlier on, had the confidence to surround myself with more people that *would really take me on*, be really difficult. … I would have learned earlier if I had a flaw in my *plan* – or a *flaw* in my approach. It isn't until later in life when you have the confidence to ask for that. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

> And I don't care who you are – if you're the President, his Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint – I don't care who you are, you need *other* brains, other than your own, involved. And if … you ever wonder whether or not you should be speaking up, put yourself in *that* leader's position. Would you like to be talking to your subordinates, and knowing that they're listening, and questioning, and critical of your judgment, and will speak up helping you get to a *better* decision? Or, do you want them to all be "yes men" and "yes women" – so all you have to go on is your own brain power? [W]hich would you have more confidence in? The one where you are speaking, and everybody else's heads are going up and down, and only your brain is at work? Or where you're speaking, everybody else is listening, they're being critical, they're helping you flesh it out, and helping you come to a better decision? The answer in my mind is the second one obviously. And that's true at every level. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> The thing that surprised me is that, even when you have bad news or dissent or you're telling somebody something they *really* don't want to hear, in the moment they may be very angry with you about it. But, I was fortunate, in most of my experience – after a decent interval, when emotions calmed down, they actually *appreciated me more*. They *valued me more* as an adviser for having pissed them off with something they didn't want to hear (chuckles). But they valued … they realized [it] was important and they needed to hear. So that the sort of tolerance for confrontation or friction in that moment actually – that allowed me to make a contribution that actually increased my value. Pissed them off in the moment – or made them angry in the moment – but made them value me *more* as an adviser over time. And *built trust*. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

Like the previous experience, the distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was its need for mental closeness between the national-level principal and their strategic adviser—in order for the adviser to know whether and when the principal appeared to be going off course. In addition, this experience was distinguished by the need for higher order thinking—to analyze the situation being presented to the principal by their advisers, think critically about the issues at hand, and evaluate the solutions proposed by the adviser—as well as by the realization of the significant consequences of the issues for which advice was sought.

Adviser consistently giving credible advice, being willing to say "I don't know," and admitting mistakes. While participants valued and trusted those advisers willing to stand their ground and challenge the principal, they recognized that what mattered in the end was that the advice turned out to be accurate, and they trusted advisers who consistently gave such advice. They also knew from their own service that advisers make mistakes, or may not know the answer to the question being asked. Participants noted that their trust in an adviser rose when that adviser demonstrated a willingness to admit that they didn't know the answer and an ability to admit mistakes when they happened.

> *Absolutely* – I perceived him as being trustworthy – which was really the *foundation* of the relationship that we had. And part of it was, he was trustworthy in the sense that he provided me information that was valuable, that was accurate, that was consistent. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> To me, trustworthiness has a pretty straightforward meaning – which is that I trust you to be *honest*. Give me your *best judgment*. And probably *as* important, I trust you to be honest about when you *don't really know the answer* – so don't send me down the garden path because you don't want to admit that you don't know the answer. (C. Wagner, February 17, 2016)

> About the third question in, I said to him, "Mr. President, I don't have a *clue*, but I'll find out." And you could see the President just *relax*. Because he realized that I was not going to fill him full of stuff that I didn't know. And I wasn't going to try to tell him that I was an expert in everything. And he's told me since that, for the six years I had the privilege of doing that with him, he always trusted my judgment, because he knew that I was going to make sure he knew; what I knew for a fact; what I was extrapolating from what I knew as facts; and what I needed to go back and get more details on. He always appreciated the fact that *he* knew,

> not only *what* I was saying, but what I was *basing it on*. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> If you give them bad information, get back to them *quick*. … [M]ost senior leaders have been around the block enough that [they] understand that things change. Especially in fluid situations. But … especially when they're doing media things, you've got to get to them as quickly as you can. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> Well, *as soon as* you discover it's wrong, you go *right to* whomever you gave the wrong information to. You *don't* try and cover it up. You *don't* hope that it's going to go away – bad news doesn't get better with time. And certainly in the business of intelligence, there are a lot of unknowns. As intelligence professionals, we are making our *best estimates*. What is *important* is to convey the confidence *associated* with those estimates. … And then, if we get *additional* information that either *contradicts* or *amplifies*, it is our responsibility to put that information forward as *soon* as possible, again, with the level of confidence with this *new* piece of information. (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

> It seems to me that you give your best advice. And if it turns out that *you* find out that your best advice wasn't correct, that it is *your* responsibility to correct what you got wrong. Or if you do something, and it turns out that it doesn't work out the way you thought, to report back that it *didn't work out*. I mean, if I have a subordinate who comes to me and says, "*Hey sir, I kicked this one into the stands*," that's somebody I can trust! It means that (a) they're smart enough to know they don't know everything; (b) they've recognized their mistake; and (c) they're going to come to me and tell me, so I don't have to find out on my own. As opposed to a subordinate who *might* think, "*Well, if I don't say anything, maybe they won't notice.*" You know, now you have *two* problems. You've got a problem that you don't know about. And, two, you've got an individual you can't trust. So, I mean, to my mind, very black and white as far as trustworthiness and being a straight shooter. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

This experience was distinguished by several characteristics. Similar to the two previous experiences, one was that the principal needed to be mentally close to their adviser—in order for the principal to be comfortable that their adviser knew what information would be of value to the situation at hand. A second was the significance of the consequences of the issues being considered, which demanded that the principal trust that their adviser would admit mistakes and not risk those consequences by presenting information they did not know to be accurate.

Adviser and principal sharing a crisis. Several participants noted that the perception of an adviser's trustworthiness could rise during a crisis situation. While this was true for career professionals, it was even more pronounced for principals who were political appointees. In a crisis situation, a politically appointed principal had no choice but to trust their career professional advisers, and those advisers had an opportunity to demonstrate their trustworthiness.

> The catalyst was 9/11. It was sitting in the National Military Command Center – side by side – [the Secretary of Defense] and [me] – trying to figure out what we should do next to protect the country – to protect our military. And I think that seeing each other in a crisis situation – seeing how we behaved – and the bonding that goes in when you're sitting in a Command Center that is filling up with smoke (that we eventually had to evacuate, because the fire was still burning in the Pentagon), I think it was a real turning point in trying to develop a trusting relationship. … [T]he bombing that happened the day of 9/11 – in the Pentagon – while I was acting Chairman (when the Chairman was out of town) I think was – sort of changes that relationship forever. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

> In the early hours after the 9/11 breaking news, when I was at my residence, staring at the TV – my second day on the job. Standing there, watching the Twin Towers come down, and knowing that I had the responsibility of overseeing an [embassy] of about 1,500 people, with six Consulates spread around Germany. … At that point, I had to *rely* on those [in the embassy] who *did have* the experience; who had been well-trained in addressing these kinds of situations. … I was grateful for the fact that we had experienced people there that could give *me* the kind of advice I needed, in terms of making the right decisions. (D. Coats, February 24, 2016)

> I *do believe* that there's a different understanding amongst political appointees…. That plays out interestingly in the national security arena, because for the *most* part, other than in the military, folks are coming *into* those positions where folks they've worked with have not always been that trustworthy and that forthcoming. … And it takes a little while – normally a *crisis* – for the new folks in the new administration to come to appreciate the fact that, no kidding, the military guys and gals who are there, *regardless* of who put them in their position, are loyal to the Constitution of the United States … are going to try to serve the country as best they can. … [T]he folks who may have gotten their jobs by – oh, what's the right word – "jockeying for position" or "advantage" over others to get to the jobs they were in – *some of them* have a hard time accepting the military ethos until they've had a chance to see it in action. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> I mean, as sad as it sounds, truly, a *crisis speeds up the interaction* between people. It puts you in a position where you *must* – because you can't do everything yourself, and because the timelines are so tight – you absolutely *must trust* other people's judgments. And when you're *forced into that* – the sooner you get *forced* into that, and the sooner you *must* trust other people's judgments, and you see the results of those trusting – those judgments – you – your *team* comes together. The crucible of the crisis brings out *weaknesses* in some of the people. I mean, it doesn't mean that everybody is going to trust me. At the end of a crisis, there's people you trust and people you don't trust. But it helps you more quickly get to the understanding of who those people are who should be trusted, and who those people are who should not be. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> As a 3-star … in the National Security Council process … folks who had never been around the military before – in the other agencies – weren't sure whether or not they could trust you and believe you. And that was a *disconcerting feeling* for me. … I'd *never* come across anybody not having the basis being: "*We trust you until you prove us wrong."* The basis [for political appointees] was: "*We're not sure we can trust you. You've got to prove that we can."* And that to me was a total 180 from the way I led my *entire life* before that. But again, after the first crisis – and you showed (one) that you're loyal to the Constitution and the Commander-in-Chief, and [two] that what you said people could rely on, you know, that quickly turned around. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

The experience of sharing a crisis was characterized by two distinguishing features. The first was that the fact that the mental closeness between the national-level principal and their strategic advisers was furthered by sharing a crisis. A second was that in order to utilize the crisis to determine whether the principal's own strengths and weaknesses were compensated by those of their advisers required a deep understanding both of oneself and of others.

Adviser adding value to principal's decision making. Participants trusted those individuals who gave advice that was value added, from the perspective of the principal receiving the advice. Adding value could include helping the national-level principal remain focused on the strategic view rather than the current crisis, or broadening the principal's perspective by providing relevant information, or answering the unasked question, or offering a view outside the adviser's own narrow area of responsibility.

I think it's important that you have someone who *keeps you focused on a strategic view*. Because, it's very easy, particularly in dealing with national-level strategy, to get caught up in the *current crisis*. … [You need to] anticipate possibilities and prepare for possibilities. And then, as the situation changes, things will become more clear. But, you've got to continue to cast that line further out, so you continue to look out there. And what the realm of possibility is, so that you can see courses and potentials that are out there, and provide advice accordingly. … And so, you've got to continually be looking *longer range*. … And it's important to have something that *drives you to continue to do that*. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

What do you want from a strategic adviser? I want someone who will broaden *my* thinking on things. And [he] was able to do that, and these two assessments [he wrote] are good examples of how he broadened not only *my* thinking on things, but *other* people – *other national leaders*. … Your responsibility as a senior leader is to prepare the organization for success in the future. And if you don't have other people or an organization *within* your organization helping *you* think about and prepare for the future, you're not going to be successful." (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

[I was surprised to learn] how *hungry* decision makers are for good, relevant, operational advice. I *never* really appreciated how *lonely* it can be to be a decision maker – and how *terrifying* it is to have an important decision to make, and to not be able to find *anyone* who can give you advice that answers – that helps you reach that decision. I've been in that position a couple of times. It's *lousy*. (W. Wood, March 15, 2016)

Sometimes in the military, we have to *answer the unasked question.* … And what I came to realize was … how *little* that accumulated group really *understood*.… I *didn't fully understand* the foundational knowledge level of the people I was talking to. … I assumed everybody else had – maybe not the same level, but a similar level of understanding [to mine]. And *it just wasn't true*! … So, the point for advisers is, you need to appreciate the level of knowledge and understanding of your audience. The person you're advising [chuckles]. [J]ust because they're in a position senior to you doesn't mean they know everything. It used to drive me crazy when people would come in to brief me as the Army Chief of Staff. And they'd say, "*As you know, Chief.*" And (laughs) I'd say, "I don't know anything." (G. Casey, March 5, 2016)

When I became Vice Chairman … I went to my first NSC meeting. And I was sitting there, and the topic was not about the military. But I wasn't comfortable with what was being said. And I'd promised myself that I was never going to leave a room, not having said what was on my mind. So I said – at the NSC meeting, I said to the President, "Mr. President, this is a little bit out of my lane, but…" And that's as far as I got. He said "[General], as long as you're in this room, *nothing* is out of your lane." So, I told him what I was thinking. Two days

> later, I went back to my next NSC meeting. And again, there's a topic that had nothing to do with the military – but I'm thinking, you know, Joe Six Pack down at 7-11 isn't going to get this. So I'm going to say something. (chuckle) So, I said – again, you know, I'm a new guy in the NSC process, and I don't want to be offensive – so, I try to put it on the table gently, and I said, "Mr. President, this is a little bit out of my lane, but…" That's as far as I got the second time. He said "[General]! Didn't I tell you two days ago that as long as you're in this room, *nothing's* out of your lane?" I said, "Mr. President, you *did* tell me that. And you will *not* have to tell me that again." But what the President did was, he said to me – and everybody else in the room, "Just because there's a quote "expert" talking, and it's not your area of expertise, *I* still want your brain engaged. I – the President – still want your brain engaged. I want you asking questions. I want you to be comfortable." And, oh-by-the-way, without telling me, he also told me that just because I was wearing a uniform in the room, he expected everybody else in the room to be asking me questions about military operations. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

Three distinguishing features characterized this experience. The first was that the principal needed to be close enough to their adviser, mentally, to determine whether the advisers understood what actually added value to the principal's decision making process. The second was the need for higher order thinking, where the principal could analyze the advice provided, and think critically about the issue and the proposed course of action. The third distinguishing characteristic was that the experience was dependent both on the context of the problem and the social relationship between the principal and their advisers.

Adviser sharing principal's views, agenda, goals, principles and values. Participants emphasized that in order to gain the trust of the principal, advisers had to demonstrate that they share the principal's view of the problem, vision, goals, and values, are focused on solving the principal's problems, are trying to help the principal, and are invested in the outcome.

> This adviser thing is not simply … a logical construct. … You know, I trust somebody's judgment – not necessarily because it makes sense, but because something in *me* tells me that they're kind of viewing the problem the way I am.

The words mean the same thing to them that the words me to mean. That the colors are the same colors to them as the colors are to me. That the notes are the same to them as the notes are to me. And that, therefore, they're worth listening to. (W. Wood, February 23, 2016)

But the *real* reason [I trusted the adviser] … is [that] it quickly became apparent to me that we shared *common values* in terms of our outlook on life. The *seriousness* with which we took our job. The *rigor* that he approached his job with matched what I considered to be mine. And so, it was all that *like-mindedness*, if you will. But at the end of the day, if I had to, you know … if you're going to poke a little bit on *why* we came together, I would have to say it was because we had a *shared belief system* and a *shared set of values*. (R. Burgess, January 27, 2016)

Find somebody who … shares your vision, and cares about *outcomes*, and is willing to help you achieve them. … [P]ick your *own* advisers. Pick your own advisers based on what? They share your vision (taps table). … And you've got enough of a rapport with them that you can be comfortable and trust them. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

It's a valuable thing when [the national-level principal] discovers that, actually, the [advisers] are more interested in solving *his* problems than in having him solve *theirs*. … For me, trustworthiness means a sense that the adviser will *help* you and *not hurt* you, if he can. And by that I mean he will give you … *good* advice. And, he will not then run out to the press and undermine your position in order to aggrandize his. Trustworthiness *can't mean* confidence that the person who is advising you has no personal agenda – because *everybody* has a personal agenda. It *can't mean* the person advising you has no preferences, and is merely a vehicle for your will – because *everybody* has preferences. Trustworthiness simply means that the guy will try to help you, and will *absolutely not* try to hurt you. And trustworthiness is not sainthood – and it's particularly not martyrdom. There *are* some saints out there. There *are* some martyrs out there. But if you demand that as a requirement for accepting advice, you're going to be listening to *damn few* people – and they're going to be a little peculiar. (W. Wood, February 23, 2016)

I can visualize [people] that have been around me – that have been my advisers, I can sense their commitment to me – to make sure I'm successful – at my mission. Not just personally, but *at my mission*. They feel it, and I appreciate that sense of duty, and it makes me *trust them more* because they're invested. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinguishing features. One was the need for a sufficient mental closeness between national-level principal and their strategic adviser that the principal could be certain the adviser actually did share their views, agenda, goals, principles and values. The second was the need for the principal to have a deep understanding of themselves (specifically, their own values, principals, goals, etc.) and of their advisers.

Adviser demonstrating discretion. Participants were clear that trusted advisers were those who demonstrated their ability to be discrete. Advice, especially when it contradicted what the principal was most inclined to do or pointed out a shortcoming in a plan, was best given in private, and that advice had to stay private. A trusted adviser was someone who the principal could use to discuss contentious options, debate difficult issues, and share raw opinions without worrying their comments would be repeated outside that room.

> You know, in our business, I know the guy can pass a polygraph. I'm going past that, because just because you can pass a polygraph, doesn't mean that I'm going to put *full trust and confidence* in you with *everything*. So, he demonstrated to me – and I was able to watch – that conversations I had with him that were private, *stayed* private! (R. Burgess, January 27, 2016)

> [The principals] would use me to bounce ideas off … that I think that they didn't want, maybe, their staff to know. Or maybe, that they were unsure about. Something they wanted to ask me. You could ask me something, and that's not going to get around to your whole staff. Or it's not going to make you look indecisive. Or that you don't know something. You can ask me. And they were confident I wouldn't go tell anybody. And I *wouldn't*! And so, I was a good sounding board…. [Y]ou can say anything to me. This isn't going to go anywhere – this isn't going to go out of this room. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

> I never heard chatter while [this adviser] was working for me that … he was going – talking behind my back and telling people things, talking out of school to people. Because, a lot of folks – when you're debating *really hard issues,* people aren't necessarily comfortable with that … with that kind of debate. But you *have to have* that kind of debate to sharpen your thinking on things. And so people can get … can walk out and say, "Well, that dumb SOB, you know, he doesn't know [anything]." (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

> I also didn't worry about sharing things in confidence with him, which becomes really important at our level. … [H]e was always very discreet. He only shared information I provided him if he asked. And I had confidence that I could share fairly *raw* opinions of things and have him help me understand, maybe, another way of looking at things. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

There were two distinguishing characteristics to this experience. One was that the adviser's demonstration of discretion was something that was continuously built in the perceptions of the principal, and those perceptions could be undone. The principal had to discern that the adviser was always discrete. The second was that the principal actually was able to perceive the adviser's behavior as demonstrating discretion.

In summary, when reflecting on their service as national-level principals who were being advised by others, participants' perceptions of the trustworthiness of those advisers was influenced by the experiences with those advisers in several areas. These included the reputation that the adviser had developed; their demonstrated ability to maintain a strategic view of the issue; their demonstrated ability to anticipate the needs of the principal and tell them what they needed to know; their demonstrated willingness to be honest, to the point of challenging the principal; their demonstrated ability to consistently give accurate advice, admit when they did not know the answer, and admit and correct their mistakes; their demonstrated ability to add value to the principal's decision making; their demonstration that they shared the principal's view of the problem, vision, goals, and values; and their demonstrated discretion when it came to discussions between the principal and adviser. Having shared a moment of crisis accelerated the perception that the adviser was trustworthy.

Several characteristics of the experiences which led the principal to perceive an adviser as trustworthy were apparent. Most of these experiences had multiple characteristics. Nearly all of the experiences that led to the principal perceiving the adviser as trustworthy included the characteristic of mental closeness between the principal and that adviser. Several of the experiences were continuous over a long period of time, either being built or being undone; required higher order thinking; or as a combination of cognition and behavior; or by the exceptionally significant consequences of the problems being addressed; or were dependent on the context of the problem and the social relationship between the principal and their advisers. Two of the experiences required the principal to have a deep understanding of themselves and their advisers.

Adviser's Experiences that Developed the Principal's Perception of Adviser's Trustworthiness. The right-hand column in Table 4.3 reflects observations of participants while considering the time they spent serving as strategic advisers to national-level leaders. The column summarizes the participant's views of their own experiences that led to them being perceived as being trustworthy advisers by the principal they were advising.

Learning while doing every job. Participants emphasized that there are no courses to prepare someone to be an adviser at the national-strategic level. Having demonstrated their ability at one level, participants described how they would be given a more challenging assignment advising at a higher level. Each position was different from the last, and in order to be perceived as trustworthy by the principal they were advising, they had to *learn how to do* that job at the same time they were *doing* the job.

> One of the challenges was, I mean, really I was *learning* as I was doing it. It was on-the-job training. And it was *all new* to me. It wasn't just that it was a new *job*. It was *all new*. … [A]ll of a sudden, I'm in this joint policy / program / budget / requirements world. And the *lingo* was new. The *landscape* was new. The *players* were new. And I was surrounded by a lot of *very senior*, *very smart* people. So that was a real challenge.   (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

Those lessons *stuck with me* throughout my career. Because I found that, as you move through a career, you're always occupying a position that you've never occupied before. And it doesn't matter whether it's in your line of traditional expertise or not. You've got to learn *how to operate* in that position and *that there are ways to do it*. And, invariably, I would go looking for reference documents, right off the bat – before I even got *into* the job – to try to learn what the job was all about, what it entailed, what it meant, and what was documented, and where was it documented. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016) I didn't know everything in *any* job I ever went into. I mean, I had more experience, more knowledge, more expertise, my ability to do things – but I learned in *every single job that I ever went into*. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

When you're an *adviser*, you're certainly in the help mode – but you're also in the *learning* mode. As I was an adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs – as a brigadier and as a 3-star – I was *learning* the operating environment at the national security level for the United States of America. By the time I *got into that environment* at the national level, when I was *a player* in that environment, I had learned it – as a brigadier and as a 3-star – and I felt like I was *better prepared to deal with it*. So, you're *working*, but you're *learning*. And I didn't necessarily *think of myself* as – that I was *preparing myself* for another level. … But you're *growing* as well as contributing as an adviser. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

[As] a 1-star, I was the Director of Requirements for a very big Air Force command. … And again, it was an area I'd never worked in before. … And so, I spent the next two weeks in immersion on programs I knew very little about – absorbed all that – and then stood up and gave the briefings on our various programs, their status, and all that sort of thing. … [At U.S.] Space Command, I had no background in space. So, the first thing I had to do was establish at least a modicum of competency in things "space." I had to throw myself into that to really understand what we're talking about, here, and all the different facets of space. I mean, I had to educate myself or have the staff help educate me. … And I think the way you establish your credibility is, work your butt off to become familiar with what your territory is. And I didn't have the luxury of having been in the Operational Requirements Generation business before, so I had to learn. The same at Space [Command] – I had to learn. And I worked really hard at learning things that I was just totally unfamiliar [with], and visiting places, and being open to anybody that wanted to help me – enlisted – officer – whoever knew (chuckle). "Come tell me, so I can get smarter on these issues." (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

The distinguishing feature that characterized this experience for a strategic adviser was that it was continuous. To be perceived as trustworthy, advisers had to continue to learn about every new job they undertook—while simultaneously doing that job. Failing to do so could undo the principal's perception of the adviser's trustworthiness.

"Being in the room" with a strategic leader – learning to see the world through that principal's eyes. All but one of the participants recounted their time serving as the executive assistant to a national-level leader as one of the most important experiences in terms of allowing them to be perceived as trustworthy. Working on a close and continuous basis with a national-level principal, who was also serving as a strategic adviser to someone even more senior, offered participants the first opportunity in their careers to see the world through the eyes of those operating at the national strategic level, observe how those individuals addressed very complex problems, and see what national-level leaders were looking for in those advisers they trusted (as well as those that were not successful). It also allowed them to serve as the interlocutor between the principal and their trusted advisers.

> [I was] the Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence [for three years]. And that was the beginning of – truly – my role as a strategic adviser. Because, at that time, the Director was a member of the cabinet. … I was working with a Director who was seized with working the business of national security, the role of intelligence, given the fact that, in this case, *he* was a senior adviser to the President of the United States … I was dealing on a day-to-day, 24/7 basis, with a senior decision maker in the person of the Director of Central Intelligence … and that was my first exposure to, you know, the role. … Very few people sit right next to the principal for all those hours, all those years. (J. DeTrani, January 15, 2016)

> It's a combination of the experiences that you've had (and I've been lucky in that, too), and then also watching how more senior individuals handle themselves … like when I worked [as the military assistant to] the DepSecDef, or I worked [as the executive assistant to] the head of the CIA…. [T]hey took me everywhere they went. I was not excluded from anything. So I knew almost as much as they knew – on a day-to-day basis – and they would give advice, and I said "Oh, that's an interesting way to say that," or "Whoa, that's not exactly what I would have said." (M. Hagee, October 9, 2015)

I had two experiences as a younger officer to be an aide-de-camp to more senior leaders. … [T]he second time … I was a senior military aide to the Secretary of the Army. … I got to sit in the back of the room when the Secretary of the Army had conversations with others at a *very senior* level that affected the entire structure of the Army. I got to watch a senior leader who had great responsibilities, and how *he* went about *his* business of taking input from *his* staff, how he took input from others *outside* his staff, and then how he developed that and carried ideas and thoughts forward that he thought needed to be implemented. So there's an apprenticeship to this, I think, of being able to observe and understand and see how decisions are made and outcomes are achieved at a senior level. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

For two years, first as the Director for Initiatives and then as the Special Assistant to the four-star, I had a daily opportunity to either witness [advising at the strategic level] or to participate as an adviser to that senior leader – who had pretty significant responsibilities. And *that* experience – and it was a really important experience for me – shaped how *I* used advisers and how I tried to *be one* for the people that, as I moved through my career and found myself as a senior adviser…. I would say this was the *preparatory* job that gets me ready for the ones that come later – where I'm a general officer advising general officers. [In that job,] I'm a colonel learning, for the first time, how to really deal with it. … [A]s his special assistant, [I] sat in every meeting and then, after the visitors had left, talked with him about what actions needed to come from that – and the direction we needed to go. … I was comfortable that, while I wasn't the most brilliant person around him, I was someone that he trusted to give him the best advice possible. (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

At the end of my time as a brigadier [general] on the Joint Staff, I was assigned to [an Ambassador] as he was negotiating the end of the Kosovo War. … I got to see the power of military interaction with diplomacy to achieve *significant national results*. … I felt like I had a very good understanding of how policy was shaped, how it could be influenced, and what the military's role was in providing civilian leaders effective military advice. … Those are the things that I felt *most* prepared me to be able to become the strategic adviser. (G. Casey, March 5, 2016)

I was E[xecutive] A[ssistant] as a Lieutenant Colonel to an Army 2-star … in Korea. … I got to watch a man who – in my mind – had enormous integrity. And I watched him go from getting the briefings from *his* subordinates to determining – based on those briefings – what the *next right step* was. And – especially in those cases where the next right step was *not* going to be an easy recommendation to make – to watch him go, as a 2-star, to the Commander-in-Chief [U.S. Forces Korea], who was a 4-star, and lay out why we should be doing whatever it was that we preferred not to be doing, perhaps. And just matter-of-factly giving his *best* advice to his Commander. And doing his homework. And, I think importantly, learning *how to present bad news or contrary news* to a boss in a way that the boss can listen. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016 – B)

> I talked about that *early opportunity* … where I got a chance to watch a senior leader work with a lot of advisers. … *[H]e let me watch the way he made decisions*. And he let me watch advisers who were *very successful* and *trusted* and invited in to provide advice. And I got a chance to observe people that *weren't* successful, that were excused from the discussion. And, if you're smart and you're paying attention to that, you'd rather be in the first group than the second group when it's your turn. So, you want to watch the behaviors that those people had. It's *preparation*. It's a *broad* point of view. *It's recognizing your own biases*. And it's making sure that you're taking into account that *alternative* points of view as you're winding that advice in for the senior leader. It's watching how they make decisions, and presenting things in a way that they can digest it. So, as somebody that had a "seat in the bleachers" to watch how the senior leader worked with senior advisers, and then who was gently mentored into getting to be an adviser by him over time, and then – over time – had a more prominent role, I'm very glad I had that experience.... (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

> I was on [the] National Security Council staff, under [National Security Adviser X], so I got to see the larger picture – the larger considerations – the existence of a *much broader field of view* than you would just simply get from the Air Staff. … [I]t allowed me – intellectually – to have a bigger canvas (chuckles) to work with. But, just in the practical day-to-day functioning of the job, it allowed me to share with three-stars (you know … three ranks my senior!!) that, "You're not thinking about this the right way [chuckles]. You need to *let me tell you how this is going to look on the other side of the river* kind of thing." … [A]nd they appreciate it. (M. Hayden, February 12, 2016)

This experience had three distinguishing characteristics. One was the demand that the adviser develop a mental closeness to the national-level principal they were serving as their day-to-day assistant. The second was the requirement for the adviser to have a deep understanding of themselves (especially their own capabilities and limitations), the principal (and what they really needed), and the situational requirements of the issues being addressed. The third was that the experiences highlighted the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level (in that the courses of action being recommended had both national and international impacts).

Doing the hard work to develop a reputation for consistent excellence. Participants emphasized that they worked hard to develop and maintain their reputations, that is, establishing a track record that showed they could be trusted to get the job done and provide added value to the principal, while remaining in the background. At the same time, they were cognizant that it was possible to damage one's reputation.

> You come in with a certain reputation because you are a colonel or a general or whatever you happen to be carrying in or wearing on your shoulders. But then, as soon as you start interacting, within a relatively short period of time, you're building an additional reputation. You're either building on the reputation you came in with, or you're distracting from it. (M. Hagee, October 9, 2015)

> I think that *every day* I went in to work believing that I needed to work *as hard as I possibly could* that day, and learn *as much as I possibly could* that day, so I could be smarter than yesterday and give better advice than yesterday. And I may not have woken up saying, "Okay, today I'm going to get smarter," but my whole approach to the staff – my whole approach to my job was, "I only know what I know. And I *need to know more*." (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> That gave me opportunity to be in places, to learn things, to be at the right place at the right time where things were happening … to go out and demonstrate that I was up to the task. So the point here being is that the – what we call in the department (I'm sure you have the same thing in the Pentagon) – that "corridor reputation" was a very important element of your career path. (M. Polt, November 10, 2015)

> What you're going to hear from [me] is going to be *accurate*, and there's no dissembling or anything of that nature – so you have a combination of my substantive *expertise* in the area of China, and the *reputation* I established working … at the Central Intelligence Agency, in many jobs, and then eventually becoming the Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence. (J. DeTrani, January 15, 2016)

> I determined a long time ago [that] … I came into this world really with only one thing and that was [my] name. And at the end of the day, with all this other *stuff* that I'm doing or have done, whatever that is and all that, I'm going to go out of this world with one thing and that's [my] name. And so it meant, and still does mean a lot to me, that when people think of that name, you know, I want them to have the right regard for that. And once you put a little nick in that armor, if you will, it's pretty hard to get that back. (R. Burgess, January 13, 2016)

> One way of doing it is to give them updates. "Mr. President, I told you yesterday *this*. I've done some more homework, and this is what you know I want to tell you *now*." Either it's *changed* from yesterday, or this is *additional information*. …. Any question the President asked me I *always wrote down* … even if I had just answered him. Because I'd go back and look at that day's questions, and I

would do my homework, and the next time I saw the President, if there was something else I wanted to add or something I wanted to modify, I would *do that.* And I think that helped. Number one, it helped the process by getting more data to him. But I also think it helped him *trust me* to give him the best I had *at the moment* … but also to know that I was going to *come back with more*. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

[After I became Vice Director of the Joint Staff] we turned the process around in a very short time and started being very responsive to the demands that were being placed on us. The senior adviser to the Secretary of Defense took notice of that right away … that something was different, something had changed, something was going differently. … [W]hat *happene*d as a result of that was that I moved from an *unknown recommended* person who was occupying a position – very rapidly in terms of the close confidante of the Secretary of Defense – to being an individual who had a certain *trustworthiness*. … A trustworthiness in the sense that I would produce *results* for them, and that it was *credible* because it was what they had been looking for that they had not discovered in other ways, and started being *consulted* on things that I had not before. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

I think there was a time of *earning* [the Secretary of Defense's] trust through the quality of the work that we did for him. You know, helping – making sure that the policy organization that I ran was *delivering* to him the analysis, and information, and position papers, and talking points that *he* needed to be successful in both his role in the National Security Council and his role internationally, with counterparts and so forth. … Initially, it was a matter of *earning* that trust by doing good work, and making sure he was well-supported. I think over time, you know, the trust was there because we had a track record. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

To me, an important part about being … a *really good adviser* at that level is, you have to have had the competence and the abilities to develop a reputation that makes you a credible adviser, and yet you still have to be willing to work in the background and be more focused on the outcome than on … continuing to build your personal credit. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

Like the first experience in this section, the distinguishing feature that characterized this experience was that it was one that was continuously built, and could be undone. Just as participants noted, when reflecting on their time as principals, that they were constantly determining and considering the reputation of their advisers, so too they commented that, as advisers, they were constantly either building or undermining their own reputations. The former led to perceptions of their trustworthiness, while the latter detracted from that perception. Another distinguishing feature that characterized this experience was that it involved a combination of cognition and behavior—thinking and working every day to be smarter and provide better advice.

Thinking "for" the principal; anticipating principal's needs; delivering valuable insights. Participants emphasized that a key element to being perceived by the principal as a trustworthy adviser was to have enough experience to be able think *for* that principal, anticipate their needs, and deliver insights that the principal found to be valuable with regard to the decisions they had to make.

> *My experience was [to] win* the trust of the person that you're serving … [you need] the ability to *put yourself in their shoes*. And think through *what do they really need* for them to feel prepared – for them to feel ready for *their* advisory role to the President. And to try to make sure I was not only meeting the sort of stated tasking, but anticipating what *else* he would need that he hasn't directly articulated. And then, I think … understanding *how* this person likes to be advised. *How* do they like to receive their information? … *Two different people* in the same role [SecDef]. You're trying to advise them both. But they want their information in *radically* different ways. And my job was not to complain about that – my job was the day after [one] left and [the other] came in, to turn the whole organization on a dime and make sure we were giving the new Secretary the information that he *needed* – and in the format that he *wanted*. And, you know, no complaints about it. Because that's what we did – that was the job (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

> I think it is primarily … to put yourself in a position of the individual who has the responsibility. Has to make the decisions. And *thinking through* what those requirements – even if they haven't been *stated* by the decision maker – specifically to you. To think it through – *from his point of view* – of what he's being asked to do – to decide. And then, from that, to have adequate response time to try to develop that information in a way that you can provide it when it's needed – so that it can be used, and it's not after-the-fact. And what became a really critical point to me for the rest of the time that I was a Director [of DIA] is that information is *only* valuable, or is *most* valuable, when it can be *applied* to the situation that's at hand. If you find out about it after the fact, it's nice to read – and history – and to know about, but it's not operationally *relevant*, okay. And so, you've got to get it in time. Even if it's the best information you have (tapping

table), it's better than no information at all to contribute to the decision-making process. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

[H]ow do you go about obtaining that [relevant information], so you can provide the *right kind* of strategic advice to the decision maker? So, you have to *understand* the person that you are advising. You have to understand that both the information needs and the intelligence needs. You have to understand the *behaviors* of that individual, and what kinds of questions can you *expect*, so that you can answer those questions. … I mean, he'll take you down levels of detail that are required in order to come to the right decisions. And so, you've really got to anticipate what that is, and go beyond simply what you're being given individually. As a strategic adviser, *you've got to think forward*. And think about what is *really required*. And then *demand* that as much as you can possibly get from those who are providing you the information. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

Advising at the national strategic level – you've got to understand your customer. You've got to understand how they operate. How they like to *receive* information, *process* information. And what's important to them. … You needed to deliver a *good enough solution on time*, as opposed to the 100% solution *late*.… Very helpful when you've got to get information to the Director of National Intelligence, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as they're walking out the door to go to the White House for a Principals' Committee meeting. If you get them [taps table] what's *good enough* for that meeting, *before* they walk out the door, that's what they need – as opposed to the *perfect solution*, [but] they've *already left*. … [G]etting it to them in a *format* that can be digested, in a format that's *useable* [taps table], on the *right timeline* [taps table] – very important! (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

Put yourself in *their* shoes. You have to see the world through *their* eyes. … As a senior person, you need people to tell you what *you* need to know about your environment, not what *they* know. … [Y]ou have to understand the issue from *their* perspective. And shape your advice to help them *fill their needs*. And sometimes, you have to guess, but when you have the opportunity, you ask for it. … "How can I *help* you? What is it you really need to know about this?" And if they're honest, somebody will say, "Well, *I don't know yet*. I need you to go out and thrash around a bit and help me shape this." And other times, they'll say, "*This is what I need*." … Tell them something they *don't know*. Because a lot of times … you get regurgitated conventional wisdom. [T]he leader already has the conventional wisdom. … You've got to get *past* that level. … *Help them find the nugget*. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

As we prepared the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense for their testimony before the 9/11 Commission, I had responsibility for pulling the team together to prep the Chairman. That meant that I had to develop my *own* knowledge and expertise, and figure out who the primary sources were, or the primary documents, or the primary information and material associated with that was –

and then present that in a way that it helped prepare the Chairman in his recollections or knowledge of events that occurred, so that he was prepared for his testimony. … I did research on the 9/11 Commission themselves and the other testimony that they were taking [and] discovered … what kinds of issues they were focused on. What kinds of questions was each member of the panel likely to ask? … And how would that apply to the Chairman or the Secretary of Defense? … And then we'd start going through the session, and relaying information, providing documentation, providing input, answering his questions, developing likely Qs and As. And I remember distinctly, at one point when somebody said something, the Chairman said, "Oh yes, that was this and this and this." And I stopped him and said, "No, sir, it wasn't. Because this had already happened, and so this was a follow-on to that." And he turned around and he looked at me and he said, "How do you know? You weren't even here." I said, "Sir, I know that because this document says that here's what happened. And this person has already testified that this happened." And once he looked at it, he said, "Oh, yes – oh, that is right." So I developed a certain – a credibility if you will – a *trustworthiness….* (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

If I was looking for a presentation or something to take up to the Secretary of Defense, [my 2-star staff officers would] come in – and it would be probably 2-star level stuff, you know – and I'd say, "Look, you know, this is going to the SecDef. So this is 4-and-a-half-star stuff. And so, I need some *insights* here." And, as I said the other time … *I was the one* that had the insight, because I was the one who *talked to* the Secretary of Defense. And so, … *I had to help them more*. Help me find the nuggets. And it would probably take an iteration or two more to get where I needed to get with them. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

I think the reason we seemed to work well together was that I had an opportunity to watch the way he made decisions, and the way he liked information presented. I paid attention to that. … It's just working very hard to listen to and anticipate what he *needed* of me. Attacking that. Having *a way* of providing complete and professional information that is presented in a way that he likes to receive it. I think that's one of the *really key things* that you have to figure out – how does he *receive* information? And when is the best time to present him information? … And you want your boss to be as prepared – and as comfortable – and as informed – and as thoughtful as he can possibly be. (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

The *more senior you are*, the *more responsibility you have*. That is compounded at the level just above you. And therefore, your advice going up [the chain of command] *really* needs to be couched in terms of, "If you were that person, what would you need to hear? What do you say that can be *helpful* to the person above you?" And the more senior you become, the more *impactful your decisions are*. And therefore, the more you need to be listening to *your* advisers. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016 – B)

> Your advice is *only as good as* (a) it is, and (b) how well can it be absorbed. … [P]art of being an adviser is to *study your boss*. And to watch the grimaces, and read the body language, and *listen* to the kinds of questions they're asking. And try to discern "Is the question being asked because it wasn't presented? Is the question being asked because it was presented and it just wasn't presented in a way that was understandable?" In other words, try to develop an understanding of *how* your boss absorbs things. And then – *over time* – don't change the message, but change *how you present the message* so it can be absorbed. … So yes, I mean *studying your boss* is a big part of being a good adviser. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016 – B)

> I think as an *adviser* you are trying to convey the information the principal needs to make a well-informed decision. And to make sure that they have the *context*, and the *background* and whatever information they think they need to be *comfortable* having an engagement and making a decision on whatever the issue is. And so you're focused on what information – *distilling* – of all the things I know, what's the key information to push forward to this person? What's important? What's not so important? What's a key nuance? What's just more than they need to know? So, you're sort of sifting through the sea of information to figure out what's important, what do they really need to know to be able to make this decision or do this task? (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

Four distinguishing features characterized this experience. One was the demand that the strategic adviser develop a mental closeness with the national-level principal in order to be able to "think for" that principal. A second was that the adviser needed to develop a deep understanding of both themselves and of the principal, in order to anticipate the principal's needs. The third was the requirement for higher order thinking in order to deliver truly valuable insights. The fourth was a combination of cognition and behavior—thinking 'for' the principal to determine what they needed, and then do the work to provide the right kind of information.

Observing and learning from own and other's dysfunctional adviser-principal relationships. When reflecting on experiences that had helped them learn how to be perceived as trustworthy, several participants discussed having learned, either from their own personal experience or by observing relationships between others, from dysfunctional relationships where trust did not exist.

> [I worked with] a *very* dysfunctional senior team. Which made it hard, in fact, for the *entire* organization. … I joined the organization as a Senior Executive…. It was a *real* balancing act…. It was *toxic* … for the organization. We all walked around on pins and needles. … [I]t was a good learning experience for me on (chuckle) multiple levels! (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

> Early in my career … I would tell [seniors] that were sort of getting out of control – using my sense of humor – saying, “Well, that’s a very interesting technique – not one that I think I’ll [use]. I’ve learned a lot of things from you, but [I’m] probably not going to bring *that one* forward in my kit bag!” … [I]f you’re generally abusive to everybody, you’re not going to get very good results. (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

> I got assigned to be the Secretary of the General Staff – which is basically like the Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff of the division and a post. [T]hat’s where I really started to seeing (chuckles) how people can either *successfully* interact with senior people, and how they can *unsuccessfully* interact with senior folks. That was probably the real *eye opener* for me. … [W]orking with the Chief (tapping table) – sitting in the back row as he’s getting briefed. … I started *seeing* how people could successfully present *and not present*. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> The department was *challenging*. [Senior leaders] did not get along, so there were [different] camps. And there was a lot of animosity that had built up…. [Y]ou can’t just assume that the [leadership is], necessarily, on the same page. And you need to tread *carefully*. And you need to *think about* making sure that the other one is informed, because their staffs didn’t *talk* to each other. So, I was very, very cognizant of not appearing to *blindside* anybody. … [I]t was just *really awkward*. … I would actually suggest sometimes to [one leader] – in my adviser role – that it might be a good idea to consult [another leader] on a specific issue. Because, I felt if I *didn’t* suggest it, it probably wouldn’t happen. … So, that was maybe something that [my earlier experiences at] DIA might have helped me with a little bit. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

This experience was characterized by three distinguishing features. One required the adviser to develop a deep understanding of themselves, especially their capabilities and limitations, as well as of others in order to learn from what they observed in the relationships between other advisers and the principals they served. A second was that the experience was both contextually dependent on the position and situation, and socially dependent on the individual adviser and principal involved in the particular dysfunctional relationship. The third was that the experience involved both cognition and behavior—thinking about the situation and taking steps to ameliorate that situation (if it involved the participant).

Being honest with the principal, speaking up, dissenting, challenging and providing grounding for seniors. All participants, when reflecting on what led to them being perceived as being trustworthy advisers, mentioned the importance of learning to speak up even when the message was unwelcome or presented uncomfortable truths, dissent from consensus views, challenge the principal (normally in private rather than in a group, though a particularly trusted adviser could act as a Devil's advocate in front of a group), challenge the established bureaucracy, and provide grounding for senior leaders' consideration of the situation by explaining the basis for the adviser's view. Participants noted that this was difficult, but became easier if it was a skill that was exercised over time. Speaking up and challenging the principal was especially important when dealing with politically appointed leaders, because they were very reluctant to revisit policy decisions, even when conditions had changed.

> Trustworthiness is *integrity in response and advice*. And what that means is that, sometimes you've got to convey a message that *isn't welcome*. Sometimes you convey a message … sometimes you convey knowledge, but there has to be a *basis* for it, not just opinion, and sometimes – and I learned this … serving in the Intelligence Community – you provide your *best* information based on what you *know*. But it's important for you to tell, as an adviser, what the *basis* of your input is. What you're *relying* on. And what you *don't* know. How *good* is this information? (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

> I had to make [the general] aware of things that I thought were sort of *uncomfortable truths* about the way he was settling in. And to his credit, he didn't throw me out when I said, "I need to come and talk to you about some things that you're saying. That I think, maybe – in retrospect – six months from now – wouldn't be things that you'd say." He valued that candidness, because he

intimidated a lot of people. And I did my best to work through what is natural anxiety – when you're going to talk to them about something you don't agree with. (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

There's several things [to establishing trustworthiness as an adviser]. One was being willing to call an issue *as I saw it*, rather than as one might guess the decision maker wanted to hear the information. So, you know, being able to give an *honest* response – even if it wasn't the desired response. … Being willing to *dissent* from an emerging consensus, even when it was uncomfortable to do so – but I thought it was important for the quality of decision making. Being willing to speak *uncomfortable truths*, even if it was going to make people angry with you. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

It's *too easy* to be in a meeting with a group of people who are all in agreement, and heading down the road – it's *too easy* to let it go, and sit back and say, "Well, that's what the group said." As opposed to, "Can I say something? I don't agree with what's being said – and here's why." And if your intuition – if your sense tells you that, [then] you have an *obligation*, I think, to raise it. So that those who are making decisions can, at least, consider that there's something else out there that they ought to listen to. And in most cases, I have found that those who are in a position of responsibility want to hear *more* about that. They want to dig deeper. They want to find out more about that. If your sense is – *and they trust you* – and your sense is, "This isn't right" – that they're going to want to know and hear *more* about that. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

You've got to be able to say (taps table), respectfully, "I *disagree*, and here's why. And here's why you ought to consider this course of action, or this option, as opposed to the one that you're about to execute." (L. Long, February 11, 2016)
I had a good friend who was much more senior in the White House, working directly for President Clinton, say, "Your job as a political appointee is *not* about job security. It's about telling the senior political leaders what they *need* to hear – not what they *want* to hear. And you need to come to work every day willing to lose your job. Because most of the other people – who are making a career in government – are not going to take that risk." So, he was saying, you have to speak truth to power – even when it makes people yell at you (chuckle). And *that's your job*. … And if you start pulling your punches, then were in big trouble. Because then the President or the SecDef or, you know, people are *not* hearing what they need to know to make good decisions. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

I think I got away with saying things to senior folks – and to the commanders – that maybe other folks wouldn't. But I wouldn't say it *in front of* anyone. … I mean, you've got to be really *careful* about that. I knew I could say on occasion, "You can't do that. You just – that's just *not* going to work." Whereas, I don't think very many people on his staff would say that. You usually don't *say* that kind of thing to a four star, or even to a three star. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

I learned [a lesson] when I was on the Joint Staff, and I sat in meetings and watched a strategic adviser to the Secretary of Defense (who was a part of his inner circle) who occasionally played the "Devil's advocate." Not just playing the "Devil's advocate," but would *intentionally take an opposing view* to force the Secretary to consider an alternative view on things. And he would press the point to where he knew he shouldn't press it anymore, and then he'd come back to state what he really thought. But he would *force* the decision makers mind to go in a different way, which was – I thought – very helpful and very educational. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

I knew I had the permission of the President to work directly with him and bypass [the State Department bureaucracy] if necessary. I tried not to ever *abuse* that, but there were occasions where I thought I needed to weigh in at the very top – and ask the President to reconsider what his *experts* were telling him. Because what his *experts* were telling him was not what I had assessed and experienced. And [slight chuckle], the President actually said, "Well, my *experts* have told me.…" And I had to be able to say, "Mr. President, I think – in this case – your experts are not giving you the full story. And I would strongly recommend that you consider a different approach here." He said, "Well, let me think about that." He called me back and said, "I'll go *your way* on this." And that couldn't have happened if we hadn't had a relationship of trust. (D. Coats, February 24, 2016)

Aristotle … writing 300 years or so B.C., [said] that moral goodness is a result of habit (tapping table). … [L]ike physical fitness, you have to exercise it periodically (tapping table), so that you get better and better at it. And as I've reflected on my career – so this is looking back, this is after the fact – what I realized was that … I got in the habit of making ethical decisions…. And some of the decisions I slaved over as lieutenant and a captain – I mean, I laugh now because they were inconsequential in the grand scheme of things – but at the time, they were pretty *huge* for me. And over time, the decisions got harder and harder (tapping table). So, when I had to disagree with the President, I was able to do it. Not without a lot of thought (chuckles), and to-ing and fro-ing, but I was still able to do it. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

An adviser has to give *best advice*, and when they're wrong *admit* they're wrong, but you should *never hesitate* to give advice because you might be wrong. You should believe you're right. You should give your best advice. But you *shouldn't hedge your bets* when you're in those positions. You should say what you believe at the time, and why you believe it. And if it turns out you're wrong, admit you're wrong. And if it turns out you found out you're wrong, and nobody else knows, you should go *tell people* that you're wrong. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

Invariably, things don't stay on course. So, how do you advise that things are off course, and we need to take other actions to get them back on course? I think that's one of the *hardest things to achieve* in strategic advising – to tell people they're off course. And that course corrections need to be made, and here's why.

> Mostly because people don't want to *hear* it – don't want to *admit* it. And I think that's particularly true in a policy arena. But you've got to understand where it's *going*, what you're trying to *achieve*, and then whether or not you're actually *getting there*. And be honest about it when those things come up. And you've got to *stand your ground*. I had multiple times where I was trying to approach senior leaders and tell them I did not think things were going the way they thought they were going. And, in some cases … I had people who got downright *angry* at me. And, rather than backing off, I had to continue to *make my case until it finally got through*. And, in *most* cases, when it finally got through, it was a big "A-ha moment." "I didn't see it that way. Didn't under[stand]. I got it. I understand now." And, all of a sudden, you have this big breakthrough where it makes a huge difference. Particularly when it's *really important* – you've got to hold your ground and *keep pressing* until they get through. Now, you'll reach some point where you aren't going to get through, and you may have to come up with a different strategy by *somebody else*. You're not having the influence. Maybe *somebody else* is going to be the person or a *group* of people – are going to, all of a sudden, approach this in a different way. If you think the point is that important, *you don't give up on it*, okay. You keep going after it. But you may have to take a *different approach*. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

There were four distinguishing features that characterized this experience. One was the fact that this experience was built over time, with participants noting that speaking up took practice earlier in their career, and that practice in turn made it easier to speak up when serving a national-level principal. The second was the demand that the adviser develop a mental closeness with the principal, with that closeness allowing the adviser to be honest, deliver dissenting views, and even challenge the decision maker. The third was that the experience involved both cognition (thinking for the principal, thinking about the situation, thinking about alternatives), and behavior (telling the principal what they needed to hear, rather than what they wanted to hear). The fourth was the need for the adviser to have a deep understanding of themselves, as well as the real needs of the principal.

Knowing own limits and admitting "I don't know, but I'll find out." Knowing one's own limits and being able to say, "I don't know, but I'll find out" was critical to being perceived as a trustworthy adviser by the principal. Participants consistently stated that the four most important words in a strategic adviser's repertoire had to be "Sir, I don't know," and the next four should be, "but I'll find out." This applied whether in a new position as an adviser or after many years' experience, and tied directly to the view of participants that it is virtually impossible to be an expert at the national strategic level because of the breadth of the areas of concern and the speed with which situations changed. Participants noted that it was difficult, because advisers felt the *need to provide something* in response to questions from a senior principal.

> There's several things [to establishing trustworthiness as an adviser]. … [One is] being willing to say, "I don't know" when I didn't know the answer … "but, I'll go find out." (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

> The very first time I had the privilege of briefing the President one-on-one in the Oval Office … I'd been on the job all of about two days, as Vice Chairman. … Right after the NSC meeting, I went into the President's office. He asked me several questions. … I said to him, "Mr. President, I don't have a *clue*, but I'll find out." (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> *Part* of integrity is being straight. You know, "Mr. President, Mr. Director … I really don't know." … I've [also] said that a few times to [Congressional] oversight committees, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. … That was the *smartest* thing to do, because then when you got back with a good product, you knew the principal was pleased. (J. DeTrani, January 15, 2016)

> I had to do my homework upfront to be in that position [knowing what I *did* know]. And if I *didn't* know it – to provide the senior leader with what I did know and say, you know, "But I am uncomfortable going beyond this right now. And I'd either like to bring in the expert to give it to you, or I'll come back." But I didn't – I *never felt compelled* to go to a place that would make me uncomfortable – that that person was deriving knowledge from me that wasn't solid, okay. And so, that becomes a matter of self-confidence. That you know that you don't have to *be* the know-all – all the time. And oh, by the way, senior leaders will appreciate that more than they will appreciate being told something that turns out to be wrong. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

> I wrote down something I refer to in my own mind all the time, and it comes from the cadet prayer at West Point. "Know no fear when truth and right are in jeopardy." "*Know no fear when truth and right are in jeopardy*!" I think the

absolute integrity of response is required. If you don't know, *you don't know*. "I *do* know this. I'm *uncertain* about this. I'll get back to you immediately, but let me make certain of what I'm telling you." I think that the absolute integrity of your response. And *don't* tell people just because you want to come across as, "Gee, he really knows his stuff." If you don't know, *you don't know*. And don't put people in the position where they're relying on your advice and your input at this level, when you don't have that. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

Do *not* tell [the President] something you do not know. And that sounds simple – it may sound even kind of funny. But anybody who's an adviser, at any level – when somebody asks you a question and your responsibility is to be their adviser on that, you *want to be the one that's got the answer*!! And you've got to be careful. And especially when you're … briefing the President – or answering the President, you want to make sure that you're not just giving him something off the top of your head because you're the adviser. You want to make sure that you're *right*, and that you're making sure he knows. So, it was so easy and so comfortable to be around the President that I had to keep myself focused on making sure that I didn't give him a knee-jerk answer or off-the-cuff answer. … He trusted me, and I *knew* he trusted me. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinguishing features. One was that it required the adviser have a deep understanding both of their own capabilities and, more especially, of their limitations. The second was the need for the adviser to always keep in mind that advice being given to national-level principals could have significant consequenc, and realize how important it was to avoid telling the principal something they did not know to be accurate.

Being yourself; being confident. When reflecting on the experiences they had had which resulted in being perceived as trustworthy strategic advisers, participants emphasized that one was to learn to be yourself to the principal and be confident in what you were doing. Without confidence in yourself, it was difficult to present opposing views to the principal.

[I established my trustworthiness] just by basically being who I am. Because I basically deal with people as I find them. And I just told them, you know, these are my goals – and I'm here to help any way I can. And, you know, they either buy it or they don't. And you then follow through with your actions. … You basically show through your *actions*, as well as your *words*, that you are *sincere*. (C. Wagner, February 15, 2016)

You have to provide your *own* views, based on your *best judgment*. And sometimes your judgment is right – sometimes it's not. I have learned over time to *trust* my judgment, though. I learned to *trust* my intuition, to *trust* my judgment. And to express that, even though if it's contrary to everything else that's being said and going on in the room, okay. … It's a whole "bus to Abilene" deal. Everybody's onboard, and nobody is bothering to say, "I don't want to go" to it. And so, you've got to do that. And it's *okay*. And, oh by the way, if somebody doesn't like it, that's okay. You've served – you have served the person you are advising in the best way you can by expressing a concern, a reservation, or a different view. And it's important that *that be done* because, sometimes, just by doing that, it will reinforce something they think, they've seen, they know, they've heard. Or it will cause them to start examining something in a different way, and *may* change the thinking of others who are in the room as well. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

There was a growth process involved in *being* the adviser. … I *may* have been less confident than I *should have been*. … I probably could have done *more*. So, if I had it to do over again, I'd say, "No, I actually *do* know something about this. I can *speak up* in this room." … I'd sit in the room [at the NSC] and say, "Gosh, these people are smart. I'd better be quiet." Until somebody started to talk about something I really knew something about, I said, "*He doesn't know what he's talking about*!" … I thought, "Wait a minute! *I know more about this than they do*!" But that took me a bit to grow into that. (M. Hayden, February 12, 2016)

There was one distinguishing feature which characterized this experience. It required the adviser have a deep understanding of themselves, which allowed them to become confident in their own knowledge and abilities and not paralyzed by their limitations.

Admitting and learning from mistakes; seeking feedback; accepting criticism. While it was important to have confidence in yourself, participants also noted that part of establishing a perception of trustworthiness with the principal was admitting and learning from their own mistakes. In addition, advisers who wanted to be perceived as trustworthy had to learn to seek feedback about the advice they gave, and then make changes to accommodate perceived shortfalls. To be perceived as trustworthy, advisers also had to be willing to accept criticism.

> And if I made a mistake with something, I was quick – tried to be quick to say, "Hey, boss, I told you this yesterday. This is not the case. *This* is – I found out *this* is the case." But I was demonstrating when I made a mistake, I wasn't afraid to come back and tell him that – that I did. But what was most important, that they *had correct information*. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> You can't gain expertise without actually *experiencing* what you're going through. But also, identifying where you fell – come up short. And making the necessary adjustments to learn from *mistakes* – or learn from *others* – in terms of how to conduct your job in a better way. (D. Coats, February 24, 2016)

> [Before the launch of the North Korean Taepodong missile in July 2006,] we had not thought through the problem enough to understand what the *real information needs* were of the Secretary of Defense concerning the launch of that missile. And what actions that he might have to take, and what information was required for him to make the decisions. … [W]hat it showed *me* was that it wasn't enough to simply report on an event that was going to happen, but to think through what the potential *implications* were in the *decision-making process* that our national leaders had to have in order to make a *decision* about what actions were going to be taken. … It was a serious gap for me in terms of how I provided information, advice, and the questions that *I asked* in advance of those kinds of activities – understanding the decisions that had to be made by a national-level leader. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> I would always seek feedback. To say, "Hey, when you have a chance, tell me how that went. Is that what [you're] looking for?" So I get *better* each time. And I'm not looking for compliments. I'm looking for constructive, you know – "You gave too much information" or "Not enough." (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

> It's a *learning* process. … [T]hrough experience, you learn – kind of trial and error, okay. "Too much information. Too little information. This is what the Secretary wants." And you – *you* get trained. And you train your organization. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

> You have to continue to demonstrate that you are trusting and trustworthy, and take bad news as well as good news, and accept critique in a positive way … from the principal. "Hey, you guys. You know, the Secretary was very frustrated that we were – that a lot of our processes, and a lot of our force structure, and the way we organized ourselves – were still 20th Century. And now we have a 21st Century threat. And were not able to – with any agility – handle it very well. And he was very frustrated by that." (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

The three distinguishing features that characterized this experience were that it required the adviser have a deep understanding of themselves, it was being continuously built, and it acknowledged the very serious implications and consequences of the advice being given. Part of the deep understanding was the realization by the adviser that they were not infallible and would make mistakes (though they should be minimized whenever possible). The feature of being continuously built revolved around the constant need for the adviser to seek feedback in order to improve their performance, and thereby strengthen the perceptions of their trustworthiness. In addition, the principal had to be sure the adviser was taking into account the implications and consequences of the proposed courses of action.

Being humble; giving credit to others. Hand in hand with being willing to admit and learn from mistakes, participants emphasized the importance of an adviser being humble and willing to give credit to others. When it became clear that the adviser was more interested in the success of the principal than in claiming personal credit, that boosted the principal's perception of the trustworthiness of that adviser.

> An adviser needs to be more focused on helping the person they're advising succeed, and so more focused on an outcome, rather than getting personal credit. It helps if the person you're advising is gracious and generous enough to recognize your *contribution* to something … sometimes that happens, and sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes it happens privately, but not publicly – and that's frequently as good as it gets. … [Y]ou have to care more about the outcome than getting personal credit for it. And, if you are a person who has built up a reputation in your field, sometimes that's hard for people. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

> [I was] able to resolve issues without *ever* letting it be known that I had to step in. … *I don't need the glory.* … All I want to know is *it got done*. He was happy. His staff was happy. The U.S. Government was happy. State [Department] was happy. … *[The principal knew]* that I'd done it. But I didn't try to look for credit. You know, "*Oh, look at me. I'm the big problem solver.*" And without [highlighting that] mistakes had been made on *this* end. Mistakes had been made by *him and his*

> *staff*. … "[S]he didn't try to make us look like we dropped the ball. She just *fixed* it and everybody looked good." And I think [the general] liked that. I know, in fact. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

> You have to have a *healthy dose of humility*. … [T]he more senior you become, the more senior your position is, the *more* you need to maintain your humility. … I *always* felt that. When I was in the Oval Office, I would wonder, "Man, *what are you doing here*!!? *Do they know that you're just a kid from Teaneck, New Jersey?* ... [H]ow did you end up here?" And … the little voice on your shoulder is saying, *"This is the President of the United States.* You know, *don't* tell this man something you don't *know*. And don't try to *smoke and mirrors* anybody." (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

> There's a certain *humility* that you have to adapt, and focus on, "How do I *best serve* the process? How do I *best serve*? How do I make sure the best decisions are made?" And sometimes, that means – there are times when you just have to subordinate your own *ego*, your *ambition*, and getting *credit* for something yourself – being the one to speak up, being the one to dominate the meeting. Whatever the ego thing is, you have to subordinate that to "What are we here for? What are we trying to do here?" (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

> People would perceive me as not acting in my *own* interest, but acting in a *larger* interest – that interest usually being support of them. It was less – it wasn't about me. It was about how can I support them *better*? (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinguishing features. One was that the adviser needed a mental closeness with the principal in order to understand and be able to focus on what would help the principal succeed. The second was that the adviser needed a deep understanding of themselves and others, to include remembering the difference in the roles of the adviser versus those of the decision maker.

Being discrete; demonstrating loyalty. Similar to being humble, participants noted the importance discretion on the part of the adviser played in establishing a perception of their trustworthiness. In part, this was ensuring that advice given in confidence remained in confidence, rather than an adviser playing up their role in giving that advice. In part, it was demonstrating loyalty, not necessarily to the principal, but to the advice you gave to that person and to the Constitution.

[Trustworthiness means] not betraying confidences. So, people who have served in these jobs – [then] they go out and write books – I think have betrayed the trust. … [T]hose who write books and tell stories about "The President said this" or "The Secretary said that." You know, if the President wants to say what he said, *he* can say it – in *his* book!! … [T]he *only* thing a President should worry about when picking a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is, who's going to give me the *best military advice*? Who do I trust to give me the *best military advice*? Part of that equation should *never* be … "Are they going to write a book about things they hear me say?" … I mean, that betrays the trust. And I think too many people are *too quick* to betray trust. … I don't think they're *thinking* they're betraying trust. But at the end of the day, that's exactly what they're doing. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

Discretion is really important when you're being really open with people. And it's something that I think about *myself* when my bosses bring me into their confidence. It's not for me to share. It's for me to react to the information I'm hearing. It's *their* story to tell and their thing to share. … [Otherwise] people have not been *trustworthy* with the confidence that you give them…. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

Loyalty is an important characteristic for an adviser. As an adviser you don't want to be in a position where you are advertising that you came out of the meeting – and that the person didn't take your advice – and therefore the person is *wrong*. You want to continue to *maintain the trust of that person*. And so, there's a *loyalty* to the *advice* you give. And you give it in confidence. You maintain it in confidence. And that's advice to that person. But your loyalty *overall* – and I come back from my perspective – that my oath was to the *Constitution*, it wasn't to a *person*, it wasn't to an individual, it wasn't to charisma, it wasn't to a political viewpoint, it was to the *Constitution*. So, you're serving an individual who is serving the nation. And you've got to give advice with that in consideration. So, your loyalty – even though you're *loyal* to the commander-in-chief, you're *loyal* to his representatives, and those who are providing advice to them – you're *doing so* within the construct of the oath that you took to the Constitution. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

[The principals] would use me to bounce ideas off … that I think that they didn't want, maybe, their staff to know. Or maybe, that they were unsure about. Something they wanted to ask me. You could ask me something, and that's not going to get around to your whole staff. Or it's not going to make you look indecisive. Or that you don't know something. You can ask me. And they were confident I wouldn't go tell anybody. And I *wouldn't*! And so, I was a good sounding board…. [Y]ou can say anything to me. This isn't going to go anywhere – this isn't going to go out of this room. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

One distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was that it required the adviser have a deep understanding of themselves and the principal, specifically what discretion and loyalty meant to each of them. A second was that discretion regarding discussions with the principal, while remaining loyal to the advice given, had to be continuously demonstrated. Otherwise, the perception of the adviser's trustworthiness could be undone.

When reflecting on their service as strategic advisers to national-level leaders and what led to them being perceived as trustworthy, participants addressed a variety of their experiences. These included their ability to learn while doing every job; learning to see the world through the eyes of a national-level principal while serving as their executive officer or military assistant; doing the hard work to develop a reputation for consistent excellence; learning to think for the principal, anticipate their needs, and deliver valuable insights; observing and learning from dysfunctional adviser-principal relationships; speaking up even when the message was unwelcome or presented uncomfortable truths, dissenting, challenging the principal and the established bureaucracy, and providing grounding for senior leaders' consideration of the situation; knowing one's own limits and learning to say "I don't know, but I'll find out"; being oneself and having confidence; admitting and learning from mistakes, seeking feedback, and accepting criticism; being humble and giving credit to others; and being discrete while demonstrating loyalty.

Several characteristics of the experiences which led advisers to be perceived as trustworthy by the principals they served were apparent. As had been the case with the experiences recounted by participants when recalling their service as principals, most of the experiences that they recounted about their time as advisers also had multiple characteristics. Nearly all of the experiences were characterized as requiring the adviser to have a deep understanding of themselves, the principal they were advising, the situation being addressed, and /or others around them (such as other advisers and other national-level leaders). A good number of the experiences demanded the adviser develop a mental closeness with the principal; were continuous over a long period of time, either being built or being undone;or required a combination of cognition and behavior. Still other experiences highlighted the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level. One of the experiences was dependent on the context of the problem and the social relationship between the adviser and the principal they were serving, and one required higher-order thinking skills.

With regard to the characteristics of the experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness, there were similarities between the participants' recollections from the perspective of being a national-level principal and from the perspective of being a strategic adviser. For example, the experiences of both principals and advisers were characterized as requiring a deep understanding of themselves, as well as others. Principals had to understand the strengths and limitations of their advisers. Advisers had to thoroughly understand the needs of the principal, the situation they were dealing with, and other advisers and national-level leaders. From the perspective of both the principal and the strategic adviser, the experiences that led to a perception of trustworthiness were characterized as demanding a high degree of mental closeness between the two individuals. The experiences of both principals and advisers were characterized as being continuously built or undone over a long period of time. Likewise, some of the experiences of both principals and advisers were characterized as requiring higher order thinking, and others by the exceptionally significant consequences of the problems being addressed. Other experiences of both principals and advisers were also characterized as involving a combination of cognition and behavior and still others as being dependent on the context of the problem and the social relationship between the adviser and principal. Most experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness—both from the perspective of the principal and that of the strategic adviser—were distinguished by multiple characteristics. The characteristic most evident from the perspective of the principal was the demand for mental closeness between the leader and their strategic adviser. The characteristic most evident from the perspective of the strategic adviser was the requirement to have a deep understanding of themselves, the principal, the situation, their own domain, and/or other advisers and leaders.

Perceptions of Expertise

Turning from perceptions of trustworthiness to perceptions of expertise, participants were again asked to reflect during one interview on time they had spent serving as national-level principals being advised by others, specifically recalling advisers that were highly valued and others who were not. This allowed them to describe the characteristics of experiences that led to their perception—as principals—of an adviser's expertise. In the other interview, they reflected on time spent as a strategic adviser to national-level decision makers. This allowed them to describe the characteristics of the experiences that allowed them to be perceived as experts themselves—when serving as advisers. Those are views summarized in Table 4.4, below.

Table 4.4. Experiences That Build Perceptions of Expertise

Principal's Views	Adviser's Views
• Adviser embracing ambiguity – and still offering a view • Adviser demonstrating original thinking • Adviser making connections across broad national security domains • Adviser having understanding as well as knowledge • Adviser always searching for relevant, more complete information • Adviser knowing own limits – and facilitating interaction with those who have the needed expertise	• Appreciating nuances • Keeping an open mind • Developing broad experience from variety of positions • Being deliberative or being decisive (and knowing when to do what) • Knowing more about my domain than anyone else in the room • Realizing I am not an expert ; having a hunger for new information and continuous learning • Delivering the needed expertise – even if it comes from someone else • Being able to synthesize a great deal of information, justify the advice given, frame the recommended decision and possible consequences, and provide value added for principal.

Principal's View of What Led to Principal's Perception of Adviser's Expertise. The first column in Table 4.4 reflects the observations of participants while considering their time serving as national-level principals with advisers of their own. They were asked to reflect on advisers that were highly valued with regard to their expertise. The column summarizes the principal's views of what experiences by an adviser would lead the principal to perceive that adviser as having expertise.

Adviser embracing ambiguity – and still offering a view. In line with the comments noted earlier regarding the difficulty of being an expert at the national strategic level, participants valued the ability of an adviser to embrace the ambiguity of the complex situations they were dealing with. An adviser who, at the same time that they recognized that inescapable ambiguity, they also had sufficient agility of thought to be able to offer a view on that situation was perceived as having expertise.

> One who *knows* this is an ambiguous situation, *admits* that it is, *embraces* that reality – but *still* can offer a view. That's expertise. … [I]f you're not offering a view, you're not helping much, either. And so, you really do have to step up and offer your thoughts…. You just can't sit in the dugout. (M. Hayden, January13, 2016)

> I would say you've got to be open to ideas … agility of thought. And one of the things that I think what the Secretary and the President were looking for in the next Chairman was agility in thought. … Understand the doctrine, but be agile enough to know that new situations may require new ways of doing business. So, I think agility. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

The distinguishing feature that characterized this experience for principals was their ability to determine that an adviser demonstrated sufficient agility of thought to deal with complex, constantly changing situations. Principals perceived as experts those advisers who consistently demonstrated an ability to critically analyze an evolving situation as additional information became available or priorities changed, and who then reexamined and adjusted their thinking.

Adviser demonstrating original thinking. In a related vein, participants perceived advisers who demonstrated original thinking to have expertise. That is, they not only wanted an adviser to be able to offer a view on an ambiguous situation, but to offer a view that was original, and then be able to explain that viewpoint.

> I really appreciated … having people around me who think about problems in different ways. … [Y]ou [want] people who don't think the same way that you do – so you don't get into a Groupthink mentality, but you *consider* things from different vantage points. I think that's particularly important when you are dealing *internationally* – and *strategically* – with people who have very different mindset, who have grown up in a very different culture, who think about things in a *very different way*.… I always found it very helpful to *me* to seek out those who were either talking about problems in a different way – who had very, very different viewpoints on things – so I could understand what the basis of that was. So I could reach my *own* conclusions about things. But I think it's very important that

> you engage people who think and are *different* than you are, so you can have those kinds of *insights*. It's *immensely helpful* to do that. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> We should look for those people that *think differently*, and we should realize that's going to strengthen whatever end result we have. … [Y]you've got to make room for the quiet person in the back of the room that is going to say, "Hey, have you thought about it this way? Are you looking at it this way? It's a nice idea, but…" [T]he people with the bravery [to say] "but" need to be – you need to *reward* them in front of the group. You *need to say*, "That is such an interesting way of looking at it. I think all of us need to think about that for a minute." And you need to do that, even if it's not such a great idea (chuckle). (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

Similar to the previous experience, the distinguishing feature that characterized this experience for principals was determining that an adviser demonstrated originality in their thinking. Once again, principals perceived as experts those advisers who demonstrated they had the ability to not only to critically analyze the available information regarding a situation or issue, but to then take an original approach in developing a proposed course of action and explain why that course made sense.

Adviser making connections across broad national security domains. In addition to embracing ambiguity yet still offering a view, and also demonstrating original thinking about complex situations, participants commented that the valued advisers they perceived to be experts were those who were able to make connections across broad national security domains. This includes understanding all aspects of their own domain, being able to look outside that domain to the rest of the national security community within the Executive branch, and also to outside influences across the larger U.S. government, non-governmental organizations and individuals, as well as with allied nations and coalitions.

> [I highly valued] his *broad experience* and his – the breadth of his life, his education. But, mostly, his professional experience had taken him to the width

and depth of our profession. And, you know, he'd been on the operations side and the policy side and the politics side – and he just had a very *broad* perspective. He probably won as many as he lost. And so, he had a lot of experience that was really valuable. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

Even at the three-star level, you have three-stars that are *better advisers* – and give you *better information and insight* – than others. They all give you a *good* level, but there are others that just *think differently*. That looked *outside* the Army. That looked outside the Army more than looked *inside* the Army. That *interacted* with the OSD staff on a regular basis and had relationships there, so *they* could influence things without *you* having to influence things. There were some folks that were just better *strategic leaders* than others. … In fact, one of the leader development programs I ran was for three-star generals, or two-stars who were getting promoted to three-stars – especially the ones coming to work in Washington. We set up a program to get them to *meet* the people on the Hill, and in the Department of Defense, and on the Joint Staff, and things that they would interact with in their job. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

There are a lot of different *forces* that are work at a strategic level. And you're never quite sure where things are coming from. And it's important to try to go figure out why dynamics are moving the way they are, and what are the influences that are causing that shift? And sometimes, I found that that was coming because of influence from a different location – although I think we worked *very closely* with the other agencies, and we really did know what our differences were, and why they were there. Or with commands. But we got to a point – particularly when we reached *inflection points* in Iraq – where there were influences coming from *outside* the organized structures of government that were having a *big influence* on decision makers within government, okay. And so, *unless* you spent time studying what these outside influences were bringing to the table, and what they were suggesting, and *how* they were developing their information – where it was coming from – and these include studies by individuals, think tanks, or just influential groups of individuals – then you never under—, you couldn't quite understand the whole picture of what was acting on the *person* that you were trying to influence. … And so, understanding where that was coming from – what the viewpoints were … was really important to try to understand. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

I think competency – at the Chairman's level, for sure, and Combatant Commander, for that matter, because you're working with lots of folks in the interagency, to include the Intel agencies – is the ability to make them part of your sphere of relationships. So, it's got to be broader than just your own team. It's the responsibility to build relationships with a much broader team. So, as Chairman, I needed to be as familiar with the State Department as I did the Defense Department, in terms of people getting around and getting things done. … And then, occasionally, at Justice – or Commerce – or Treasury – whoever was working the problems that we had on the day, whether Iraq or Afghanistan or the general – the whole notion of the War on Terror. And so, that's part of being – I think that's part of the competency piece. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

If you're a colonel or a brigadier on the [National Security Council] staff, you have to be thinking about, "Okay, well, what is it the President needs to understand about this situation?" Understanding that he's got political, economic, social – all kinds of other issues that he's got to deal with. And *it's not just military*, you know. [Y]ou have to do that – you have to *understand* that. … [T]he higher up you go, the more the keys to your success lie *outside* the organization. And so, the more time you have to spend *outside* the organization, influencing people so that you can get done what you need to get done. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

[The strategic adviser has] to consider the *implications* to a *decision maker* in multiple dimensions. And it's not just singularly from a national security standpoint, as it affects *our* nation. Sometimes, it affects *other* nations – *other relationships*. It affects partners – coalitions that we have. And sometimes, we make decisions that may not make everybody happy. But it's the right thing in order to maintain the cohesion of a coalition. … [O]ne of the things that I found *most* remarkable in how we could all see the same thing … and yet have *very different viewpoints* on what that was. What we were seeing – and what it meant. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

This experience was distinguished by several characteristics. One was the need for higher order thinking skills on the part of the principal. Specifically, using those skills to determine which advisers were able to best make the connections across the broad national security domains within the context of the issue or situation being considered. Another was the acknowledgment of the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level—in this case, considering the implications (nationally and internationally) associated with any piece of advice. A third was the requirement for a deep understanding by the principal of their own strengths and limitations; of the breadth of the experience and knowledge of their advisers, as well as of their limitations; and of the situation and what was needed to take action. A fourth was that the experience was both contextually dependent (on the issue at hand) and socially dependent (on the individuals involved and how they interacted with one another).

Adviser having understanding as well as knowledge. Participants distinguished between those advisers who "knew a lot" about a particular topic, and those who "really understood" the issue at hand. Advisers who saw themselves as being experts simply because they knew a lot were not seen as experts and not trusted by principals, who viewed them as being trapped by patterns of the past. Participants perceived expertise in those of their advisers who were able to go beyond knowing a lot about a particular situation to actually being able to synthesize their knowledge to gain understanding of the meaning behind the facts, identify future-oriented trends and indicators, and then consider new possibilities.

> I learned over time that … certain individuals could fill me in on things that I wouldn't get any other way. Because I'd dig down deeper and get – *not knowledge*, but understanding. And understanding is *so much more important* than just "knowing," okay. You can gain knowledge, but knowledge doesn't give you *true understanding*. And, in the world we operate in, and as a senior adviser, it is more important to have *understanding* than it is knowledge. There are a lot of people who can get a lot of knowledge by reading, but you don't get true understanding until you have experiences that you combine with your knowledge to give you a different level of understanding. And so, you have to leverage that. … [E]ven today, a great deal of what I try to do is gain understanding. Not just of what they're saying, but [what] do they mean? … It's trying to *get to that*. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> I would prefer the word *wisdom* [vice expertise]. Realize wisdom is based on expertise but, you know, there's a *tyranny* of expertise, too. … Expertise … trapped [the advisers] into the patterns of the past, and motivated them to predict that they would be the patterns of the future. … I'm really *distrustful* of people who are *sure* of themselves. (M. Hayden, January 13, 2016)

> So there's an expertise that is *derivative of synthesizing knowledge* and trying to draw trends or indicators or possibilities out of that. That then could open up other doors that can be exposed to a senior individual to enhance his thinking. So it draws it away from the *fact*, and into the *significance* of the knowledge. And it takes a *different level* of expertise, I think, to do than it just does knowledge and depth of knowledge. … "What does this really mean?" Okay. So, you've got to understand that meaning. I think that's important. … And you've got to keep learning all the time, because it's constantly changing.-(M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

The distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was the need for the principal to develop a deep understanding of the situation, of their advisers (and what they brought to the table), of themselves, and how best to draw out both the knowledge and understanding of the problem facing them that was needed to make a decision.

Adviser always searching for relevant, more complete information. Participants also valued the expertise of advisers who always searched for more complete information to improve their own understanding the issues, problems, and concerns facing the national-level principal.

> What [the Secretary of the Army] expects of me is – every one of the disciplines of the Intelligence Community is going to evolve, *all the time.* And I've got to stay on top of those changes (taps table). I've got to see where were going to have a policy gap. … [The Secretary] expected [me] … to be an expert in my functional area. And to be on top of each of those specific disciplines, as they were important to the Army, its capacity, and its ability to do its job. And I felt that weight. And I also felt like he knew if it was an area that I did not have a lot of experience in, he knew me well enough to know I would go *after* that expertise. (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

> I think in order to be an effective adviser, you have to *understand the issues*. … And understanding is really a *big key to me* – it's not superficial. It is really understanding what the issues are, and what the *problems* are, or the *concerns*, or what a senior leader – a decision maker – is having to *deal with*, so you can try to put yourself in that person's shoes. And, using your best judgment, try to bring out the information that is *best* going to *help* that individual. So, you have to expose yourself to a lot more information. You have to understand what the *arguments* are, and you have to understand what the *possibilities* are. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> The people that *I* have learned to rely on come at every rank and every shape, size, nationality. There's a sense that I get that they *do the work.* They bring me complete – their *very best work*. If it's incomplete, and they know – if I tell them, "Hey, go out and find more" – that they're still in a great place. We always talk about … I always talk about … "You have a million dollars of credit in the bank at this point. You've done so much to do your best for me. So, if it doesn't quite go the way we wanted it to (chuckles), you can go out and come back in with another idea." (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

The distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was that it was something that the principal was continuously looking for from their advisers. The principal wanted to be sure that their advisers were constantly reviewing and updating the advice they offered, so the principal could be as well informed as possible in situations that were constantly changing.

Adviser knowing own limits – and facilitating interaction with those who have the needed expertise. Regardless of an adviser's efforts to gain both knowledge and understanding, participants noted that expertise did not have to reside within that specific adviser. In fact, advisers who knew their own limits, and therefore brought in others who had the information that the principal actually needed, were more likely to be perceived by principals as having expertise than were those advisers who thought they could know it all themselves.

> He [my adviser] was very good about providing me good advice where he could and, in other cases, telling me that I probably ought to talk to somebody *else* about that. But he would refer me to somebody who probably knew more and could probably give me better advice on a subject than he could. And I appreciated that, too – that he would do that. … [H]e specifically identified individuals who ought to travel with me, as younger analysts, but had the expertise that he knew I would *need* and *rely on*, on the trip. And it wasn't *him* who had to give it [information] to me. He arranged that I would have access and travel with these young folks, who really *knew* their business, and were *current* on all of the issues. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> I think [my adviser] gained credibility by working *really hard* to master other topics. But also, he was someone if he *didn't* know (if he wasn't the right person himself) would always bring the *expert* with him. You know, was willing to not have to be "the expert" – but if somebody else had better expertise that I needed to hear from, he would bring that person to the table. So, he kind of checked his ego at the door and let somebody else be the expert, if he wasn't the right person or the best person. … [A]s long as he was able to get the right person for me, it didn't matter [to me] if it was him, or if he was the conduit to finding that person. … I also had to create an environment where *my staff* understood that it was okay to have a slightly larger meeting to bring the right people to the table, you know. … And to allow junior people at the table, if they were the best expert. … Like,

> who's in the meeting is not based on rank. Who's in the meeting was based on expertise and what they could – the value they could add to the conversation. Which is not always how it works – in government (chuckles). (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

This experience was characterized by several distinguishing features. One was the need for the principal to develop a deep understanding of themselves (especially their own limitations), the situation and the information the principal needed to address it, and their advisers at all levels within the organization. A second was the combination of cognition and behavior on the part of the principal: thinking about the situation, seeking the best advice, and valuing whoever was able to provide that advice. The third was that this experience was both contextually dependent on the situation and socially dependent on the relationship between the principal and their advisers.

In summary, when reflecting on their service as national-level principals who were being advised by others, participants perceptions of the expertise of those advisers was influenced by the experiences of those advisers in several areas. These included the adviser's ability to embrace ambiguity while still offering a view; the adviser demonstrating they were an original thinker; the adviser making connections across broad national security domains to include whole-of-government and allies; the adviser demonstrating understanding as well as knowledge; the adviser always searching for relevant, more complete information; and the adviser knowing their own limits and facilitating interaction with those who had the needed information.

Several characteristics of the experiences which led the principal to perceive an adviser as having expertise emerged. In contrast to the experiences that led principals to perceive their advisers as being trustworthy, those experiences that led principals to perceive their advisers as having expertise were often distinguished by a single characteristic. Several experiences were characterized by the principal's ability to evaluate which adviser(s) demonstrated higher-order thinking skills, including the ability to critically analyze an evolving situation as additional information became available or priorities changed and then having the agility of thought to reexamined and adjusted their thinking, or take an original approach in developing a proposed course of action and explain why that made sense, or best make connections across the broad national security domains within the context of the issue or situation being considered. Several other experiences were characterized by the need for the principal to develop a deep understanding of the situation, the strengths and limitations of their adviser(s), and their own abilities to gain the knowledge they needed and understanding of the problem they faced in order to make a decision. Other characteristics included that the principal was continuously looking to be sure that their advisers were reviewing and updating the advice they offered, so the principal could be as well informed as possible in changing situations; that they acknowledged the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level; that the experience included the combination of cognition and behavior on the part of the principal—thinking about the situation, seeking the best advice, and valuing whoever was able to provide that advice; and recognizing that the experience was both contextually dependent on the situation and socially dependent on the relationship between the principal and their advisers.

Adviser's Experiences that Developed Principal's Perception of Adviser's Expertise. The right-hand column in Table 4.4 reflects observations of participants while considering the time they spent serving as strategic advisers to national-level leaders. The column summarizes the participant's views of their own experiences that led to them being perceived by the principal they were advising as having expertise.

Appreciating nuances. Participants emphasized the importance of being able to appreciate the nuances of the complex issues about which they were called on to advise. In order to be perceived by the principal as having expertise, it was important that the strategic adviser to have sufficient experience to be able to both appreciate the nuance of the situation, and convey that nuance to the principal, because that was expected at the strategic level.

> [When I was] advising the first four star, the Air Force general, nuances were easier to convey. And he was much more accepting of [me] saying, "Well, you know, it'd be better if we didn't – maybe if we didn't do this, I mean let's phrase it a different way." He didn't take it as a challenge to his authority. … I was always concerned that [the generals] understood … the *reaction* of what our actions would be – seen through the lens – the perspective … of the official host country – the population. I think that was really important. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)
>
> But the really good advisers … [are someone] who has thought about something very, very complex and says, "Here is what I would recommend, and this is why." You get it immediately. With some of the nuances. *Nothing* at that level, in my opinion, is black and white. So a strategic adviser, besides being able to do that, does have an appreciation and an understanding of the nuances. And that comes back to [studying the situation] again. (M. Hagee, October 9, 2015)
> The new Secretary of Defense was very experienced – from an intelligence standpoint. Had a great background in intelligence. I mean, he was a *consumer* of everything he could get his hands on. A *close* listener. He looked for *nuances*. He had the background, the experti[se], the knowledge. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)
>
> There are some general principles, I guess, one ought to think about. But at the national and strategic level, there's a *lot of nuance* and [pause] and *thought* [pause] and *judgment* that needs to go into it…. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

The distinguishing feature which characterized this experience was the realization by the adviser of the complexity of the situation and the need to convey that complexity to the decision maker along with the potential consequences of the advice being presented.

Keeping an open mind. In order to continue to have that appreciation of the nuances of constantly changing situations, often in countries or about topics with which the adviser may not have had much prior familiarity, participants emphasized the importance of keeping an open mind. This was especially the case when the participants were discussing simultaneously being a strategic adviser to the President or a cabinet secretary while also serving as a national-level principal getting input from their own advisers. As one participant commented, "Keep an open mind. I mean, if you're going to be asking [the principal you are advising] to be willing to change *their* mind sometimes, you have to be willing to also take in new facts and change *your* mind" (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016). To be perceived by a national-level principal as having expertise, the strategic adviser had to demonstrate that they were willing not only to continue to learn, but also to receive advice from others.

> I'm not stuck on the idea that I have in my head. I'm always keeping my mind open to the fact that, other than the Creator – with all the answers – there's always going to be opportunities to see things a different way. So, *not being fearful of that* is important. And being able to say, "Here's a point of view – but here's a few others." (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

> I think, as a strategic adviser, you have to *create* a situation – individually – personally – where people were willing to *give me advice*. *Not* tell me what I wanted to know. *Not* tell me what they singularly thought I needed to hear. But go beyond that, and tell me what I *needed to consider*. And so, you needed people who had both the knowledge and the understanding in order to do that. And once you found them, to *leverage* them to really increase – *continually* – your learning and the *depth* of your knowledge – the *depth* of your understanding, and how changed conditions affect what you *thought* you knew that is no longer valid, okay. Because *it changes over time*. So, how do you recognize when you hit an inflection point, and something's changed? And how do you see that soon enough that you can leverage that to advise those you are advising that something has changed? (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> When getting advice – and when you're giving advice – you hope the people that are taking it are open and willing to listen and so forth. … Since that was my desire as I was *giving* it, my desire when I was *receiving* advice from whomever was to be as open as I could be, so I'm going to attract the naysayers, the dissonance, the ones that don't agree with the mainstream thought. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

Several distinguishing features characterized this experience. One was that it required higher order thinking on the part of the adviser; specifically, being able to keep their mind open to alternatives while critically evaluating a situation, keeping competing ideas in their mind, and developing alternative courses of action. Another was that it represented a combination of cognition and behavior by the adviser—not prejudging complex situations, doing the hard work of evaluating multiple possible alternatives rather than favoring one, and then being comfortable outlining the complexities while still making a recommendation.

Developing broad experience from a variety of positions. Having an open mind was facilitated by having had experiences in a wide variety of assignments, often in so-called "stretch positions" above the participant's pay grade at the time, rather than spending one's entire career progressing from one level to the next within a narrow domain. Succeeding in those positions had the additional benefit of establishing the adviser's reputation as being able to demonstrate expertise in a variety of jobs at significantly higher levels.

> The first 15 years of my career gave me the solid foundation to *be* that adviser to a national-level leader. And probably one of the best things that prepared me was I *worked* in so many different organizations. I had the opportunity to *see* so many different perspectives and *learn* about different aspects of national security – both from the Defense Department angle and the national intelligence angle. (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

> [The ambassador] would call me up for *special* things to do. You know, if he had to send somebody on something that he thought needed some kind of delicate

> handling. … And that was really above my pay grade, but he thought that I would do it. … I think what taught me how to do that – perhaps that was my way of coping with being…. I was always given jobs that were quite above my pay grade. I was always in stretch – what they call "stretch positions". Or in positions where somebody senior to me had, for some reason, they were gone or whatever. And I had to take that responsibility earlier. … I think being challenged *beyond* your experience level is a really good thing to do. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

> In terms of gaining the expertise to be an adviser to – in my last job, the Secretary of Defense – I think the primary experiences were *both* a series of leadership positions in think tanks, over the years – and sort of writing, publishing, speaking on a certain set of Defense and National Security issues (so, becoming *known* as an expert in the field). And then also, I think some *experience* in government, at a more junior level, you know, at the sort of DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense] level, and the PDAS [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense] level in the Clinton Administration. So, having some expertise not only on the policy itself, but on how the policy-making process works – how to get things done in the Pentagon – how to engage the many stakeholders that need to be engaged to actually move the policy forward, and so forth. I think it was [by] a *mixture* of the sort of more think tank and academic background, and the writing and publishing in the sort of usual ways, that … give *credibility as a practitioner* to know how to get things done. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

The distinguishing feature that characterized this experience was that it was continuous throughout the adviser's career. In every position, including when serving at the highest position within their particular national security domain, strategic advisers continued to learn, broadened their understanding, and developed their reputations.

Being deliberative or being decisive (and knowing when to do what). Different situations called for different kinds of advice, and participants noted that in order to be perceived as having expertise, a strategic adviser had to have the necessary experience to know the differences and be able to determine what was being called for.

> The *situation you are in, the time you have available,* and the *advice that you are providing* are key factors. [In one instance] I had an incident that was *occurring*, a *short* period of time, and *no answers,* okay. And answers were required in a very short period of time in order to facilitate decision making. That's *very much* a decisive period that you are in. And in cases like that, you don't have time for "sit-around-the-table; let-me-hear-all-sides-of-the-equation." You know, you've

got to cut through all of the chatter and get down to the specifics of what you need. There are other times you could be much more deliberative, and it depends on the *environment.* It depends on the *situation,* and the *time,* and you've got to be able to read that – whether you have a *deliberative* situation or a *decisive* situation – as an adviser. And you have to know … what kind of position the decision maker is in, and whether he has time to consider *possibilities* – or he needs *answers*, okay. You know, I don't need, "maybe this, maybe that." I need "our best answer is this, and here's why: boom, boom, boom, boom." And be very decisive in the advice, in order to *enable decision* in a crisis period. And so, a situation and time, I think, are very important. So, you know, are you into *possibilities*? Are you into *conclusions*? Which do you need – possibilities or conclusions? You know, do you need to brainstorm? Do you need to be direct about it? And, you've got to have *clarity of understanding, clarity of thought* of the situation that the strategic decision maker is in – in order to provide the right strategic advice. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinctive features. One was that advisers had to combine cognition and behavior. They had to carefully consider the situation, time available, and what was needed; do the hard work of gathering and coordinating the information that could be acquired to provide what was needed within that timeline; and be comfortable helping the principal consider possibilities or make a decision. The second was that advisers had to keep in mind the very significant consequences of misjudging the situation (e.g., discussing an issue when what the principal needed was help making a decision).

Knowing more about my domain than anyone else in the room. While appreciating nuances, keeping an open mind, and having had a broad set of experiences were important, participants commented that strategic advisers still had to know more about their specific domain than anyone else in the room in order to establish their bona fides.

I had the European desk, so I had to be more familiar with European issues than *any other officer* on the Joint Staff. And to do that, I had to have contacts all around the government (tapping table). So I knew not only about the area itself, but what the people in the different agencies of the government were saying on

> particular European issues. And then, I had to be able to *convey* that expertise in a way that was *useful* to the person I was advising. I had to be able to think and relate at their level. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> I guess the reason they decided … for me to take that [political adviser] position in SOUTHCOM was because [of my] experience in Latin America. … The choice was made because I knew plenty of people, you know, in the Bureau that would deal with Western Hemisphere affairs. Spoke Spanish. Spoke Portuguese. And, I think, just the fact that I had that kind of experience and could help the individuals – the senior leaders, the four stars – that I was going to be advising. … I brought *a lot* of overseas expertise. … I had been overseas a lot. *A lot* in South America. … What I brought to *that* situation was *lots* of perspective on: "If you say *this*, you may think that's what it sounds like in America, but this is what it sounds like in – you name the country – Columbia, Brazil, whatever." (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinctive features. One was that it was continuously built by the adviser in assignment after assignment. The second was that it involved a combination of cognition and behavior by the adviser, who had to be able to constantly think about their particular national security domain, do the hard work of continuously updating their knowledge as well as their database of others who could provide useful insights, and be comfortable presenting that to the decision maker.

Realizing I am not an expert; having a hunger for new information and continuous learning. Even when they knew more about their particular domain than anyone else, participants emphasized that did not mean that they considered themselves to be an expert on that topic. Strategic advisers had to have both a deep knowledge of their specific area, as well as a constant hunger for more information.

> If you're in a job, you should know more than *anybody else on the planet* about that job. But I don't think you should consider yourself an expert. … I mean, being the *smartest* guy in the room about a particular subject doesn't mean you're the *expert* on the subject. It means that at that moment in time, you know *more* than everybody else about that finite bit of information. But you'd better know more tomorrow about that *same* subject than you know today. Because the President and the Secretary of Defense deserve to have an *evolving* understanding

of whatever the topic is. And the only way they're going to get that is by the folks who are giving advice evolving *themselves*. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

I think early on, [becoming credible as an adviser] was really working hard to master a topic. Because, sometimes I was being asked to advise on things that I *wasn't* an expert on. So, I went through a process of what I needed to do to *master* the topic. And that meant reading the intelligence – reviewing other studies and work that had gone before – interviewing established experts -- pulling together the information – and so forth. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

Expertise is *deep knowledge* and *continuous learning*. Knowledge and a hunger for more information – that's expertise, in my view. In my case, I'm a China person. … I spent many years in China. I know the language and all that, but you're always learning. … I have some knowledge. Hopefully, it's a little deeper than just "some," but that's a dynamic – so you're always learning. And you're always reaching out to people who have *more* knowledge than you, who are *more* substantive than you, that have *greater* expertise than you. That's expertise, in my view. (J. DeTrani, January 15, 2016)

And [do] not be afraid to say when you don't [know] – when you're out of your depth, don't be afraid to say it. You know, don't be afraid to say, "This is *my opinion*, rather than my *informed opinion*." And then be willing to say, "But I will get educated." You know, be willing to show that you're willing to learn. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

I guess my definition of expertise relates to the *proportion of guesswork* inside the decision – or the *proportion of uncertainty* inside the decision. I mean, experts have uncertainty, but *less* uncertainty. Amateurs have *more* uncertainty – and may not even *know* they have uncertainty. But this notion that there is a *right* solution out there is *malarkey – nobody* is *that* expert. In addition, expertise carries with it the concept – the connotation – of limitation. … This is *context – big stuff – broad stuff*. And expertise, by definition, *can't* be expertise about *everything*. Yet a strategic decision must take into account *everything*. And therefore, by defining somebody as an expert, you are *defining* him as more limited than the decider he is advising. (W. Wood, February 23, 2016)

I don't think I *ever* considered myself an expert [on the Balkans or Iraq]. Because … once you get to a level of depth on an issue, you realize how much you *don't* know (chuckle). And the more I got into the Balkans, and the more I got into Iraq, the more I realized I *didn't* know. … And what's worse was that I realized I *couldn't control* [things]. … I *constantly* was building my knowledge of the environment. But it was always *changing*. And so, I had to keep rethinking and reshaping my knowledge of it. … [A]s soon as I thought that [I was gaining expertise], something would happen that was *completely outside* of what I would have thought. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> And you've got to *continually* understand that tomorrow's advice – and your approach – should be – *better* be, based on yesterday's experience – *better* than it was yesterday. And if you're not looking to get *better*, if you're not looking to be as pure as you can be, I think you've *lost* a very special part of *trying* to be a good adviser. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

The distinguishing feature that characterized this experience was that of the adviser having a deep understanding of their own capabilities, but more especially their limitations. By keeping those limitations in mind, the adviser was driven to seek additional knowledge and understanding, with the realization that they would never have all the answers.

Delivering the needed expertise – even if it comes from someone else. Along with realizing the limitations of their own knowledge, strategic advisers enhanced the perception of their expertise when they found ways to overcome those limitations by bringing in others who had the information needed by the principal. One participant was willing to give up her seat at the table to make sure that the best individual to deliver the advice was there. When that happened, the adviser demonstrated that they had sufficient expertise to know what was needed, get the right person in front of the principal to deliver, and not feel threatened by not being the person to provide the advice. This also applied to situations where a subordinate on the adviser's staff was given the opportunity to present a dissenting opinion. National-level principals valued being given all points of view.

> If you're going to give *good* advice then, yes, you do need to have expertise. Or you at least need to know enough to know *when you don't know*. And *don't give advice* if you don't know. Get somebody else to help you. Or to get advice from them and then pass it on. (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

> Sometimes, as a senior adviser – because you have that unique access to the principal – you may *think* you know it all, which you *don't*. … [A]nd that's why I emphasize: You've got to get it right! You've got to work with those people who

are *really* the experts … the people who are truly experts, who are paid to provide this advice, but they don't have the immediate access.… Advisers have to be deep, but, no one has everything all the time. And you need to really reach out to the true experts. And they need to have confidence in you that you're representing them well … you're advocating for them. (J. DeTrani, January 15, 2016)

I realized that it wasn't about me having to be the *deliverer* – the *messenger* of the expertise. It was that I could *produce* the expertise that the Secretary needed – whether it was from me or from somebody else. I was going to get him what he needed, in the most efficient way possible. And sometimes that meant taking myself out of the – *not* being an extra layer – or not being an extra step in that process – but simply getting the expertise there directly. … What I asked is, either to bring that expert with me to the meeting – or experts – or to say, "If you really are only going to give us one seat, I will give up my seat so the expert can sit there." (chuckle) (pause) If it is really about helping the decision maker make the best possible decisions, it's really not about *who* delivers the expertise. It's about getting the expertise *to them*. … It really wasn't about *me* getting to be the adviser. It was about getting the Secretary what *he needed*. You know, the *best* expertise – on time – when he needs it so he can make better decisions – whether that's *from me* or *from somebody else.* (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

If there was a strong dissenting opinion [I asked my advisers to] attach it to the main memo as the dissent, on a routine basis, and/or just make me aware of it. And if I thought it was important enough, I would bring the dissenter with me into the meeting with the Secretary, so he could hear it straight from the horse's mouth. … [A]t least the Secretary would have the opportunity to consider a different point of view before making a decision. And again, for me, it became kind of a "best practice" idea. … I wanted to have a mechanism where people – like if there was serious dissent on anything we were working on day-to-day – that we would have a vehicle for knowing about that. … [B]oth the Secretary and the President – they both, whether or not they ultimately agreed, both made it clear that they valued hearing the dissent before they made a decision. So they knew where the risks are; they knew what the other option was; they knew maybe – and even if they decided to go a different way, they could also add some things in to kind of mitigate the risk that somebody was raising. And they felt they were able to make a better decision. … [E]very time I went to a Deputy's meeting, I was willing to carry a dissenting view if there was merit to it. Or even if I – I would often also say this is *my* position, this is where the Secretary [is], but there is this strong other view (taps table) within the Department that thinks such and such (taps table). And just put it on the table, so that people are aware of it and have an opportunity to consider it and examine it. Again, I had a very strong belief that the *broader* the perspectives that were brought to the table, the better the decision making that's coming out of that process. (M. Flournoy, April 18, 2016)

> [The Secretary of Defense] knew I *wasn't bothered* by the fact that the advice was not following a hierarchy in order to get all the way through the system to the person who had the information, to get all the way back up the system to the person who needed the information. That it was perfectly okay to *jump to the expert*, and to have the feedback directly from the expert. And I learned from that that it was perfectly okay for me, too – I wasn't bothered by it any way – I wasn't threatened by having *whoever* that expert was, wherever that expert was, be the person who is briefing the Chairman, or briefing the member of Congress, or briefing the principal. … The Director of DIA was *not expected to be* the subject matter expert in all things – and I never thought that I could be the subject matter expert. … So *it wasn't about me*. It was about getting the Chairman what *he* needed, or getting the Vice Chairman what *he* needed, or getting the Secretary of Defense what *he* needed, as well. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

> Technologically, I'll *never* feel like an expert. I am a practitioner that understands how to move toward technology. … And, I have a team of people that come to me – that help me stay on top of it. And, I know – when I *don't know* something, I know where to go. I know where those center points are in this country, and then in the commercial sector, where I can go and get immersed. (M. Legere, March 4, 2016)

> Some Chairman – before me – believed that *only they* should be giving military advice to the President. I believed, because I was the *principal* military adviser to the President –that I should not be the *only* one. … I always believed that it was *very important* to get other voices. … [T]o have the hubris to think that *my* advice was always going to be the *best* advice, I think, would have been detrimental to the functioning of the Armed Forces. … [N]ow you had more people listening, and talking, and getting opinions, and sharing advice. You had a much, *much better* opportunity to give the best information to the President. And to understand what the President's guidance was, and the things that needed to have action taken on. One person can't – and shouldn't – take upon themselves that. (P. Pace, March 22, 2016)

There were several distinguishing features that characterized this experience. One was that it required a combination of cognition and behavior on the part of the adviser. They had to think about the situation or issue at hand (and their own limitations on the topic), do the hard work of finding those who could fill the gap, and be comfortable putting the right person with the necessary knowledge in front of the principal. A second was that it was both contextually dependent (e.g., different levels of understanding about different situations) and socially dependent (e.g., making sure the principal was interacting with the right person to get the advice that was needed). A third was that the adviser kept the significant potential consequences of the situation in mind when determining who should be providing advice to the decision maker.

Being able to synthesize a great deal of information, justify the advice given, frame the recommended decision and possible consequences, and provide value added for principal. Reflecting on what led to them being perceived as advisers with the necessary expertise, participants emphasized having sufficient experience to be able to synthesize a great deal of information, justify the advice being given, help frame the decision being recommended while also articulating the possible consequences, and add value to the principal's decision making process.

> In some cases – [the adviser is] trying to *educate*; you're trying to *inform*. In other cases, if you get to really the heart of "*advising*," you are trying to influence an individual's decision-making and the *direction* an individual is taking, or the *view* that the individual has of what's going on – of what the *possibilities* are. And so, how do you go about doing – influencing – those outcomes, or *exposing* the person to potentialities that person may not have considered in the past? I think it is a *key* ability to be able – as a senior adviser – to *synthesize information*. You get information from many sources. You have to be able to take that information, *synthesize* it in a way that it's understandable – it's clear, but it is representative of the information that you have received; that *includes the differences*, or issues with what is known. … [E]xposing what we do know, what we don't know, what we know we don't know, and were trying to get. And then, what are the possibilities out there – that we haven't even *considered* yet – that might be at work? And so, you have to develop, I think – as a senior adviser, the ability to *project* the consequences and the outcomes of courses of action. And don't allow people to be on a straight-line path, because the world doesn't operate that way. And so, you've got to be able to *present* these alternatives, if you will. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> [As the] Political Counselor and Deputy Political Counselor… [I] report[ed] directly to the PermRep [Permanent Representative] … or the Deputy PermRep [at the UN], depending on how the issue plays out. I was brought up to straighten out the incredibly *complex* sanctions that were being proposed for the Balkans. And there was just too much detail and too many agencies involved for [the ambassador] to be able to incorporate it in a good way. … I wasn't the smartest – I wasn't the most energetic – but I could phrase things in a way that [the

ambassador] could understand. And that was *key*. I could phrase technicalities in a way that was intelligible at a policy level. … You are writing for *deciders* – so tell the decider what the decider needs to know. (W. Wood, February 23, 2016)

Justify why you say what you say. Justify why you give the advice that you give. What leads you to your conclusion that you're telling me this? And be able to answer that question. … You always have to be able to explain why. "Why do you say this?" … "Why do you say that? What will be the consequence of your advice if I followed it? And what do you base that opinion on?" … An adviser needs to be able to justify his or her advice. (M. Polt, November 19, 2015)

Expertise is *also* having a level of experience and a level of comfort that enables you to *anticipate* … what might happen. I mean, it is *not* having the answers to all the questions. It *is* being able to anticipate … scenarios. Anticipate questions. You know, anticipate things that can go wrong. And having a sense of how to deal with them. (L. Long, February 11, 2016)

Being a strategic adviser is *more* than simply being the best mechanic in the garage. At some point, you want to say not, "This is how you make the car *better,"* but, "You really ought to *get a new car*." … [P]art of what the person you're advising values is your technical expertise, but what he's really looking for is *value-added*. And the value-added can come in the area of technical expertise. … Or it can come in any of the elements laid out so brilliantly by Terry Deibel [Deibel, 2007] in his discussion of what strategy is. I mean, is it feasible? Is it sustainable? Is it acceptable? Is it advisable? … Are you really using the right ends – ways – means…. And the strategic adviser is one who provides advice on *any* of the components of a *strategy*. Is this the issue? How important is it? What are the ends, ways, and means available to address it? What are the costs? What are the risks? How flexible is it? (tapping table). I mean, a strategic adviser is, at least, in my definition, one who provides advice on any of those subjects. (W. Wood, February 23, 2016)

This experience was characterized by several distinguishing features. One was the requirement for higher order thinking on the part of the adviser. Another was the recognition by the adviser of the very significant consequences of the advice they were giving. A third was that it involved a combination of cognition and behavior by the adviser.

When reflecting on their service as strategic advisers to national-level leaders, and what led to them being perceived as having the needed expertise, participants addressed a variety of their experiences. These included their ability to appreciate nuances; keep an open mind; develop a broad range of experiences based on serving in a variety of positions; knowing when the principal needed advice that was deliberative or decisive; knowing more about their specific domain than anyone else in the room, while keeping in mind that they were really not an expert and needed to continuously seek new information; being able to deliver the needed expertise, even if it came from someone else; and being able to synthesize a great deal of information, justify the advice given, frame the decision being recommended and the possible consequences of that approach, and providing added value to the principal's decision making process.

Several characteristics of the experiences which led advisers to be perceived by the principals they served as having expertise were apparent. Unlike those experiences that led strategic advisers to believe they were perceived as trustworthy, most of which were distinguished by multiple characteristics, the experiences that led strategic advisers to believe they were perceived as having expertise seldom had more than one or two characteristics. Of these experiences, many were characterized as involving a combination of cognition and behavior, and half were characterized by the adviser realizing the need to be mindful of the potential consequences of the proposed course of action, as well as of misjudging the situation. Other characteristics of several experiences included the requirement for higher order thinking by the adviser—keeping their mind open to alternatives while critically evaluating the situation and developing alternative courses of action, a combination of cognition and behavior, or that they were continuous throughout an adviser's career. One experience was characterized by the adviser developing a deep understanding of their own abilities and limitations, while another was characterized as being both contextually and socially dependent.

With regard to the characteristics of the experiences that led to perceptions of expertise, there were similarities between the participants' recollections from the perspective of having been a national-level principal, and from the perspective of having been a strategic adviser. Most of these experiences were distinguished by only one or two characteristics. Among the characteristics of the experiences, both from the perspective of principals and advisers, were: the requirement for a deep understanding of themselves (including their own strengths and limitations) and others, the need for higher order thinking to analyze and evaluate information and think critically, the combination of both cognition and behavior, the nature of expertise being continuously built, the contextual and socially dependence, and the exceptionally significant consequences of either the proposed course of action or of misjudging the situation.

Derailing Perceptions

Participants emphasized that the vast majority of those who advised them when they were serving as national-level principals were perceived both as being trustworthy and as having the necessary expertise to be seen as credible, but that was not always the case. In some cases, advisers, even at the national strategic level, simply were not valued by the principal.

> I've had many [advisers I didn't value,] and I didn't value them for *all of the reasons* that I talked about earlier. I didn't think the quality of their advice was very good. Or I didn't think they shared my vision. Or I didn't think they were in control of their portfolio. Or they just made agreement on a final decision *more difficult* than I thought was necessary. Or they were looking for an end-state that didn't conform to my vision. (Pause) Or lastly, they just weren't very easy to talk to. There's a *human dimension* to all of this that's *very important* … in any

conversation, there are two individuals. And sometimes, there are no sockets for their plugs, or no plugs for their sockets. (W. Wood, March 15, 2016)

In addition to considering what experiences led national-level principals to perceive their advisers as being trustworthiness and having expertise, participants were asked to reflect on advisers that were *not* valued. This allowed them to describe the characteristics of experiences that derailed their perception—as principals—of an adviser's trustworthiness and expertise. Those are views summarized in Table 4.5. The characteristics of these derailing experiences were the opposite of the distinguishing features mentioned above, in that they detracted from the credibility of the adviser by diminishing the perceptions of their trustworthiness or the perceptions of their expertise.

Table 4.5. Derailing Perceptions

Derailing Perceptions of Trustworthiness	Derailing Perceptions of Expertise
• Adviser focused on themselves / getting credit • Adviser having own agenda • Adviser demonstrating bias • Adviser unable to understand principal's needs • Adviser not being discrete • Adviser often being wrong	• Adviser unwilling to say "I don't know" • Adviser unwilling to get / take input from others • Adviser presenting positions that are not well developed or coordinated • Adviser telling "what they know" rather than "what principal needs to know"

Derailing Perceptions of the Adviser's Trustworthiness. Both columns in Table 4.5 reflect the observations of participants while considering their time serving as national-level principals with advisers of their own. They were asked to reflect on the characteristics of the experiences of those advisers that were not valued with regard to their trustworthiness. The first column summarizes the principals' views of what experiences derailed their perceptions of the trustworthiness of that adviser.

Adviser focused on themselves / getting credit. Participants did not view as trustworthy those advisers whose primary focus was on themselves or on getting credit for the advice they gave to the principal.

> I didn't value … people that really are *driven* in their advice by Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. [For them] at the end of the day it's always about *me* and how is it going to affect *me* – as opposed to how it's going to affect *us* and *we*. (R. Burgess, January 13, 2016)

> This was an instance [selecting a key adviser] where I decided to *go* with a recommendation of somebody else that I trusted and valued…. And the relationship didn't work out. It was one where I thought that, as I worked with the individual, I found that the individual was focused *more* on *self* than on service – which is a trait and a value that I don't appreciate. I didn't appreciate, and I don't appreciate. And, we never developed a relationship that I thought was fully beneficial to the agency. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

> [With some advisers] it's all about *me* getting the best of *you*, rather than *getting the job done*. And that's kind of sad. And I think it's really – I think we've all seen this. You've probably seen it too. You've probably worked with people like that. That it's all about whether they *win*, you know. Whether they get... Not getting the job done. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

The distinguishing feature that characterized this experience was that the principal perceived that the adviser failed to understand the difference between their role and that of the decision maker, thereby showing that the adviser failed to understand both themselves and others.

Adviser having own agenda. In a similar vein, participants did not view as trustworthy an adviser who they perceived to have their own agenda, rather than the adviser sharing the agenda, goals, principles, and values of the principal.

> There were times when I was dealing with certain [individuals] … who had an agenda that was different from what I thought our agenda ought to be, or was directed by the people *I* was responsible to, which was, in this case, the Secretary of State … and the President. … And, unfortunately, once that *happens*, … then it's very hard to be in a position to *work with* that person and *trust* that person going forward. Once the trust is *breached*, it's very hard to repair. (D. Coats, February 24, 2016)

> I didn't trust him personally. I didn't *respect* him. … I felt like there were hidden – that there were agendas that would be to the detriment of both the *mission* and other *people* and *me*, in some cases, personally. Although I did try – I tried *very* hard. … But it just didn't work. … I just always felt like, "This person is *not here to help me*. This person is here to aggrandize *themselves*," you know, "promote themselves; and that's what this is all about." (C. Martinez, February 25, 2016)

There were two distinguishing features that characterized this experience. One was that the principal perceived that the adviser had failed to achieve a sufficient mental closeness to understand what the principal actually needed. The other was that the principal perceived that the adviser did not understand what their role was (i.e., advising), and how it differed from the role of the principal (i.e., setting the agenda).

Adviser demonstrating bias. Participants commented that national-level principals did not trust advice from individuals who demonstrated a bias (their own or that of their parent organization) or tried to slant the information in order to advocate for a particular course of action or influence a decision.

> It's very easy for an adviser … if you're coming in, and you're trying to get a decision from someone, and if you lay your arguments out – to either take one of the arguments and attempt to *skew* it, or just altogether *leave it out*…. You can use words to change the *slant* of input. And people, if they wanted things to end up in a certain way, can help *drive* a decision in that direction. That would *bother* me, if I picked up on that. (R. Burgess, January 13, 2016)

> [When I was not trusted,] it was *usually* because … someone assumed that I had a bias. Where I was carrying water for some bureaucratic interest, or some particular player. That *I was not* being a straight shooter. *I was not* being…. You know, that I had *some* hidden bias. I was championing the military's perspective. … But it was some *assumption of bias* – that I wasn't actually giving my *best advice*, but I was carrying somebody else's water, bureaucratically. (M. Flournoy, March 29, 2016)

> [I had] this *one* individual [who always] had a contrarian view on everything. … *[D]espite* the significant evidence we had that his views were wrong – because we got *compelling* evidence – *compelling* evidence – this individual would always find a reason why those were *exceptions*, and they did not change his opinion *at all*. … [W]hen you have a confluence of evidence coming in, and 16 [intelligence] agencies all saying, "This is *compelling*," and – for *whatever* reason

> – this person holding to his original assessment, you started to wonder about (and I did) his *professionalism*, and his *competence*, and his *judgment*. (J. DeTrani, February 2, 2016)

This experience was characterized by three distinguishing features. One was the perception by the principal that the adviser had failed to achieve a sufficient mental closeness to understand what the principal needed. The second was that the principal viewed the adviser as failing to utilize higher order thinking skills (carefully analyzing and evaluating information, using critical thinking, to provide unbiased advice). And the third was the perception by the principal that the adviser failed to understand that providing biased information could lead to immense, negative consequences.

Adviser unable to understand principal's needs. Participants did not trust the advice of individuals who could not understand their needs.

> I can think of a senior leader who I failed … you know, it's my job to be his adviser, but in particular topics, I *failed* him because I could *not* figure out how he viewed the problem, and kept coming at him from my *own* perspective. And it was *not* successful. … [I said], "You really ought to fire us, because were not meeting your expectation as your senior advisers. We're not giving you what you need…." (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

> There would be times when stuff we were getting from them – I would say, "It's not sufficient – not good enough." Those [principal staff officers] aren't – most often – not the kind of people you're going to replace right away. But then you'd have to have a longer conversation with them, and say, "Hey, you're not measuring up in this area. I need this. I need that." … I thought their focus was too narrow – not strategic – and more parochial. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

> There's a guy who worked for me when I was a three-star. … And when I first came onboard, he was there, and I looked to him for advice. But in a relatively short period of time, I saw that he was a great philosopher, but he wasn't very practical. And, in fact, he was no longer in that core group [of close advisers]. … Probably the best way to say it – it wasn't about *him*. It wasn't about *me*. It was about the *organization* and what we were *doing*. And he was not providing that to me. … [H]e was not the right advisor at the right time. (M. Hagee, November 17, 2015)

> Principals – when they feel they're not getting the best advice from a senior adviser – occasionally go to others who then become a more *important* senior adviser, … because they feel they're getting a better product. … [In that case], that senior adviser should leave. Because he or she … probably lost the confidence of their principal…. (J. DeTrani, January 15, 2016)

> [The Office of the Secretary of Defense] guys used to say, "You go up and give a briefing. And everyone would smile nicely. And you'd leave. And then they'd say, "That was very *un*fulfilling." (chuckle) And that was the code word for, "What a s**ty briefing." You didn't provide the level of information that they *expected at that level*, so that became kind of our code word. I could say to the guy – I would tell them that story, and then we'd kind of look at each – you know, someone would give [a briefing], and *everybody knows* that it wasn't quite where it needed to be. And I'd say something like, "That was *a bit on the unfulfilling side*. We need to work a little bit here and there." … I would usually just say, "Hey guys, we need to tighten this (tapping table) pitch up a bit. We didn't quite get an A on our last report here. We need to tighten it up." (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

The distinguishing feature that characterized this experience was the perception by the principal that the adviser had failed to achieve a sufficient mental closeness, substituting the adviser's own perspective for what the principal really needed in order to make a decision.

Adviser not being discrete. Advisers who were not discrete were not perceived as being trustworthy. That included an adviser discussing their one-on-one, private interactions with the principal not only with someone outside the organization, but even with the adviser's own staff.

> If you meet people that you would like to rely on for advice, and you have your conversations reflected back from other sources, and you haven't said, "Hey, it's okay to share this," then you quickly *clam up around those people* in the future. … [P]eople that have not been *trustworthy* with the confidence that you give them … at which point, you know, *that sharing stops*. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

> I just felt [this adviser] had no discretion. … [He] was *never* in the inner circle. … I would never bring him down and say, "I've got to make a decision and I'm troubled. Let me tell you what's going on." I wouldn't have done it. … [H]is access was based on the schedule, not on [him saying] "I need to see the Director now." (M. Hayden, February 12, 2016)

> You're always going to be grateful for [that adviser's] contributions to you, or to your Service – but they become *less valuable* to you [if they are indiscrete]. And I can visually see people that I thought would be very valuable to me through this experience, but I couldn't really *trust their confidence*. So, if I was struggling with something very sensitive, I would never think of sharing it with those people. Because, candidly, their desire to *be on the inside* was more important than their wiliness to keep it to themselves. So, *discretion* is really important when you're being really open with people. (M. Legere, April 5, 2016)

> One way that it would destroy a relationship and not make you trustworthy – if every time I went up to the Secretary's office, or we had a meeting – and I was really frustrated about the outcome, or about where the Secretary was on an issue – if I went down and ranted to my staff. … That would eventually get back, right? So you can't do that. … You know, if you're saying it, you're thinking it. If you're thinking it, it's going to manifest itself in other ways in that relationship. … If you're frustrated, that's fine. You're in a position where you're not going to be able to vent a lot, thank you very much. And you've just got to get on with the business. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinguishing features. One was the perception by the principal that the adviser, by not being discrete about privileged information received from the principal, had failed to demonstrate the appropriate behavior. The second was the perception by the principal that the adviser, by failing to constantly reinforce their reputation for discretion, had forfeited their right to be seen as a trusted adviser.

Adviser often being wrong. While participants realized that the very nature of the problems being considered at the national strategic level were so complex that no adviser could be expected to be right all the time, they also noted that when an adviser was wrong too often or did not apply sufficient rigor to their analysis of the situation at hand, the adviser was no longer viewed as trustworthy.

> You know, getting it wrong is not a sin – as long as you don't make it too frequent. And then you begin just, you know – you lose your space. Because, he can't – he doesn't have *time* for it. It's not that he *dislikes* you. He's not *devalued* you. He's just – you're not *helping*. (M. Hayden, January 13, 2016)

> I actually had an adviser [that] … I was going to say, "Was not expert in their field," however, I really to this day don't know if they weren't expert or they were simply lazy. And what I mean by that is, the advice they rendered was often wrong. I know that they were *capable*. I haven't figured out the *why*…. I would ask questions. They *always* had an answer. However, it wasn't the *right* answer. And so, I came to recognize very *quickly* … that they were *shooting from the hip*. (L. Long, March 9, 2016)

> I had some advisers that I *didn't* value. And I think the reason I *wouldn't*, you know, value their opinion, generally – I could put in, you know, two or three buckets. The first, of course, would have to be trustworthiness. They hadn't shown themselves to be trustworthy in terms of – the *rigor* in which they approached the task they were given. Doing *all* of their homework. Understanding it from top to bottom – in terms of that – before they made a recommendation. (R. Burgess, January 13, 2016)

There were two distinguishing features which characterized this experience. One was that the principal viewed the adviser as failing to demonstrate higher order thinking—carefully analyzing and thoroughly evaluating information, thinking critically, and proposing well-crafted options. The second was that the principal perceived that the adviser's repeated failure to provide accurate advice reflected a failure on the part of the adviser to understand the significant consequences that could result from being wrong.

In summary, participants identified several experiences that could derail their perception, as national-level principals, of the trustworthiness of their advisers. Principals did not view as trustworthy those advisers whose primary focus was on themselves or on getting credit for the advice they gave to the principal, advisers perceived to have their own agenda rather than sharing that of the principal, advisers who demonstrated a bias (their own or that of their parent organization) or tried to slant the information in order to advocate for a particular course of action or influence a decision, advisers who could not understand the needs of the principal, advisers who were seen to be indiscrete, and advisers whose advice was often wrong.

Several characteristics of the experiences which derailed the principal's perception of the trustworthiness of an adviser emerged. One was that the principal realized the adviser failed to have the necessary understanding of themselves and their advisory role and of the principal and their agenda-setting, decision-making role. Another characteristic was that the principal determined there was not the necessary mental closeness for the adviser to understand what the principal actually needed to make a decision. A third was that the principal viewed the adviser as not using higher order thinking skills to analyze and evaluate information, think critically, and provide unbiased advice and well-crafted options. Yet another characteristic was that the principal was concerned the adviser failed to understand the immense, negative consequences of providing biased information or repeatedly failing to provide accurate advice. Others were that the principal determined the adviser's behavior was inappropriate, such as not being discrete about privileged information, or that the adviser failed to work to constantly reinforce their reputation for trustworthiness.

Derailing Perceptions of the Adviser's Expertise. The right-hand column in Table 4.5 summarizes the principal's views—when reflecting on an adviser they did not value—of what experiences had derailed their perceptions of that adviser's expertise.

Adviser unwilling to say "I don't know." Participants were very aware of the complexity of issues at the national strategic level and questioned the expertise of any adviser who was never willing to admit that they did not know the answer to a question.

> [The adviser was] shooting from the hip. They were just trying to answer my questions, without having the full picture or the full understanding. And I recognize that initial observations are often wrong, but if you don't know, you should *say you don't know*. You need more time to analyze; don't have all the information yet; it's early, you know … whatever. And then come back. … [My

> deputy and I decided], "This is too important a position for this individual to be running this particular area." And we moved him. (L. Long, March 9, 2016)

> You can't just opine on stuff. But I think that happens *way too often*. Because people who have become advisers – because people [who] think they have expertise don't like to acknowledge that they *don't have it* in all areas, or in all aspects of the areas (C. Wagner, March 28, 2016)

Three distinguishing features characterized this experience. One was the perception by the principal that the adviser did not have a deep understanding of their own capabilities and shortcomings. The second was the principal's view that the adviser did not have a sufficient mental closeness with the principal to understand what the decision maker really needed. The third was the principal's concern that frequently "shooting from the hip" rather than admitting when they "didn't know" reflected a failure of the adviser to understand the immense consequences of providing incorrect information.

Adviser unwilling to get / take input from others. Similarly, participants noted that they did not value advisers who were unwilling to actively seek, and take, input from others.

> Be willing to *take* advice. A good adviser will always *take* advice. I think that's really important. Because some advisers think they're only advisers … they're not listeners. (C. Martinez, February 18, 2016)

> Incident occurs … and so I say, "I need to talk to [X] … make sure they bring their team with them." So, there're three or four people in the office. … And I'm watching the *body language* of the individual's subordinates. And I'm recognizing that they're *disagreeing* [with the principal adviser] – and they're *afraid to speak up*. So I just ask them directly, "What do *you* think occurred?" And I get a *very different* answer. … That was a real indicator to me that [my adviser] wasn't encouraging input. Or, if they were *getting* input, they weren't *taking* it. (L. Long, March 9, 2016)

> I think competency is also the ability to build a team. So, inside the Joint Staff, I wanted a team-like atmosphere, personally. I know of cases where the J-3 and the J-5 wouldn't talk to each other – and wouldn't allow their staffs to talk to each

other. Because when they went to the morning meeting with the Chairman, they wanted to be the most brilliant one in the room. I wouldn't – that was Pass/Fail for me – if I found that going on, we would very quickly find a new [general]. (R. Myers, April 13, 2016)

This experience was also characterized by three distinguishing features. One was the view by the principal that the adviser did not sufficiently understanding their own strengths and weaknesses. The second was the principal's perception that the adviser could not combine cognition (thinking about what information was needed) and behavior (finding the right person to deliver the needed information). The third was the principal saw the adviser as unable to understand the contextually and socially dependent nature of the situation, which required the adviser ensure the decision maker got the *best* advice, even if it did not come from the adviser themselves.

Adviser presenting positions which were not well developed or coordinated. In addition to questioning the expertise of an adviser who never admitted they did not know the answer to a question and an adviser unwilling to seek or take advice from others, participants also did not view an adviser who presented poorly developed or coordinated positions as having expertise.

I had the experience with a Secretary of Defense … and I watched on many occasions where people came in to brief him, or give him advice, where they never got past their first slide or the first part of their presentation. Because they either couldn't defend the assumptions that they had made, or they wouldn't stand up to his questioning in the first five minutes. And, therefore, he had concluded they didn't know what they were talking about, and he wasn't going to waste the rest of the time listening to them. And the meeting ended, and they left. I saw it happen on multiple occasions. … [I] if you didn't [know what you're talking about], you're likely to get blown out of the water – because you didn't do what you were supposed to do – [that is] to have the *expertise* that that leader is reliant on, and that's what they were looking for. (M. Maples, January 29, 2016)

This was an instance [selecting a key adviser as Director of DIA] where I decided to *go* with a recommendation of somebody else that I trusted and valued, based on simply my own instinct in the interview. And the relationship didn't work out. …

> I never felt like I was getting *good* advice that was well developed, considered, and based on a *real analysis* of what the agency needed to do. … There was no feel [that] the strategic direction – and where we were going as an agency, and what we needed as an agency – was being represented at her level. And there was no plan to get *in front of* the issues. (M. Maples, February 4, 2016)

There were three distinguishing features which characterized this experience. One was the principal's perception that the adviser had not achieved sufficient mental closeness to realize what the decision maker really needed (e.g., well-developed, well-coordinated advice). The second was principal's view that the adviser did not utilize higher order thinking skills to deliver the advice required by the situation. And the third, as a consequence of the other two, was the perception that the adviser did not adequately understand the consequences of giving advice that was not properly developed or coordinated.

Adviser telling "what they know" rather than "what principal needs to know."

Similarly, participants did not view as experts those advisers unable to distill all that the adviser knew within their specific domain down to what was relevant to the decision facing the principal, or advisers who were unable to understand the larger picture. These advisers did not provide *what the principal needed to know*.

> [As an adviser,] you have to be able to demonstrate that you're operating *at their level*. That you're not just trying to show them how much *you know* about the subject. You have to understand that [the principal you are advising is] providing military advice to the senior civilian leadership in the country. Your job is to help them shape that advice – not just to let them know what you know. … [T]hat's *really hard* for a lot of folks to understand. … [I]n Iraq, I did a lot of that stuff myself, because I didn't have the people that operated at that level. (G. Casey, March 9, 2016)

> To provide value-added to the decider, you have to have some sense of the pressures that are operating on the decider outside of your portfolio. And if you only give advice within your narrow lane – without trying to understand the pressures on the strategic leader that are coming from spheres outside your lane –

> then you're not doing as good a job as you could be doing. And in this case, I didn't. (W. Wood, February 23, 2016)

> Just by virtue of *how – long – you've – been – in – Service* (tapping table) – sticking to the military examples – you *have* a level of expertise that's *different* from the level of expertise of other people around the table. [Y]you've *hopefully* assimilated something after 30 years in the military. Now, whether you're able to make the *transition* and be *able to relate* those experiences into something that is useful and intelligible to a civilian leader who doesn't have your 30 years of background – that's a different story. And that's where folks come apart, I think. Because *every* 3 or 4-star general that goes over there is *good* at what they do, or they wouldn't *be* there. But the *real art is* whether they're able to *translate that experience* into something that's *relevant* for the civilian leader. (G. Casey, March 16, 2016)

This experience was characterized by two distinguishing features. The principal viewed the adviser as not being mentally close enough to understand what was really needed at that time, for the decision that had to be made, or for an action that needed to be taken. The second was the principal's perception that the adviser was not demonstrating the higher order thinking skills needed to analyze all the information, think critically about what information was actually relevant, and then deliver their advice in a way that helped frame a decision.

When reflecting on advisers that they did not perceive as having the necessary expertise, participants addressed a variety of their experiences when serving as national-level principals. Principals questioned the expertise of any adviser who was never willing to admit that they did not know the answer to a question; or was unwilling to seek and take the advice of others; or presented positions that were not well developed or coordinated; or were unable to provide advice that was what *the principal* needed to know.

Several characteristics of the experiences which derailed the principal's perception of the expertise of an adviser emerged. One was the principal's perception that the adviser lacked a deep understanding of their own capabilities and shortcomings. A second characteristic was the principal's view that there was not the mental closeness necessary for the adviser to understand what was really needed, at that time, for the principal to make a decision. A third was the principal's view that the adviser did not understand the immense consequences of providing incorrect information. Another was that the principal perceived the adviser could not combine cognition and behavior to think about what information was needed and then find the right person to deliver it. Yet another was the principal's perception that the adviser lacked an understanding of the contextual and socially dependent nature of the situation. The final characteristic was that the principal did not perceive the adviser used higher order thinking skills to analyze information, think critically about what was relevant, and deliver advice that helped frame a decision.

Themes of the Characteristics of the Experiences

The experiences recounted by the participants were individualized to a particular point in each person's career. However, when looking at the characteristics which distinguished the experiences, seven themes emerged: (1) they required a deep understanding of the adviser, the principal, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and one's own domain; (2) they demanded mental closeness between the adviser and the principal; (3) they were continuously built and could be undone; (4) they involved higher order thinking skills; (5) they acknowledged the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level; (6) they involved a combination of cognition and behavior; and (7) they were both contextually and socially dependent. All seven were apparent in the characteristics of the experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness. Six of the seven themes were found in the characteristics of the experiences that led to perceptions of expertise (the second theme—mental closeness between the adviser and principal—not being apparent). All seven appeared for the characteristics of the experiences when participants recalled their service as national-level principals, and when they recalled their service as strategic advisers.

The first theme regarding those experiences that developed perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise was that it required a deep understanding of yourself, of others, of the situation, and of your domain. Having a deep understanding of oneself included knowing your own strengths and limitations. As an adviser, having a deep understanding of others involved knowing the principal (their goals and objectives, values, and what they needed to make a decision). As a principal, having a deep understanding of others involved knowing your advisers, especially their strengths and limitations,. Both advisers and principals had to understand others around them (either other advisers or other national-level decision makers). In addition, as deep an understanding as possible of the situation at hand, as well as knowing more about your domain than anyone else in the room, was part of this theme of deep knowledge.

That second theme flowed naturally from the first, in that it demanded mental closeness between the adviser and the principal. Mental closeness permitted the adviser to see the world through the eyes of the principal, anticipate the principal's needs, and deliver the necessary information in the right manner to facilitate the decision to be made. Similarly, it also allowed the principal to trust their adviser and be confident that they would supply the necessary expertise (either their own, or that of someone else).

The third theme of the characteristics of the experiences was that they were continuously built and could be undone. They began being built at the very start of the participants' careers and continued to the end, including when they rose to become national-level leaders in their own right. In addition, they could unravel at any time due to an ill-considered action, such as being indiscreet. Participants were either building or undoing the perceptions of their trustworthiness and expertise in every position they held.

The fourth theme was that the characteristic of the experiences that developed perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise involved higher order thinking skills. Advisers had to carefully analyze and evaluate a wide variety of information about evolving situations, think critically about what specific pieces of all that information the principal actually needed to address the situation at hand, and create carefully considered courses of action. Principals had to apply higher order thinking skills when evaluating what their various advisers presented and think critically about the issue they were facing or the decision they had to make.

The fifth theme was the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level. The advice presented and the decisions made could literally be a matter of life and death, and both the adviser and the principal often characterized their experiences in terms of constantly being mindful of the consequences of advice because of the consequences of the actions it led to or prevented.

The sixth theme involved a combination of cognition and behavior. Advisers had to be deliberate in their thinking, trying not to prejudge complex and shifting situations, then do the hard work of evaluating multiple possible alternatives without favoring one over another, and finally present their recommendations to the principal in a manner that met their needs. Principals had to think carefully about the issue facing them, the time available and what was needed, then take action to obtain the best advice to help them shape their decision.

The seventh theme was that the experiences were characterized as being both contextually and socially dependent. The contextual dependency had to do with the specific situation in which the adviser and principal found themselves. The social dependency had to do with the relationship not only between the principal and their advisers, but with other advisers and other national-level decision makers.

Chapter Summary

This chapter described the findings of a basic interpretive study addressing the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders. The development trajectory that led participants from the start of their career to the point where they were strategic advisers and national-level principals was described. Participants' definitions of trustworthiness and expertise, and the relative importance of each, were presented. Then the participants' reflections on the experiences and their characteristics that built perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise, viewed from both the perspective of a national-level principal and that of a strategic adviser, as well as their reflections on experiences that can derail those perceptions,was presented. The chapter concluded with a description of seven themes of the characteristics of the experiences.

Notwithstanding individualized experiences within their own national security domains, participants described a discernable progression to positions of greater responsibility during their careers, summarizing their experiences at each level. Their careers began with formative experiences, where they learned their craft and built reputations in the eyes of peers and superiors. This groundwork provided opportunities for future assignments at higher levels. Near the mid-point of their careers, participants recounted a transformative experience, such as being an executive assistant or senior military assistant to a national-level principal or serving on the National Security Council. This provided the opportunity for participants to expand their horizons, refine their awareness, and learn to see the world through the eyes of a strategic leader. Later, participants went on to advisory positions below the national level, serving in senior staff positions in embassies, combatant commands, on the Joint Staff, or on the Intelligence Staff. This refined their awareness of what was expected of key advisers, though their advice to national decision makers was filtered through more senior individuals within their own domain, such as a Cabinet secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Director of National Intelligence. At this stage, participants also gained experience as mid-level principals with advisers of their own. Finally, the participants eventually rose to serve simultaneously as strategic advisers and national-level principals, both advising and being advised. This offered opportunities to enhance their effectiveness in the national security policymaking process, and to provide advice directly to national decision makers such as the President and National Security Council. Simultaneously, participants served as national-level principals in their own right, leading large organization responsible for broad areas of national security.

With regard to perceptions of trustworthiness, participants stated it was mandatory to being credible as a strategic adviser, though being perceived as trustworthy did not mean one was a good adviser. Participants included a wide range of experiences that led to being perceived as trustworthy at this level. Regarding perceptions of expertise, participants stated that it was desirable, but not necessary, to being a credible strategic adviser. They commented that it was impossible to be an expert at everything that transpired across the national security policy arena, even in one's own domain. Again, participants included a wide range of experiences that led to being perceived as having expertise. As was the case with trustworthiness, being perceived as having expertise did not mean one was a good adviser.

The participants saw being perceived as trustworthy as more important than being perceived as having expertise in terms of the credibility of a strategic adviser. Expertise was not equated with being trustworthy, and vice versa. Participants recounted instances of an adviser who was viewed as trustworthy, even though the adviser did not have the expertise necessary for the issue at hand.

Several participants commented that perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise differed between political appointees and career professionals. Political appointees presumed advisers, other than those who had previously been in the principal's inner circle, were untrustworthy until they had proven that they were. By contrast, career professionals presumed advisers were trustworthy unless they proved they were not. There was a similar view regarding differing perceptions of expertise. Career professionals viewed expertise as an important quality in an adviser, whereas political appointees favored personal loyalty over expertise.

Participants reflected on their time as national-level principals being advised by others, which allowed them to describe the characteristics of the experiences that led to a principal's perception of the trustworthiness and expertise of an adviser. They also reflected on their time as strategic advisers, which allowed them to describe the characteristics of the experiences that allowed advisers to be perceived as being trustworthy and having expertise.

When reflecting on their service as national-level principals, participants' perceptions of an adviser's trustworthiness was influenced by the reputation the adviser had developed; their demonstrated ability to maintain a strategic view of issues; their anticipation of the principal's needs and willingness to tell them what they needed to know; their honesty, to include challenging the principal; their ability to consistently give accurate advice, admit when they did not know the answer, and admit and correct their mistakes; their added value with regard to the principal's decision making; the fact that they had a shared view of the problem, vision, goals, and values; and that they demonstrated discretion when it came to discussions between the principal and adviser. Having shared a moment of crisis accelerated the perception that the adviser was trustworthy. These experiences were frequently distinguished by multiple characteristics. Almost all were characterized as requiring the principal to develop a mental closeness with their adviser. Other characteristics included the principal have a deep understanding of themselves and their advisers; being continuously built or undone over a long period of time; requiring higher order thinking skills; being a combination of cognition and behavior; being contextually and socially dependent; and reflecting the exceptionally significant consequences of the problems being addressed.

When reflecting on being perceived as trustworthy advisers to national-level leaders, participants addressed a variety of their own experiences. These included their ability to learn while doing every job; see the world through the eyes of a national-level principal while serving as their executive officer or military assistant; do the hard work to develop a reputation for consistent excellence; think for the principal, anticipate their needs, and deliver valuable insights; as well as observe and learn from dysfunctional adviser-principal relationships. It also included the ability to speak up (even when the message was unwelcome or presented uncomfortable truths), dissent, challenge the principal and the established bureaucracy, and provide grounding for senior leaders' consideration of the situation; know their own limits and say "I don't know, but I'll find out"; be themselves and have confidence; admit and learn from mistakes, seek feedback, and accept criticism; be humble and give credit to others; and be discrete while demonstrating loyalty. Once again, these experiences were frequently distinguished by multiple characteristics. Almost all were characterized as developing a deep understanding of oneself, the principal being advised, the situation, and others around them. Other characteristics included developing a mental closeness with the principal being advised, being continuously built or undone over a long period of time, requiring higher order thinking skills, acknowledging the exceptionally significant consequences of the issues being addressed and the advice being given at the national level, being a combination of cognition and behavior on the part of the adviser, and being contextually and socially dependent.

When reflecting on their time as national-level principals being advised by others, participants' perceptions of an adviser's expertise were influenced by experiences in several areas. These included the adviser's ability to embrace ambiguity while still offering a view; demonstrate they were an original thinker; make connections across broad national security domains, to include whole-of-government and allies; demonstrate understanding as well as knowledge; always search for relevant, more complete information; know their own limits; and facilitate interaction with those who had the needed information. Most of these experiences were distinguished by only one or two characteristics. Among these, requiring the principal to use critical thinking skills was a distinguishing characteristic of nearly half the experiences, while gaining a deep understanding of the situation, their advisers' strengths and limitations, and themselves; being continuously built over a period of time was a distinguishing characteristic of two experiences. Other characteristics that were present at least once included the experience being a combination of cognition and behavior on the part of the principal, acknowledging the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level, and being contextually and socially dependent.

When reflecting on their service as strategic advisers to national-level leaders, and what led to them being perceived as having the needed expertise, participants addressed a variety of their experiences. These included their ability to appreciate nuances; keep an open mind; develop a broad range of experiences based on serving in a variety of positions; know when the principal needed advice that was deliberative or decisive; know more about their specific domain than anyone else in the room while keeping in mind that they were really not an expert and needed to continuously seek new information; be able to deliver the needed expertise even if it came from someone else; and be able to synthesize a great deal of information, justify the advice given, frame the decision being recommended and the possible consequences of that approach, and provide added value to the principal's decision making process. Once again, these experiences were generally distinguished by only one or two characteristics. Of these, the characteristic of combining cognition and behavior was present in nearly all of the experiences, while the characteristic of the adviser being mindful of the potential consequences of the proposed course of action was found in half of the experiences. Using higher order thinking skills and being continuously built (or undone) over a long period of time characterized one quarter of the experiences. Developing a deep understanding of one's own abilities and limitations and being contextually and socially dependent were each characteristics in one of the experiences.

While participants noted that most of their advisers were very good, they did describe several experiences that could derail a principals' perception of the trustworthiness of their advisers. These can be characterized as being the opposite of the experiences described above.

Principals did not view as trustworthy those advisers whose primary focus was on themselves or on getting credit for the advice they gave to the principal, those perceived to have their own agenda rather than sharing that of the principal, advisers who demonstrated a bias (their own or that of their parent organization) or tried to slant the information to advocate for a particular course of action or influence a decision, those who could not understand the needs of the principal, advisers who were seen to be indiscrete, and those whose advice was often wrong.

When reflecting on advisers that they did not perceive as having the necessary expertise, participants addressed a variety of their experiences when serving as national-level principals. Principals questioned the expertise of any adviser who was never willing to admit that they did not know the answer to a question, who was unwilling to seek and take the advice of others, who presented positions that were not well developed or coordinated, or who was unable to provide advice that was what the principal needed to know.

Seven themes emerged from looking at the characteristics which distinguished the experiences recounted by the participants: (1) they required a deep understand of the adviser, the principal, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and one's own domain; (2) they demanded mental closeness between the adviser and the principal; (3) they were continuously built and could be undone; (4) they involved higher order thinking skills; (5) they acknowledged the exceptionally significant consequences of operating at the national strategic level; (6) they involved a combination of cognition and behavior; and (7) they were both contextually and socially dependent. With regard to *perceptions of trustworthiness*, all seven themes were apparent in the characteristics of the experiences when participants recalled their service as national-level principals and their service as strategic advisers. With regard to *perceptions of expertise*, six of the seven were found in the characteristics of the experiences when participants recalled their service as national-level principals and their service as strategic advisers (the second theme—the demand for mental closeness—not being apparent). The final chapter addresses the conclusions, implications, and recommendations of these findings.

Chapter 5: Interpretations, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This chapter summarizes the problem addressed and the main results of this research, interpreting those results in the light of applicable literature, the theoretical foundation and conceptual framework used, and the limitations of the study. It then presents the conclusions of this study, identifying contributions to theory, the implications for practice regarding the professional development of national-level leaders, and recommendations for future research.

This study begins to fill the gap in empirical studies about advising at the national strategic level. Strategic advisers must effectively communicate advice to an individual, such as the President, or a group, such as the National Security Council. Source credibility theory states that effective communication depends on the credibility of the source, which depends, in turn, on two components: the principal's *perception of trustworthiness* and *perception of expertise* of that adviser. This study was undertaken to answer the research question: What are the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders? The goal was to better understand how the development of trustworthiness and expertise were experienced by individuals who have been both strategic advisers and national-level principals in the national security policy domain, with particular emphasis on the diplomatic, military, and intelligence instruments of national power.

Interpretations

This section presents the interpretations from the study, reflecting the findings and themes that emerged from participant interviews. The seven themes discussed in Chapter

4, combined with applicable literature, the theoretical foundation and conceptual framework used, and the limitations of the study led to five interpretations: (1) becoming a strategic adviser to a national-level leader involves a development trajectory of experiences that unfolds over a long period of time; (2) perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise had specific meaning at the national strategic level; (3) perceptions of trustworthiness outweighed perceptions of expertise; (4) there was a breadth of experiences which led to perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise; and (5) the characteristics of those experiences were both very complex and interrelated.

Interpretation 1: Becoming a strategic adviser to a national level leader involves a development trajectory of experiences over a long period of time.

Participants recounted their individual paths to becoming strategic advisers to national-level leaders. These involved a similar development trajectory throughout one's entire career, as depicted in Figure 5.1. This interpretation builds off of the themes that characterized experiences as being continuously built throughout the entirety of the adviser's career, and that they required the adviser to develop a deep understanding of themselves, the principal they were advising, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and

Figure 5.1. Developmental Trajectory of Adviser/Principal Experiences



their own domain. The process of becoming a credible strategic adviser began with formative experiences that built the individual's reputation. The next stage was a transformational experience that expanded the individual's horizons. The third stage included mid-level advising experiences together with mid-level leadership experiences that refined the individual's awareness. The fourth stage was strategic-level advising experiences together with experiences as a national-level principal that enhanced the individual's effectiveness. The formative stage involved building the adviser's reputation as someone able to give advice, communicate complex ideas, build relationships, undertake complex projects, and learn while doing different jobs. The transformative stage included an experience (such as being the executive assistant to a national-level leader) during which the individual expanded their horizons by shadowing and being mentored by that principal, seeing the world through the principal's eyes by being in the room for everything that happened, serving as a sounding board, and observing how seniors receive information and make decisions. The third stage was bifurcated, in that the individual refined their awareness while simultaneously serving as a mid-level principal and as a mid-level adviser to someone more senior, allowing them (as a leader with advisers of their own) to learn to seek input and take advice, work with the advisers that were assigned, recognize and try to compensate for those adviser's blind spots, interact with other mid-level and senior principals, as well as (as a mid-level adviser) to think "for" the principal they were supporting, learn to see connections, have difficult conversations with those principals, and thereby add value to discussions. The final stage was also bifurcated, with the individual enhancing their effectiveness while simultaneously serving as a national-level principal and a strategic adviser, where they (as a leader) learned to pick a broad range of the right advisers, set the right conditions to get the advice they needed, develop their advisers, and protect their advisers, as well as (as a strategic adviser) anticipating the principal's needs, see opportunities, risks and threats, observe the impact of politics, utilize existing relationships, and focus on the strategic perspective.

At every stage, participants recounted that they had to learn how to do their job while they were doing it. This acknowledged that each position was unique and distinct; the next higher position was significantly more complex and demanding than the previous position; and that while prior jobs helped develop one's skills, they did not actually prepare you for the increased responsibilities of the next higher level (e.g., being a four-star combatant commander allowed one to interact with and observe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it was only after one assumed the CJCS position that one leaned how to do that job while simultaneously having to perform in the position.

Interpretation 2: Perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise had specific meaning at the national strategic level.

Participants articulated a very complex definition of what was included in perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise at the national strategic level. Perceptions of an external adviser's trustworthiness could also be affected by perception of their parent organization. Perceptions of trustworthiness could also be dependent on whether the principal was a career professional or a political appointee. This built on the themes that characterized experiences as requiring that advisers developed a deep understanding of themselves, the principal, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and their own domain; that they acknowledged the exceptional consequences of operating at the national strategic level; that they involved a combination of both cognition and behavior; and that they were both contextually and socially dependent.

A significant number of behavioral aspects on the part of the strategic adviser were associated with the principal's perception of their trustworthiness. These included being reliably consistent, telling the whole truth, being thoughtful, being discrete, delivering bad news, demonstrating character and values, speaking truth to power, being humble, being reliable and dependable, and adding value. Perceptions of trustworthiness were not equated with cognitive aspects, such as having a particular education, learning through an experience, or being intelligent. With regard to external strategic advisers from outside the principal's own organization, the perception of the trustworthiness of the adviser's parent organization was as important as the perception of the adviser's personal trustworthiness. Career professionals consistently presumed their advisers were trustworthy unless and until they proved they were not. By contrast, political appointees presumed career professionals were untrustworthy until they proved that they were.

By contrast, perceptions of the expertise of an adviser were more heavily reliant on cognitive aspects. These included being grounded in their own profession, being able to look at things differently and explain why that different view made sense, being acknowledged as an expert by others, and having valuable information. However, experience was not viewed as having been learned in the classroom, but rather as being a derivative of experience.

Interpretation 3: In terms of relative importance to the credibility of a strategic adviser, perceptions of trustworthiness outweighed perceptions of expertise.

Perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise were somewhat interrelated, but expertise was not equated with being trustworthy, nor was trustworthiness equated with having expertise. In addition, the relative value of the two perceptions differed in terms of the adviser's credibility. Expertise was acknowledged as being important, though participants differentiated between *having* expertise (generally seen as desirable) and *being* an expert (generally seen as impossible at this level). Almost without exception, participants ranked being *perceived as trustworthy* above being *perceived as having expertise* when it came to being a credible adviser. This built on the themes that the experiences were characterized as requiring a mental closeness between the adviser and the principal, and involved a combination of both cognition and behavior. As with the previous interpretation, there was a significant behavioral aspect that characterized the experiences which led to perceptions of trustworthiness, whereas the experiences that led to perceptions of expertise were more often characterized in a cognitive manner. Participants repeatedly noted that unless they had demonstrated that they were trustworthy, advisers rarely had the opportunity to present what they knew, because they would seldom, if ever, get a seat at the table. Conversely, participants noted that they (and others) were sometimes perceived as being trustworthy, which led to them being able to offer advice, even though they did not have what they considered the expertise necessary for the issue at hand. That was because the principal was confident they would find whoever had the needed level of expertise.

Interpretation 4: There was a breadth of experiences which led to perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.

Participants recounted a breadth of experiences during the development trajectory throughout their entire career. This is built on the theme that experiences were characterized as being continuously built throughout the entirety of the adviser's career. When reflecting on their service as national-level principals, they frequently referred to experiences early in their professional life. Of note is that while they were not mirror images, there was great similarity in these experiences, regardless of whether the participant had spent time in the diplomatic, military, or intelligence communities. There were a greater number of experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness than there were that led to perceptions of expertise, and the experiences differed. Likewise, experiences that led a principal to view their adviser as trustworthy or as having expertise differed from those that led a strategic adviser to think they were perceived as trustworthy or having expertise.

This interpretation also built on the theme that experiences involved a combination of both cognition and behavior. Experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness were both conceptual and behavioral in nature, but the behavioral experiences tended to predominate both from the perspective of the principal and that of the adviser. When it came to experiences that led to perceptions of expertise, the experiences were again both conceptual and behavioral in nature, but the conceptual experiences tended to predominate for both the principal and the adviser.

In addition to experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise, participants also recounted experiences that tended to derail such perceptions. These tended to be the opposite of the experiences that created positive perceptions. As above, the experiences that derailed perceptions of trustworthiness were predominantly behavioral in nature, while those that derailed perceptions of expertise were more often conceptual.

Interpretation 5: The characteristics of those experiences were both very complex and interrelated.

The characteristics that distinguished the experiences were not singular things that stood on their own, but rather were very complex and interrelated, reflecting many of the themes noted above. For example, the characteristics frequently involved both depth and breadth, such as requiring a deep understanding of the adviser, the principal, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and one's domain, or involving a combination of cognition and behavior, or being both contextually and socially dependent. Likewise, the characteristics were often interrelated, as between having a deep understanding of the strengths and shortcomings of both the adviser and principal, while also demanding a mental closeness between the adviser and the principal in order to anticipate what was really needed, or involving higher order thinking skills, while also recognizing the exceptionally significant national and international consequences of operating at the national strategic level, including consequences relating to the situation, the possible courses of action, the advice being offered regarding taking or avoiding various options, and of possibly misjudging the situation or being wrong.

The characteristics of the experiences which led to perceptions of trustworthiness had a different emphasis from those which led to perceptions of expertise. The most dominant characteristic of the experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness from the view of principals also differed from those of strategic advisers. For national-level leaders, the dominant characteristic was demonstrating mental closeness between the adviser and the principal. For strategic advisers, the dominant characteristic was the requirement for acquiring a deep understanding of themselves, the principal, other advisers and leaders, the situation, and one's own domain. The characteristics of the experiences which led to perceptions of expertise, on the other hand, tended to emphasize cognitive aspects. The importance of experiences characterized as demonstrating mental closeness between the principal and adviser was not evident, and those characterized as leading to a deep understanding of oneself and the principal was not dominant. Instead, principals perceived expertise when their advisers had experiences characterized as producing higher order thinking skills, whereas advisers were looking for experiences characterized as involving a combination of cognition and behavior.

Conclusions

This section presents conclusions from the study. Four conclusions can be drawn: (1) there is an incredible intensity involved in developing the combination of experiences characterized in the study; (2) the initial conceptual framework should be modified to reflect the interpretations of the study; (3) the behaviors discussed in LMX theory do not fully encompass the experiences, characteristics, and themes that emerged from this study; and (4) the concept of privileged expertise fits well at the national strategic level.

Conclusion 1: There is an incredible intensity involved in developing the combination of these experiences characterized in this study as leading to a strategic adviser being credible.

Operating at the national strategic level is intense in every respect. Participants, both when reflecting on their service as strategic advisers and as national-level principals, emphasized the consequences of any action or lack of action. National-level leaders wield great power—deciding whether or not to go to war, negotiating treaties, promoting or constraining trade with other nations, leading the largest workforce in the nation, and managing a budget that staggers the imagination. Decisions at this level are often irreversible—one does not have the option of resetting the game board to try a different move. Strategic advisers and the principals they serve must deal must make decisions, in a very compressed time period, about extremely complex situations using incomplete and changing information, and there is no ability to "practice" or "test" various alternatives. At the national level, principals do not have the luxury of being able to focus on only one thing, but must continuously balance a never-ending list of competing issues—domestic versus foreign, military versus economic, political aspirations versus real-world realities, budgetary versus operational, legislative versus judicial, etc. The job never ends; crises happen after normal work hours, on weekends, and on holidays. Throughout all of this, principals and advisers know that despite their best efforts, errors will be made. The weight of these decisions rests on the shoulders of a handful of principals and their advisers. Robert Gates, who has worked for seven presidents in advisory and leadership roles in the intelligence and defense community, deftly captured the intensity of the experiences at the national strategic level when writing about his time as Secretary of Defense a decade after the 9/11 attacks:

> At the bottom of the huge funnel pouring problems from Pandora's global trove into Washington, sat just eight of us* who, even though served by vast bureaucracies, had to deal with every one of the problems. The challenge for historians and journalists—and memoirists—is how to convey the crushing effect of dealing daily with multiple problems, pivoting on a dime very few minutes from one issue to another, having to quickly absorb reporting from many sources

* The eight individuals Gates discusses in this section of his book are the President, Vice President, National Security Adviser, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

on each problem, and then making decisions, always with too little time and too much ambiguous information. (Gates, 2014, pp. 412-13)

Conclusion 2: The initial conceptual framework should be modified to reflect the interpretations of the study.

Developing perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the dyadic relationship between a strategic adviser and the national-level principal they serve happens along a developmental trajectory, but it is far more continuous and interactive, and far less linear than originally depicted in this study's conceptual framework. In addition, the significance of perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise are not equal at the national strategic level. Finally, the relationship between the adviser and principal continues up the chain of command, eventually ending at the President.

In the revised framework (Figure 5.2), the domain of national security policy advising remains unchanged, as does the use of LMX as the lens to view the relationship between the strategic adviser and the national-level principal who is the recipient of that advice. The interplay between expertise and trustworthiness is indicated by the spiral, which begins with knowing enough about one's own domain (beginning closer to expertise). This is recursive and continuous—with perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness interplaying with one another (ending closer to trustworthiness). The relatively greater importance of perceptions of TRUSTWORTHINESS versus perceptions of expertise is indicated by the use of capital versus lower-case letters. The principal who is the recipient of advice at one level (e.g., the Director of the CIA) is simultaneously the adviser to a principal above them (in this case, the Director of National Intelligence) who, in turn, is simultaneously the adviser to the President.

Figure 5.2. Revised Conceptual Framework



Conclusion 3: The behaviors discussed in LMX theory do not fully encompass the experiences, characteristics, and themes that emerged from this study.

Leader-member exchange theory is a continuous, integrative, multidimensional, reciprocal, dyadic exchange relation developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles (the 'leader' element of LMX—in this case, the principal receiving the advice) and those in followership roles (the 'member' of LMX—in this case, the strategic adviser) (Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Jacobs, 1970). LMX includes behaviors involved in that exchange relationship but does not include the cognitive aspects that were recounted when participants discussed those experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. Furthermore, within the national security domain, other behaviors than those discussed within the leader-member relationship are relevant to perceptions of an adviser's trustworthiness and expertise, such as developing a deep understanding of oneself, the situation, and one's own domain; or those characterized as acknowledging the exceptionally significant consequences of advice and resultant decisions at the national strategic level. In addition, the behaviors that lead to perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise take place over the duration of an adviser's career, long before they have any relationship with the principal they are currently advising.

Likewise, LMX theory does not adequately address the reality that, at the national strategic level, advisers often interact with principals from completely different organizations where there is no member-type relationship, or that principals provide advice to other principals in a context where neither is playing a leadership or membership role. An example of the first is when the Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is a "member" of the JCS and Department of Defense, serves as the military adviser to the Secretary of State, though he has no "membership" role in the Department of State. An example of the second is when the Director of National Intelligence serves as the principal intelligence adviser not only to the President (a clear leader-member relationship), but also to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, all of whom are peers of the DNI, and with whom there is no leader-member relationship. These situations recur across all three national security communities (diplomatic, military and intelligence) and at all levels.

Conclusion 4: The concept of privileged expertise fits well at the national strategic level.

Privileged expertise has been described as being applicable to domains such as the judiciary (expert judging), weather forecasting (expert prediction), and academia (expert instruction) (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). This study indicates that privileged expertise also fits advising at the strategic level within the national security policy domain. Strategic advisers are called upon to judge the relative importance of the nuances of complex problems for which there is incomplete information, forecast the possible outcomes and consequences of various courses of action, and convey that to national-level leaders (Tetlock, 2005).

The alternative would be to use the concept of expert performance, but this would require the ability to repeatedly practice a particular skill or task until the level of performance can be evaluated against an objective standard to determine advisers are at the expert level (Erickson, 2008; Ericsson and Charness, 1994; Ericsson et al., 2006). However, within the national security policy domain, strategic advisers cannot practice giving the same advice because complex situations change constantly. Complex problems, by their nature, only permit a one-time approach. The result of any action taken or of not taking any action alters the underlying problem from that point forward. In addition, the performance of strategic advisers is "rarely, if ever, evaluated" (Weiss and Shanteau, 2012, p. 300) because there is no standard against which a particular piece of advice could be objectively evaluated. In the national security domain, privileged expertise is viewed as a derivative of experience rather than something that can be learned in a classroom or gained through repeated practice of a given task. Instead, their status as experts "is conferred via criteria such as education or experience" (p. 300).

In such situations, Weiss and Shanteau (2012) noted that rather than "thinking generically of people as *experts*, we prefer to say that a person has demonstrated *expertise* in a specific set of tasks" (p. 307, emphasis added). This is consistent with the observations of participants that it was virtually impossible to become an *expert* in even a subset of the national security policy domain. Participants noted that it was possible for an adviser to be perceived by a principal as *demonstrating a level of expertise*, though when reflecting on their own experiences as advisers, they consistently said that they never perceived themselves as demonstrating expertise, even when they knew more about an issue than anyone else in the room.

Recommendations

This section discusses the study's recommendations related to theory, practice, and future research. These reflect an integration of insights and understandings derived from the study, together with the applicable scholarly literature, while keeping in mind the limitations of both.

Recommendations Related to Theory

The results from this study suggest the following recommendations for theory: (1) revise the definitions of trustworthiness and privileged expertise in the context of the national security policy domain to reflect the findings of this study; (2) expand LMX to include national security advising; (3) revise source credibility theory to recognize that perceptions of trustworthiness are more important than perceptions of expertise in terms of the credibility of strategic advisers; and (4) use the results of this study as an initial basis for developing a theory on advisership at the national strategic level.

Recommendation 1. Revise the definitions of trustworthiness and privileged expertise in the context of the national security policy domain to reflect the findings of this study. Trustworthiness is used interchangeably with the word trust, and there are multiple definitions of trust (Smith, 2007), often focused on a single characteristic such as a set of shared expectations, or a propensity to be vulnerable (Wagoner, 1999). Based on this study, a definition of trustworthiness within the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level principals in the security policy domain is much more complex and heavily dependent on behavior. Within the national security policy domain, trustworthiness includes being reliably consistent, telling the whole truth, being thoughtful, being discrete, delivering bad news, demonstrating character and values, speaking truth to power, being humble, being reliable and dependable, and adding value. With regard to external strategic advisers (those individuals who come from outside the principal's own organization), the perception of the trustworthiness of the adviser's parent organization is as important as the perception of the adviser's personal trustworthiness. Willingness to perceive someone as trustworthy varies. Career professionals presume their advisers are trustworthy unless and until they prove they are not. By contrast, political appointees presume career professionals are not trustworthy until they prove that they were.

Privileged expertise is defined as the ability to accurately diagnose complex situations of ill-structured problems in uncertain conditions (expert judgment), make appropriate recommendations (expert prediction), and convey knowledge (expert instruction) within a particular domain. This privileged expertise is gained through education or experience, rather than repeated practice of a given task (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003; 2012). Based on this study, a definition of privileged expertise as understood in the relationship between strategic adviser and national-level principals in the security policy domain is broader and more complex, and it is generally perceived as cognitive rather than behavioral. Expertise would include being grounded in one's own profession, being able to look at things differently and explain why that different view made sense, being acknowledged as an expert by others, and having valuable information. Participants in this study agreed that privileged expertise within the national security policy domain was a derivative of experience, but not that it was something that could be learned through education.

Recommendation 2. Expand LMX to include national strategic advising. Leader-member exchange theory articulates a continuous, integrative, multidimensional, reciprocal, dyadic exchange relation developed and negotiated between individuals in leadership roles and those in followership roles (Dienesch & Linden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Jacobs, 1970). This study suggests that in addition to behaviors, LMX should include the cognitive aspects that were recounted when participants discussed those experiences that led to perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise.

This study also suggests that LMX may apply outside the normal leader-member relationship, to include instances where advisers interact with principals from completely different organizations where there is no member-type relationship, or where principals provide advice to other principals in a context where neither is playing a leadership or membership role.

Recommendation 3. Revise source credibility theory to recognize that perceptions of trustworthiness are more important than perceptions of expertise in terms of the credibility of strategic advisers. Source credibility theory states that there is a connection between perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise. Hovland et al. (1953) argued that credibility was dependent on both *trustworthiness* and *expertise*. Several studies showed that trustworthiness alone was not enough or was less important than expertise (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993), while others showed that trustworthiness was more influential, regardless of the perceived level of expertise (Lui & Standing, 1989; McGinnies & Ward, 1980; Whitehead, 1968). Solomonson (2012) showed a moderate, positive correlation between the perceived level of expertise and trust.

This study suggests that in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level principals, perceptions of trustworthiness are more important than perceptions of expertise. Expertise was acknowledged as being important, but being *perceived as trustworthy* was consistently more important than being *perceived as having expertise* when it came to being a credible adviser. Unless advisers demonstrated they were trustworthy, they rarely had the opportunity to get in the door to present their expertise.

Recommendation 4. Use the results of this study as an initial basis for developing a theory on advisership at the national strategic level. The last academic work on the subject of advising at the national strategic level was published in 1978 (Goldhamer). In his historical overview of the topic, Goldhammer noted that ancient Chinese, Indian, and Greek writers, as well as Europeans through the Renaissance, had addressed the process of advising national rulers, whereas writers since the nineteenth century had focused on what advice had been given to national leaders. Notwithstanding the fact that several national-level leaders, such as the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that advising was their most important task, the topic has not been studied. Whereas there are various theories of leadership and followership, there is no counterpart theory of advisership.

This study developed a description of the developmental process by which national-level strategic advisers came to be perceived as being trustworthy and having expertise, as explained in Chapter 4 and depicted in Figure 5.1. The developmental process occurs over the adviser's entire career. This could be used as an initial basis for a theory of advisership at the national strategic level.

Recommendations Related to Practice

This study delves into the previously unexplored relationships between strategic advisers and principals at the national strategic level. Given the importance of the role of strategic advisers, and the fact that every national-level leader, other than the President, is simultaneously an adviser to someone else, three recommendations are made for practice: (1) distinguish advisership from leadership or followership and include it in professional development education programs; (2) include advisership experiences as part of professional development assignments; and (3) develop one or more evaluation tools related to strategic advising.

Recommendation 1. Distinguish advisership from leadership or followership and include it in professional development education programs. There is a rich domain of literature pertaining to leadership and a growing body of literature regarding followership, both of which are taught in professional development courses available to mid-career military, Foreign Service, and intelligence officers. The same is not true when it comes to advisership at the national strategic level. Because there is little relevant literature on the topic, it is not taught at the war colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, or the National Intelligence University.

Every national-level principal other than the President simultaneously serves as a strategic adviser, and some of the most senior members of the national security community view advising as their most important duties. To prepare rising leaders to successfully perform their duties as strategic advisers in the national security policy domain, advisership should be distinguished from leadership and followership, and specifically addressed in professional development education programs.

Recommendation 2. Include advisership experiences as part of professional development assignments. Currently, the emphasis among career managers within the diplomatic, military and intelligence communities is to encourage individuals to seek positions that will hone their leadership skills. Very few individuals are encouraged to seek positions that will develop their advisership skills—which puts them at a disadvantage when they eventually find themselves in a job where their primary role is to be the strategic adviser to a national-level principal.

To prepare individuals to successfully serve as strategic advisers, they should be encouraged to seek lower- and mid-level advisory positions throughout their career, specifically to provide opportunities to develop their abilities as advisers. The most promising individuals should be selected to serve as executive assistants or military assistants, thereby providing the key transformational experience described in this study.

Recommendation 3. Develop one or more evaluation tools related to strategic advising. Just as there is no discussion of advisership (as distinct from leadership or followership) in professional development education programs within the national security policy domain, so too there are no tools available to evaluate the performance of strategic advisers. The results of this study could be used to develop such a tool for use by principals regarding their advisers. Another evaluation tool could be developed for use by individuals along the development trajectory during their careers as they rise to become strategic advisers. It could include evaluations of whether the individual is having those experiences that lead to a perception of trustworthiness and expertise, and could also include evaluations that would warn of possible derailing experiences. A third tool could focus on facilitating individuals learning while doing the job. It could help an adviser learn to use reflective questions, conduct reflection sessions on a regular basis, check to determine if the information being presented is meeting the principal's needs, or develop their ability to deliver bad news.

Recommendations for Future Research

The concept of advisership within the government has been essentially unstudied. The findings and conclusions derived from this study suggest the following opportunities for further research on advisership: (1) conduct a similar study in other government domains; (2) assess the derailment process in greater depth; and (3) conduct additional research to develop a theory of advisership. Among the challenges to be overcome would be gaining access to the right pool of participants. Such research would benefit from the support of or sponsorship by a consortium of institutions such as the National Defense University, the service war colleges, the National Intelligence University, and/or the Foreign Service Institute. These institutions have both the necessary access and the qualified academic researchers to push forward the recommended studies.

Recommendation 1. Conduct a similar study in other domains. Further research is needed in other domains. One approach would be to look at other parts of the U.S. government outside the diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities, such as the Department of Labor, Department of Education, or the Department of Veterans Affairs. Another approach would be to assess the role of advisership at the level of state governments. A third approach would be to assess the role of advisership in the governments of other nations, particularly close allies. This last approach has two possible paths: looking at interaction between U.S. advisers and their foreign interlocutors (e.g., advice given by a U.S. ambassador or a U.S. combatant commander or a senior U.S. intelligence official to foreign governments), as well as looking at the process of advising within those foreign governments.

Much of this proposed research would benefit from the support and sponsorship of the consortium mentioned above. Every year, the National Defense University and the service war colleges teach more than a thousand students from every part of the Federal government, as well as hundreds of foreign military officers and civilians. While the Foreign Service Institute and National Intelligence University only teach U.S. personnel, the diplomats and intelligence officers who complete those programs spend their careers interacting with foreign governments in virtually every country around the world, providing unmatched opportunities for exploring the topic of advising foreigners, as well as for observing and engaging on how advisership happens within those countries.

Recommendation 2. Assess the derailment process in more depth. This study identified experiences that could derail a principal's perceptions of the trustworthiness and expertise of an adviser. Additional research is needed to determine why there is no interconnection (e.g., why can someone be perceived as being trustworthy even if they are not perceived as having expertise?), whether other derailment factors exist beyond those identified in Chapter 4, whether and how these derailment factors can be overcome, and how quickly they undercut perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.

Once again, this research would benefit from the support or sponsorship of the consortium of institutions mentioned above. Virtually all of these schools have their own research institutions (the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU, the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, the Lejeune Leadership Institute and Gray Research Center at the Marine Corps University, the Eaker Center for Professional Development at Air University, and the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research at the National Intelligence University). Given the interconnected roles of leadership and advisership at the national strategic level, this topic should be of interest to one or more of these research institutions.

Recommendation 3. Conduct additional research to develop a theory of advisership. Theories of leadership and followership have evolved over the past 150 years (Schwandt & Szabla, 2007; Yukl, 2011). These theories moved from the *person/role* view in the latter half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century (Carlyle, 1841; Galton, 1869), through the *tools of influence* view in the second half of the 20th century (Barnard, 1938, 1945, 1948, 1952; French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981), and the *situational accommodation* view (Fielder, 1967; Hersey &

Blanchard, 1969, 1977; Vroom & Yetton, 1973), to the *relational processes* view at the end of the 20th / beginning of the 21st century (Fletcher, 2004). In comparison to the extensive academic literature on various theories of leadership and the growing body of literature regarding theories of followership (Baker, 2007; Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014), there is no equivalent theory of advisership. Literature exists on coaching, and there is some literature on counseling in the private sector. Research is needed to develop a corresponding theory of advisership in the public sector.

Reflections on the Research Study

Research into the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising has been very rewarding. There were significant challenges involved in designing and conducting this study, most especially in terms of gaining access to former national-level leaders who could provide the necessary insights. Participants were gracious in providing so much of their time, and very thoughtful in using the interview guides and list of questions provided in advance to prepare their observations. The use of semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions and follow-on explorations based on their reflections provided each participant opportunities to articulate the socially constructed reality of advising and being advised at the national level based on their own individual perspective. It also allowed the researcher to attempt to understand the perspectives of each participant, and identify the relevant characteristics and overarching themes that emerged from the participants as a whole.

The need to understand advisership in the public sector at the national level, as well as how it differs from leadership and followership will, become more important as the situations facing the nation become more complex and the time available for considering and reacting to a crisis shrinks. National-level leaders cannot be expected to understand all aspects of the myriad of thorny domestic and international issues they face on a daily (and even hourly) basis. At the same time, the Congress is shrinking the size of the National Security Staff —which has grown exponentially for decades—within the White House (McInnis, 2016). This combination of factors emphasizes the importance of preparing those who will serve in the Federal government (not only on the National Security Staff, but also throughout the various departments and agencies) to be credible, effective advisers. Understanding advisership is the first step to being able to prepare those individuals for the challenges they will face.

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APPENDIX A:

INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Understanding the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising
IRB # 101501
Investigator: Eric Hammersen, (703) 477-4131, ehammersen@gwu.edu
Sponsor: The George Washington University,
Graduate School of Education and Human Development

Dear General / Admiral / Ambassador / Director XXX:

You are invited to take part in a research study about strategic advising of national-level leaders. This study is being conducted by Eric Hammersen and The George Washington University Graduate School of Education and Human Development. Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary; even if you decide you would like to participate, you may quit at any time.

You are being asked if you would like to take part in this study because you have been identified as a person who has served both as a strategic adviser to national-level leaders, and as a national-level leader in your own right who received strategic advice from others. You are one of approximately 15 people invited to participate in this study.

The purpose of this research is to gain an understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, with a focus on the diplomatic, military, and intelligence communities. If you choose to take part in this study, you will participate in interviews. The following activities comprise the desired participant involvement in the research study:

- Up to three individual, semi-structured interviews lasting as long as 90 minutes each. The first would focus on your experience as a strategic adviser (e.g., advising a national-level leader). The second would focus on your experience as a national-level leader (e.g., the recipient of advice from others). A third interview might be necessary to further explore issues surfaced during the first or second.

- The researcher may seek to contact you after the interview to resolve questions about interview content.
- Interview questions will be provided in advance. You may refuse to answer any of the questions, and you may terminate your participation in this study at any time.

You will not benefit directly from your participation in the study.

You may choose to allow your name to be associated with this study. Alternatively, you may choose to remain anonymous—in which case every effort will be made to keep your information confidential. For example, you would be assigned a participant number and you would not be named or identified if this study were reported in journals or scientific meetings.

The Office of Human Research of The George Washington University, at telephone number (202) 994-2715, can provide further information about your rights as a research participant. Please contact me using the information at the top of this letter if you have any questions or concerns.

Your willingness to participate in this research study is implied if you agree to be interviewed.

Please keep a copy of this document in case you want to review it again.

Eric Hammersen

Attachment: Research Study Overview

Research Study Overview

Title: Understanding the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising

Purpose of the Study: To gain an understanding of the characteristics of those experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders in the national security policy domain. It will seek to understand this from both the perspective of strategic advisers and that of recipients of such advice.

Problem Addressed: History is replete with examples of successful strategic leaders failing as advisers because they are not credible in that role. National-level leaders not only lead their own organization, but simultaneously serve as strategic advisers to others. Such leaders consistently state advising is their most important role, the topic is absent from professional development programs. Perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise are the main elements of source credibility, but we do not know how these develop in the dyadic relationship between advisers and leaders. Addressing the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise will improve understanding of advisership, reduce disconnects between advisers and policy makers, and better enable advisers to meet leaders' needs. It can also be included in appropriate professional development programs.

Significance of the Study: This study will help describe the characteristics of the experiences that lead to perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise from the perspectives of both strategic advisers and national-level leaders. It will contribute to source credibility theory, leader-member exchange theory, and help differentiate advisership from leadership.

Participants Sought for the Study: Participants for the study will be individuals who served both as strategic advisers (providing advice to national-level leaders) and as a national-level leader in their own right (receiving strategic advice from others).

The primary means of data collection for the study are semi-structured interviews. Up to three interviews would be conducted with each participant: the first will focus on the participant's experience as a strategic adviser (e.g., advising a national-level leader); the second on their experience as a national-level leader (e.g., the recipient of advice from others); a third might be necessary to further explore issues surfaced during the first two. Interview questions will be provided in advance. Interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed. The researcher may seek to contact participants after the interview to resolve questions about interview content. Participants may refuse to answer any questions and may terminate participation in this study at any time. Participants may choose to allow their name to be associated with this study or to remain anonymous (in which case they would be assigned a participant number). The dissertation may be published, as may articles that relate to the findings. Findings may also be presented at conferences and other educational venues. At no time will any participant who wishes to remain anonymous be identified—instead, data would be reported anonymously (e.g., "one adviser said" or "Leader 3 said").

About the Researcher: Colonel Eric Hammersen, U.S. Army (retired), is a doctoral candidate in the Executive Leadership Doctoral Program in the Graduate School of

Education and Human Development at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX B:

INFORMED CONSENT

Understanding the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising
IRB # 101501
Investigator: Eric Hammersen, (703) 477-4131, ehammersen@gwu.edu
Sponsor: The George Washington University,
Graduate School of Education and Human Development

You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted by Eric Hammersen, a student at The George Washington University.

You are being asked if you want to take part in this study because of *your prior experience as a strategic adviser* to national-level leaders, as well as *your prior experience as a national-level leader* who had your own strategic advisers. Please read this form and ask any questions that will help you decide if you want to be in the study. Participation is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time.

The purpose of this research is to gain an understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, focusing on the relationship between strategic advisers and leaders in the national security policy domain (that is, from the perspective of both the strategic adviser and the national-level leader who is the recipient of that advice).

The total amount of time you will spend in this study is approximately four hours over the course of a few weeks in summer/fall 2015. The following activities comprise the desired involvement in the research study:

1. Participation in an initial, individual, semi-structured interview lasting 60 to 90 minutes, focused on your experience as a strategic adviser
2. Participation in a second, individual, semi-structured interview lasting 60 to 90 minutes, focused on your experience as a national-level leader who was the recipient of advice

3. Participation in a third, individual, semi-structured interview lasting 30 to 60 minutes, if needed, to clarify any points from the first two interviews
4. Participants will be asked to review the transcripts of their interview and preliminary research conclusions.

The study has the following risks:

- You may feel some emotional stress/discomfort answering interview questions. You are free to decline to answer any questions or stop the interview at any point.
- Describing your experience in advising at the national strategic level may cause you to have some questions or thoughts about the experience that you may want to expand upon or clarify. If so, please let the researcher know.
- You have the option of conducting this interview *in true name* (<u>for attribution</u>), or *using a pseudonym* (<u>not for attribution</u>). The choice is yours.
- Even if you use a pseudonym, there is a small chance that someone other than the researcher could find out that you took part in the study or somehow connect your name with the information we collect from you, however the following steps will be taken to reduce this risk:

  If you wish to use a pseudonym -

  1. Your name will not be used in this study. Instead you will choose a pseudonym.
  2. The data for this study will be kept in a secure, password-protected location.
  3. At the completion of this study, identifying data will be destroyed.
- The records of this study will be kept private. In any published articles or presentations, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you as a subject *unless you indicate that you wish to conduct the study in true name*.
- The researcher's records for the study may be reviewed by the department of The George Washington University responsible for overseeing research safety and compliance.

Taking part in this research will not help you directly; however this research will benefit society by providing a better understanding of advising at the national strategic level, which could lead to improvements in professional development programs for military officers and their civilian counterparts. It will also identify some aspects of the nature of '*advisership*' at the national strategic level, how these relate to each other, and will provide recommendations to address the implications. You will not receive any payment for participation in this study. There are no additional costs to the participants in this study beyond the time spent.

If you have any questions, concerns, complaints, or think you have been harmed, please talk to the researcher. You can also contact The Office of Human Research of The George Washington University, at telephone number (202) 994-2715.

If you agree to take part in this study, please sign below. After you sign this consent form, I will provide you with a copy. Please retain a copy of this form for your reference.

Please initial whether you wish to use your *true name* ____ or a *pseudonym* ____.

____

Participant Signature

______________________________ ______________

Participant's Printed Name *Date*

____

Principal Investigator Signature

Frederick P. A. Hammersen

______________________________ ______________

Principal Investigator's Printed Name *Date*

APPENDIX C:

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL – INTERVIEW #1

Understanding the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising

Date of interview:

Time:

Place:

Interviewee Number: (1-X)

Thank you for agreeing to spend this time with me. Per your request, (you will be assigned a participant number and your responses will be kept confidential) / (you will be interviewed in true name). This interview will be digitally recorded for the purposes of transcribing and analyzing the data for use in my dissertation. You may stop the interview at any time, for any reason. I am requesting your name now so I can contact you later in case I have questions and to give you the opportunity to review the transcript from the interview to ensure it accurately reflects your comments. I will be the only person with access to the key that connects you to the interview transcript. During the interview, please refer to specific people by title and not proper name, and to organizations as “group x” or a similar pseudonym. Don’t worry if you accidentally forget this, because I will edit any identifying information from the transcript.

To begin our interview, I would like you to know that my research interest in in understanding of the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders, focusing on the relationship between strategic advisers and leaders in the national security policy domain (that is, from the perspective of both the strategic adviser and the national-level leader who is the recipient of that advice).

This first interview will include questions about your experiences as a strategic adviser. The next interview will include questions about your experiences as a national-level leader who was the recipient of advice. In both interviews, the questions are intended as a guide. The interviews can explore other aspects of your perspectives that you think are particularly relevant to the study.

Questions [the text highlighted in blue identifies what the question is addressing and text highlighted in green are probes; both will be removed from the final version before it is provided to participants]

Q1 Tell me about the *highlights of your career that led to you becoming a strategic adviser* to a national-level leader. [ice breaker & scene setter]

Q2 Tell me about a time that is particularly meaningful to you when *you were the strategic adviser* to a national-level leader. What was the *nature of your working relationship* with that particular leader? [LMX]

Q3 Were you *treated differently* from any of their other advisers? [LMX]

- If so, how? Why?

Q4 Recalling your experiences as a strategic adviser to that national-level leader, *tell me what trustworthiness means to you*. [Perception of trustworthiness]

Q5 How did you establish *your* trustworthiness to the person you were advising? [Character of experience]

- What *challenges did you face*?

Q6 *How did you know* when you were really trusted? [Character of experience]

- What happened? How did this occur?

Q7 Based on your experiences as a strategic adviser to that national-level leader, *tell me what expertise means to you.* [Perception of expertise]

Q8 How did you establish *your* expertise to that person? [same]

- What *challenges did you face*?

Q9 *How did you know* when you were really an expert? [Character of experience]

- What happened? How did this occur?

Q10 *Did the relationship with the person you were advising change over time*? [LMX]

- If so, how?
- What do you think caused the change (on your part / on their part)?

Q11 Tell me about an experience as an adviser when you did not feel trusted or did not feel you were an expert.

- Why not?

Q12 *If you were going to give advice* to someone who was about to become a strategic adviser to a national-level leader, *what would it be*?

Q13 Would that advice be the same for *someone who was going to advise at a lower level*?

Do you have any questions for me? If not, thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX D:

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL – INTERVIEW #2

Understanding the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising

Date of interview:

Time:

Place:

Interviewee Number: (2-X)

Thank you once again for agreeing to spend this time with me. This is our second interview supporting my research to understand the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in advisership at the strategic level, focusing on the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders in the national security policy domain (that is, from the perspective of both the strategic adviser and the national-level leader who is the recipient of that advice).

The *first interview focused on your experiences as a strategic adviser*; this one *will focus on your experiences as a national-level leader with your own advisers*. As mentioned last time, the questions are intended as a guide. The interviews can explore other aspects of your perspectives that you think are particularly relevant to the study.

Questions [the text highlighted in blue identifies what the question is addressing and text highlighted in green are probes; both will be removed from the final version before it is provided to participants]

Q1 Do you have anything to add after reviewing the transcript of the first interview?

Q2 Tell me about an adviser *who you really valued when you were the national-level leader*. How did the relationship develop? [LMX]

Q3 Did you to *perceive that adviser as being trustworthy*? [Perceptions of trustworthiness]

- What led to that perception? [Character of experience]

Q4 Did you *perceive that adviser as being an expert*? [Perceptions of expertise]

- What led to that perception? [Character of experience]

Q5 Did you treat this person *differently* than your other advisers? [LMX]

- If so, how? Why?

Q6 Did these relationships *change over time*? *What did you do to effect that change*? [LMX]

Q7 Tell me about an adviser *you did not value – and why not*. [LMX]

Q8 *If you were going to give advice* to someone who was about to become a national-level leader dependent on the advice of others, *what would it be*?

Q9 Would that advice be the same for *someone who was going to lead at a lower level*?

Q10 Based on what you have said in these two interviews, can you *compare what it was like when you were an adviser to others, versus when you were being advised yourself.*

Q11 *What, if anything, surprised you about the characteristics of that experience of building advising relationships*? [LMX]

Q12 Is there anything you want me to make sure to write about regarding advising at the national strategic level? [wrap up & closure]

Do you have any questions for me? Is there any other information you would like to add? If not, thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX E:

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL – INTERVIEW #3

Understanding the characteristics of experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in national security advising

Date of interview:

Time:

Place:

Interviewee Number: (3-X)

Thank you once again for agreeing to spend this time with me. This is our third interview supporting my research to understand the characteristics of the experiences that develop perceptions of trustworthiness and perceptions of expertise in advisership as it is experienced at the strategic level, focusing on the relationship between strategic advisers and national-level leaders in the national security policy domain (that is, from the perspective of both the strategic adviser and the national-level leader who is the recipient of that advice).

The *first interview focused on your experiences as a strategic adviser*. The second interview *focused on your experiences as a national-level leader who was the recipient of advice*. This third interview is designed to clarify a few points from the first two. As before, the questions are intended as a guide. The interviews can explore other aspects of your perspectives that you think are particularly relevant to the study.

Questions

TBD – any questions not asked in the first two interviews; follow-up questions

APPENDIX F:

TRANSCRIBER'S LETTER OF CONFIDENTIALITY

I understand that I have been asked to listen to and transcribe the content of digital audio recordings of interviews for research related to a doctoral dissertation. I agree to maintain confidentiality regarding the information heard on the digital audio recordings.

Furthermore, I will not make any copies of the digital audio recording files I have transcribed and will destroy the files with the transcriptions once the transcriptions are judged satisfactory.

____

Researcher Signature

Frederick P. A. Hammersen

______________________________ ______________

Researcher's Printed Name *Date*

____

Transcriber's Signature

______________________________ ______________

Transcriber's Printed Name *Date*

APPENDIX G:

SUBJECTIVITY STATEMENT

How I Became Interested in Strategic Advising

In May 2012, as I was about to begin my fourth year as the Defense Intelligence Agency chair teaching on the faculty of the National War College, a colleague, the Assistant Deputy Director for Corporate Operations at DIA, sent me an e-mail asking for my assistance. The decision had been made that the Defense Intelligence Officers, who had previously been the senior analysts focused on regions of the world (Africa, Europe, East Asia, Latin America, Middle East/North Africa, Eurasia, and South Asia) or specific topics (Cyber and Scientific/ Technical Intelligence), would be consolidated in the headquarters to serve as strategic advisers to the three-star general who was the Agency's Director. He, in turn, was the military intelligence adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and Director of National Intelligence. The questions posed to me were whether any literature discussed how advisers worked, how advisers made strategic leaders successful, and what a good adviser looked and acted like. In the words of my colleague's e-mail, "They [the DIOs] are all consummate analysts, but I don't know that they have yet made the conceptual leap to being one of the Director's most significant advisers." After checking with other National War College faculty members and my counterparts at the other senior professional development schools,[8] it became clear that nothing was being taught at any of these schools on the

[8] The senior professional development schools within the Department of Defense include the National War College, Eisenhower School of National Security Resource Management, Joint Forces Staff College, Naval War College, Army War College, Marine Corps War College, and Air War College. Each is a year-long, accredited, graduate-degree program designed to prepare rising national security strategists for the jobs they will hold if promoted to general, admiral, ambassador, or senior executive. These are highly competitive programs; only the top 10% of officers and civilians in the executive branch, as well as key allied officers, having the opportunity to attend.

subject of advising, and that what little was available in the literature focused exclusively on being a trusted counselor to a CEO in the private sector rather than on advising national-level strategic leaders.

Teaching the Topic. To meet the requirements of the DIA Director, I began to develop a series of classes on various aspects of advising at the national level. The Dean of the Faculty of the National War College suggested I turn that into an elective course and offer it during the fall semester, with the proviso that the Defense Intelligence Officers would be allowed to attend, along with students from across the National Defense University. At National War College, an elective course is considered viable if at least six students sign up, and electives are normally limited to no more than 12 students. When I first offered the elective in the fall of 2012, more than 80 students asked to enroll, and I was able to get special permission to take the 22 who had listed it as their first choice. The demand was so high that I was asked to teach it again in the spring semester. The same situation prevailed the following academic year, and I offered the course in both the fall and spring semesters. Of more than 100 electives offered each semester, this was consistently among the top three in terms of student enrollment.

The course was presented as a colloquium. Subject matter experts on various aspects of advising at the national strategic level were invited to present their experiences during each class session. As a result, I was able to observe and guide the discussion, rather than have to present from my own experience.

Reflecting on the Topic. As these subject matter experts guided the students and DIA's Defense Intelligence Officers through their classes, it became increasingly apparent there was a significant difference between advising and leading. It also was clear that the professional development programs offered at the various senior-level schools focused on *leadership*, and completely excluded *advisership*. The same was true regarding literature on the subject. Thousands of books and articles were available on leadership, whereas the last book on advising at the national strategic level had been published in 1978 (Goldhamer). Yet time and again, the most senior strategic leaders who spoke at the National War College remarked that advising was their most important duty (Clapper, 2014; Bolden, 2014; Myers, 2013; Jumper, 2012) or one of their most important duties (Casey, 2014). That led me to wonder why no one, in academia or practice, was studying a topic consistently acknowledged as being critically important.

Experiences as a Strategic-level Adviser

As I developed and taught these courses, I was also reminded of my previous experiences in uniform and as a DIA civilian. The first third of my military career was spent as an operator, leading soldiers at the tactical level, rather than advising anyone at the strategic level. My first experience as an adviser was in 1985, when I suddenly was tapped to become DIA's 'expert' on the Soviet Union's chemical warfare program. In that job, I had to provide strategic-level advice to the Director of DIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the National Intelligence Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and close NATO allies. More than a decade later, I served as the Defense Attaché in what was then the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in the world. The defense attaché in a country is the military adviser to the ambassador and his staff, and serves both as the adviser about the armed forces of the country to which they are accredited to senior U.S. leadership (Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military service chiefs, combatant commander, component commanders, and various key staff officers) and the adviser about the U.S. military to the senior leadership of our foreign partner (Defense Minister, Chief of the

Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff). After retiring from active duty, I again worked for DIA and held multiple positions where I was an adviser to the Director and other senior leaders in the Intelligence Community on various areas. Yet until I received that e-mail in May 2012, I had never given any thought to what was actually involved in being an adviser. It was just something that you 'did' whenever it was required as part of your job.

Two areas seemed particularly relevant, based on both my research and on my own experience. The first was the perceptions of trustworthiness by both the adviser and the strategic leader being advised. The second was the perceptions of the level of expertise in the dyadic relationship between the adviser and the leader.

Advising in a Specifically Defined Area. During my first experience as an adviser in the mid-1980s, I was very impressed with the level of trust the DIA Director placed in me, despite my very junior rank. He perceived me to be trustworthy because of my supposed expertise on the topic, and turned to me for my advice, allowing me tremendous latitude to establish the Agency's position in a wide variety of very senior fora. In turn, I perceived the Director as trustworthy, in that he was willing to listen when I presented some uncomfortable 'truths' about the stark mismatch between U.S. and Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, and he would back me up even when I raised issues that cast doubt on the accuracy of the Intelligence Community's earlier assessments. My problem was that I started with only the most basic knowledge of the Soviet chemical warfare program, which meant I had to work hard to develop that 'expertise.' I had to learn everything that could be learned, be aware of what could not be learned (the Soviets wrapped their chemical warfare program in a blanket of secrecy and disinformation), and clearly distinguish between the facts and my own assessments. Notwithstanding the complexity of the overall topic (various types of chemical weapons, delivery systems, doctrine for use, decontamination techniques, deliberate Soviet deceptions, etc.), it was sufficiently narrow that within a few months I was able to learn everything that was available from classified intelligence reports and open (unclassified) source material, and to gain an understanding of what remained hidden from view. Throughout the three years I was in the position, I never stopped working to refine my knowledge. Likewise, I had to learn to tailor what I presented and how that information was presented to accommodate the level of expertise of my audience.

Advising Across a Broad Area. My experience as a defense attaché was significantly different, particularly regarding expertise. More than 225 U.S. military personnel were assigned or attached to our diplomatic mission, but less than a dozen of them worked directly for me in the defense attaché office. The rest served in other offices scattered across the country and were not subordinate to me. A U.S. combatant command (and its subordinate component commands comprising tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines) was located in the country, but did not fall under the ambassador's authority. Both of the ambassadors for whom I worked made a point of turning to me, as the senior U.S. military officer on their embassy team, to answer *any* military-related question that arose. At this level, it was simply impossible to be the 'expert' on the details of all of the military programs that fell under the embassy, much less those that fell under the combatant commander. Nonetheless, the ambassador expected me to have (or find) the answer he needed to any military-related issue. His perception of my trustworthiness was not based on my personal expertise, but rather on the fact that I never presented him with information unless I knew it to be accurate, and was always willing to say 'I don't know' and then go get the answer from someone who did. In turn, I perceived that both ambassadors were trustworthy, in that they would provide me the authority necessary to do what they needed me to do, and support me when doing that required me to ruffle some feathers in the military bureaucracy. Another difference was that as the defense attaché, I not only 'advised up' to the ambassador or U.S. military leaders, but also 'advised sideways' to the other senior staff within the embassy, at the combatant command headquarters and back in the Pentagon, or in the host nation's military. Unlike during my first job as a junior officer working for the DIA Director, as a defense attaché I was called on to provide advice to *everyone* who needed information that I could provide. As had been the case 15 years earlier, I had to constantly tailor the information I presented to account for the level of expertise of my interlocutor.

Impact

My interest in advising at the national strategic level led me to select that as my area of research once I was admitted to the GWU doctoral program.